Yathartha Khyati Vada of Vishishtadvaita

Answers by Shri Kesava Rao Tadipatri


  
As a Vishishtadvaitin, I would like to point out that Swami Ramanuja's theory of illusion is defined as akhyAti samvalita yathArtha khyAti. The reason is that mere YathArtha KhyAti cannot account for all types of errors. For instance, mistaking the body as the Self is due to a non-apprehension of the difference between the Self and the body. There is no similar feature or pre-ponderence of one common element in the body and the Self.
KT: It cannot be called yathArtha khyAti. yathArtha is yathA vastu sthiti. Thus, yathArthakhyAti cannot account for any kind of errors. Vastu sthiti is something and one mistakes it for something else, that is anyathAkhyAti only. akhyAtisamvalitatva is resorted due to inability to explain the mistakenness. It is thus non- apprehension of the difference that always leads to mistakenness.
 
 The 'tejas' of silver occurs in shell.
KT: Not really. It is not the tejas, but just the color.
 
 It is not false, but a real element common to both silver and shell.
KT: Of course the fact that the person got confused or mistook is not false.
 
 It is not that silver itself is present in minute amounts, but rather, the lustre of silver is present in shell, and hence, one can say an aspect of silver itself in infinitesimal amounts.
KT: Not so. If someone's wife wears red saree and just because some one else wears red saree, one cannot say that the wife herself is present in infinitesimal amounts. There is scope for mistakenness and further analysis reveals the fact, which varies from case to case.
 
 In the case of mirage, heated sand particles manifest an element of ap (water), ie, shimmering. Only this aspect of water, ie, its shimmering quality, is present and not all qualities of water. This we can term as 'water in infinitesimal amounts'.
KT: Not at all. It is not shimmering, but apparent shimmering effect.
 
 The object of this is to prove that all cognition and knowledge is real,
KT: Which knowledge are we talking about?
In case of a person who mistook silverness in the shell has the knowledge of silver, but has no knowledge of the absence of silver in the shell. Thus
anirvachanIyatva cannot be attributed and full knowledge in this respect also cannot be attributed. Thus this mistakenness needs both the following things
1. Knowledge of silver and 2. Absence of knowledge of absence of silver in the shell.
A person (say X), who has no knowledge of silver does not mistake it for silver. A person(say Y), who has knowledge of silver and also who has knowledge of absence of silver in the shell also does not mistake it for silver. Though both X and Y do not mistake, we say that X has no proper knowledge, where as Y does.
Thus, to understand the difference between right and wrong knowledge, a deeper analysis is needed.
 
 The perception of shell as silver is erroneous, but nonetheless, real, because some element of silver is certainly present in shell.
KT: Not some element, but one of the properties, namely the color is there, which gives rise to mistakenness for a person, who uses only that. That is why 'parIkshitatva" is stressed so much. A blindman who depends on other methods like some sound test, or the like is not misguided as much as the person, who depends solely on the looks.
 
 Even Sruti posits that dreams are real, the objects are created by Isvara are real and are created for a real perception of the dreamer for karma -
'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and roads. There are no delights, no joys, no bliss; then he creates delights, joys, and bliss. There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes, and rivers. For he is the maker' (Brihadaranyaka Up.).
KT: Yes, the dreams are real, in the sense that those objects are made from vaasana-s and not the kind of matter we know of.
 
I am not fully comprehending the position of the yathArtha khyati vada for the perception of yellowness in objects by the jaundiced eye - I guess they attribute it to, the actual bile getting "real"ly flowing to/superimposed on the object for such a vision - a learned person can clarify this.  Close but needs trimming. The yellow bile affects the visual apparatus. There is a preponderance of yellowness, which completely masks the color of other objects. Hence, here too, perception is real and the error is due to a real cause. The effect, ie, yellow vision, is real as well. Other people do not have cognition of yellow bile, so they have right perception. Once again, in all these cases, an element of akhyAti is involved.
KT: It is anyathAkhyAti as explained above. A person, who is aware of yellowness caused by jaundice, knows about the absence of yellowness. The causes for mistakenness can be many, but it is mistakenness nevertheless.
 
 Refer Sri Bhashya for explanation of other examples. This and many other khyati vadas (such as akhyati vada, anyatha-khyati vada, asat khyati vada, sadasat khyati vada, the advaitin's anirvachanIya khyati vada) have all been shown to be erroneous by Sri Madhva and Sri JayatIrtha and the correct position termed by them as the "abhinava anyathA khyAti vada" has been propounded in dvaita philosophy.  No problems with that. The same has been done by VA scholars (except the last bit about abhinava anyathA khyAti!). All these vadas alone are pretty much incomplete explanations, but, akhyAti and yathArtha KhyAti together can offer a sound explanation of error.
KT: Two swords cannot go in one sheath. There is no yathArthakhyAti in the sense he saw yathArtha. The aspect that the person mistook is yathArtha and that no school denies in case of the person, who really mistook it.
 
 However, a point about 'refutations' is that often, the scholar is influenced by his own ideas/interpretations and overlooks the context that another school takes. An example is a recent posting of some gentleman here in this list regarding 'nitya suris'. It was quite an interesting point:
KT: The context of the original scripture is what the context of the school should be and not vice versa.
 
To add to that the concept of nityamuktas is rejected by the following statement of Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: ato.anyad Artam, which says that everything other than Brahman is 'ArtaM' i.e. subject to misery.  And proceeds to state that this means everything other than Vishnu is in a state of misery at some point (therefore disproving nitya-muktatva). However, the VA interpretation of this verse is not along these lines, but rather that every goal other than Brahman is misery. A person may have a goal to accumulate wealth, enjoy material pleasures or enjoy the bliss of his own Self (which is a VA doctrine; no need to go into detail). The Upanishad simply stresses that all these goals are plagued by miseries ...
KT: That is not at all the conext of the upanishad. Please read the entire ushastabrAhmaNa to see the context.
This is not about what the goal should be. Firstly, missing the context, an incorrect interpretation was given and then several examples are given to
justify such an explanation.
Also note that the context is not about sAdhakas. There is no mention of any goals here. Ushasta asks yAjnavalkya - "In case of cow or horse, we say 'this is cow, this is horse'; in case of parabrahma, tell me what is unique about Him; what sets him apart".
In such a context, to say that "everyone else has misery; but not Him" makes lot more sense than to say "every goal other than Him is misery".
Also note - Artam = duHkhi = subject to misery; Arti = duHkhaM = misery.
If misery is what is meant then it should have been "ato.anyadArti" and not "ato.anyadArtaM"
Also Shri MadhvAcharya gives another beautiful pointer.
ato.nyad = viShNoranyad ArtaM | a iti viShNorhi nAma |
 
It is well known that "a" is the name for viShNu. Thus ataH means viShNoH (a + taH ; like deshataH).
 
Also, in the same passge, the Lord is described as One, who experiences directly wthout anyone else's help thru terms like "sAkShAt", "aparokShAt". The word "ad" also indicates that meaning and so the word ataH = ad + taH (like jagat + taH = jagataH).
He alone is called "a" = adoSha = flawless and everyone else is "sadoSha" and touched by misery before attaining mukti.
 
 Even granting the interpretation, it does not disprove nitya muktas, as we could just exclude nitya suris and muktas from the verse (since anyone in vaikunta is never subject to misery). In such a case, even that interpretation shows that Brahman is enjoyed in moksha, which is again consistent with VA.
KT: The same trap. No one is talking about the state after reaching VaikuNTha. The duHkhasparsha at any time is flaw only.
 
Also Acharya quotes from bR^ihachhruti - "yadyapyete guNAH sarve viShNoreva na chAnyagAH tathApyete guNairyuktAnaj~nAH prAhuH shivAdikAn | ...ato.nye sarva eva tu brhmarudrAdayo jIvAH duHkhinaH
tatprasAdataH duHkhamuktA nijAnandaM prApnuyur... tasyaiva muktAH vipluT sukhAtmakAH | tAratamyena tiShTanti brahmA teShvadhikaH sadA |"
"All these qualities (like independence, ever bliss) are present only in Vishnu(ever happiness in Lkshmi also being His consort). Even so, ignorant ones
attribute these qualities to others like Shiva. Only Vishnu is adoSha. All the others are touched by sorrow and get liberated thru His grace. They get
infinitesimally little grace compared to Sri Hari. Even there they stay with gradation and among them Brahma is highest."
 
 I might add that BNK Sharma's observation that VA has not provided pramanas for doctrines like Lakshmi's mediatorship, nitya muktas, etc. are also erroneous.
KT: When Dvaita scholars say that there are no pramaNa-s, it only means that there are no "niravakAsha pramAnas". Here it is not a question of interpretation, but it is a question of unequivocal statement. The very approach that the proof is in statements like "sadA pashyanti sUrayaH" shows out the flaw. This
statement itself does not mention GaruDa and Shesha. Thi spiece is taken from here and linked with Garuda and Shesha. On what basis?
 
 Srimad Ramayana houses most of the pramanas (along with some pancharatric material), and has been elaborated by Sri Thirukkurugaip-piran-pillan, Sri Kandadai Andan, Sri Vedanta Desikan, Sri Lokacharya, etc. Of course, I am not inviting debate here, because Dvaita may interpret it differently, but simply pointing out that all aspects of VA have been addressed.
KT: Is there one single pramANa, which says that Garuda and Shesha are nityamukta-s?
 
 Jaya Tirtha argues that YathArtha KhyAti is a fanciful reasoning, and that a remote causal phenomenon such as the combination of elements cannot be used as an excuse. If so, it would be possible to mistake shell for so many other things and not just silver.
KT: Not at all. Otoh, if yathArthakhyAti were true, then everyone should mistake a shell for silver. That is not true.
 
 The idea is that we do not say silver is in shell, but only an aspect of silver, which imparts a likeness between shell and silver, thus making one say that silver is in infinitesimal amounts.
KT: No, it does not have even infinitesimal amount.
 
 For instance, set 1 has a, b, c. Set 2 has a, d, e. Since set 2 has a, which belongs to set 1, ...
KT: That is flawed example. In maths, such sets are possible. But in real world, it is not. Here set 2 can have a', d, e (where a' resembles a). Thus a person, who is not looking at b, c, d and e and looking at only a' and mistaking it for a.
 
one can say set 1 is an infinitesimal part of set 2 or vice versa.
KT: No, not at all.
 
We do not say the entire composition of silver is present.
KT: Not even one composition of silver is present.
 
Similarly, we need not mistake shell for other objects, as the actual error is due to memory of silver and non-apprehension of difference between the memory and the current perception (akhyAti).
KT: Pls see the explanation given at the beginning.
 
It cannot be called yathArtha khyAti. yathArtha is yathA vastu sthiti. Thus yathArthakhyAti cannot account for any kind of errors. Vastu sthiti is some thing and one mistakes it for something else, that is anyathAkhyAti only. akhyAtisamvalitatva is resorted due to inability to explain the mistakenness. It is thus non-apprehension of the difference that always leads to mistakenness.
Yes. And that is all it says. Error is the non-apprehension of the difference between the two, which is akhyati. That is all VA says as well.
KT: No, That is not all VA says.
 
Please read my earlier statement.
KT: which is "Swami Ramanuja's theory of illusion is defined as akhyAti samvalita yathArtha khyAti". We cannot have a falsehood covered truth or truth covered falsehood.
 
 YathArtha KhyAti cannot account for all kinds of errors.
KT: Two issues.
 
1. YathArtha KhyAti cannot account for any kind of error. Only akhyati or anythAkhyAti can account for errors.
2. Here we are not talking about all kinds of things. Here the topic/issue is only one thing "apparent silverness in the shell".
 
Sri Ramanuja’s object is to prove that whatever is cognized is real, and not unreal.
KT: That is exactly how adviata proceeds and comes up with "sadasadviveka/mithya" of several flavors.
 
For that, he uses both AkhyAti and YathArtha KhyAti.
KT: Thus going parallel to the path of Advaita.
 
However, YathArtha KhyAti itself has an element of akhyAti.
KT: No, it does not.
 
In other words, yathArtha KhyAti itself leads to akhyAti as the final definition of error.
KT: No, it does not.
 
YathArtha simply explains the cognition and object of cognition as real.
KT: No, yathArtha does not explain the cognition. The person who cognizes it either corectly or wrongly explains his own cognition. The explanation does not change yathArtha.
 
And in some cases, its just akhyAti.
KT: That is a total self-contradiction.
 
 Not really. It is not the tejas, but just the color.
 Call it color, brightness or tejas. However , the similarity is due to an aspect of one element in other, and hence, it is apprehension of a real thing.
KT: Similarity is not the sameness. Apprehension is not actuality. VA does the same blunder in "paramaM sAmyaM" as well. As long as the confusion between similarity and sameness does not go, the clarity cannot occur.
 
Take set 1. It has a, b, c. Take set 2. It has a, d, e.
KT: You are doing the same mistake again. You are mixing the math concept without thinking reality. Let me give you an example. Finger is part of your body.
Finger is also part of your hand. So, both your body and hand share your finger. Your neighbor has a finger, and you have a finger. You cannot say both and your neighbor share the finger. You cannot even say that infinitesimal amount of your neighbor is in you or vice versa. Got it? Just because the color of silver and shell are the same, you cannot say 'infinitesimal...' and the percentages are meaningless too. Can you say 1 % of your neighbor's body is present in 1% of yours?
 
Similarly, we do not say the ENTIRE silver is present. Lustre/color is just one quality of silver, and it may constitute 1% of the basic substance of silver. So, 1% of silver is present in shell, which also has this property. If we say this color/luster is 1% of shell, then we say 1% of silver is present in 1% of shell.
KT: See the above example of finger. Just because the colors are addressed as the same, you cannot say the samething is present there.
 
Mordern days allow us to use a bit of mathematics.
KT: Sure. I love mathematics. One must know how to use it. Otherwise the logic will boomerang.
 
Quite easily proven.
KT: And quite easily disproven too.
 
This is what VA says when an ‘aspect of silver’ is in infinitesimal amounts.
KT: No, It is not.
 
If we take ‘a’ as luster (or color) and set 1 as silver, then one can say 1/3 set 1 is in set 2.
KT: See the above example of finger. Just imagine -
"If we take 'a' as finger (or hand) and set 1 as you, then, one can say 1/100 or 1/10 set 1 is in set 2 (your neighbor)".
 
Thus, apprehension of the silver is the apprehension of what is really present.
KT: No, it is not. What is really present is "shellness" only. There is absolutely no silverness (just as there is absolutely no body of yours in your
neighbor's, though both of you have fingers, hands and legs, etc)
 
Inability to differentiate between silver and aspect of silver in shell is the error.
KT: If the twins look alike, people mistake, that does not mean one's body parts are present in the other.
Infact here the closeness is much more striking than silver and shell.
 
Not so. If someone's wife wears red saree and just because some one else wears red saree, one cannot say that the wife herself is present in infinitesimal amounts. There is scope for mistakenness and further analysis reveals the fact, which varies from case to case.
 Indeed. AkhyAti alone is taken. No school denies that the final cause of error is non-apprehension of the difference between the two
KT: And yet goes on arguing that it is not there and yet it is there in infinitesimal parts.
 
namely, two women in similar dress. Also, the error is resolved when you cannot interact with the red dressed woman in the same practical way as your red dressed wife.
KT: Irrespective of how you react, the fact is the fact. Even if you mistake, the truth cannot change.
 
That is why Sri Ramanuja states that in some cases like body/self analogy, akhyAti is preferred and yathArtha is not needed.
KT: That is where it is wrong. Yathartha is always needed. Even in case of body/self analogy, for a charvaka, the khyAti and yathArtha differ. For a spiritual person, the yathArtha comes as khyAti. Why is akhyAti preferred?
 
There is no need to say 'I mistook this woman as my wife, so wifeness is unreal' because the object of perception, namely the woman in a red dress is real.
KT: In the same way, the object of perception, namely the shell is real.
 
In the case of shell/silver example, the final cause of error is actually non apprehension of the difference between silver and the aspect of silver in shell.
KT: Whether it is final cause, or intermediate cause or starting cause, the error is error. There should not be embellishment of truth of any kind.
 
The aspect of silver in shell cannot be put to practical use because of it being present in slight amounts (alpatva)
KT: No slight amounts. It is not present. Period.
 
whereas, silver can be used for ornaments.
KT: That may be your reasoning. Your inability to use is not the reason for its absence. The absence is the reason for your inability to use.
 
The error becomes known when one understands this difference.
KT: Even if one does not understand, the difference is there. Remember svataH prAmANya.
 
Not at all. It is not shimmering, but apparent shimmering effect. Nonetheless, the cognition and the effect are real.
KT: Partial statements are ambiguous. The fact is that the person cognized shell as silver. The fact is that the shell is not silver. The effect is that the
person got confused. Note that a person who has never seen silver and who has no knowledge of silver can not mistake shell as silver as he does not know what silver is.
 
The sole reason for mistaking a mirage as water is because of this real effect of shimmering produced by sand particles. Water also shimmers. Using earlier arguments, an aspect of water is present in infinitesimal amounts.
KT: Same mistake. See the above example of finger and hand.
 
Nobody denies that shimmering was actually seen.
KT: It is similar to a jaundiced person seeing every thing as yellow. The flaws are of many kinds.
 
The error lies in non-apprehension of difference between shimmering mirage and shimmering water and the fact that the mirage cannot be put to the same use as water.
KT: Even if you fail to see the difference, they are different. Your apprehension or non-apprehension has nothing to do with the actual fact. The fact is still a fact.
 
If you argue that mirage is an unreal optical illusion, then please see the examples of double vision leading to two moons being seen, or a rotating
firebrand.
KT: It does not matter if you bring hundred such examples (for analysis of those examples, pls see the "upAdhikhandana" of Sri Madhvacharya), they all go under the same category.
Your inability is your inability. The fact is the fact.
 
Sri Ramanuja explains how the object cognised even in optical illusions is real in the Sri Bhashya.
KT: That is where the point is missed. That is why it has been refuted, where it went wrong.
 
 And you agree that the property is cognised, which makes the object of perception real.
KT: You are missing the point and going in wrong direction. Of course, the shell is real, but not the silverness in the shell.
 
So, by seeing a lustre/color, one thinks he sees silver, when it is really shell.
KT: Finally you got it. "It is really shell".
 
As mentioned before, there is no need to say he saw something unreal.
KT: Definitely not. He saw real shell. But he did not see real silver. You are creating confusion to yourself with partial statements.
 
Often, an object is never cognised, although it leads to action. By perceiving the shine of a gem, one can attempt an action to pick up a gem. The actual object is not perceived, is it?
KT: Is it?
 
The property itself is one of the basic constituents of silver. Let me give an example. Chemical A is blue, and Chemical B is blue. Blueness may be
due to an ingredient, say, methylene blue, which is common to both A and B. But A and B differ in other properties, do they not? A may be poisonous like arsenic, B may be sweet like saccharine. Thus, error is due to a non-apprehension of the difference between the two due to a common element, ie, methylene blue. If methylene blue constitutes 1% of A, then 1% of A is in B, making one say that an aspect of A is in B.
KT: Take the above example of finger. Methylene is like finger (or hand). Would you say 1 % of your body is in your neighbor's or vice versa?
 
Not at all. Otoh, if yathArthakhyAti were true, then everyone should mistake a shell for silver. That is not true.
 Nope. Only those who have a prior cognition of silver but have no cognition of the actual object, ie, shell, would mistake it. A person with good discrimination can spot shell.
KT: Precisely. So, don't call it as yathArthakhyAti. It is anyathakhyAti only.
 
 The idea is that akhyAti is also involved,
KT: No it is not and that is what Sri Ramanuja is missing. The blunder VA is committing is that it is using partial statements and creating self-confusion.
 
 which Sri Jaya Tirtha misses.
KT: No, he hit the nail right on the head. In the shell-silverness, one real thing is mistaken for another thing that is not there in the same object.
 
 The defect is in sense organs of the person who has poor discriminatory abilities.A person with good eyesight will make no error.
KT: Precisely. Why do you pass on your defects to the actual objects saying "yathArthakhyAti", while it is not?
 
No, it does not have even infinitesimal amount. Yes it does.
KT: No, it does not. If it does, you got to explain your finger and your neighbor's finger too.
 
 In the example you gave, you say a resembles a' and hence, the mistake is due to a resemblance. In which case, a' itself had some quality of a that
caused the mistake. So, if a' had, say, 0.3% a, then one can say 0.3% of a, which is 0.3% of 1/3rd of set 1, is present in set 2.
KT: Your finger resembles your neighbor's finger and so what percentage you two will share?
 
 If an object resembles another, it 1) needs to have an aspect of the other object in it,
KT: Again your finger resembles your neighbor's finger and so how much you two share?
 
 or 2) error is due to simple akhyAti (mistaking the body as the Self).
KT: Again see charvaka and spiritualist.
 
 Mathematically, it stands to reason that an infinitesimal amount of an aspect of silver is present in shell. ‘Infinitesimal’ is the key word.
KT: Is it? Then you say infinitesimal part of your body is in your neighbor's and vice versa.
 
Yes, the dreams are real, in the sense that those objects are made from vaasana-s and not the kind of matter we know of
 That is the idea. Here, one can attribute any error to akhyAti, meaning non-apprehension of the difference between temporary objects in dream and permanent objects in reality, and the practical use of the two. Sri Ramanuja never says YathArtha KhyAti accounts for all errors, but simply that either akhyAti or akhyAti samvalita YathArtha KhyAti is enough to explain all errors.

KT:Again that is the blunder Sri Ramanuja is committing. First of all, there is no escape to claim "all kinds of errors". Let us just take current example
rather than wandering. There is no yatharthakhyAti at all. Your "infenitesimal theory" will be a thorn in the bed.
 
 Dvaita, thus, needs to admit that no element of unreality is involved in objects perceived,
KT: You have not understood Dvaita here. The shell is real. The presence of silverness is unreal. Thus VA is forced to admit its flawed statement "that no element of unreality is involved in objects perceived".
 
 which is what Sri Ramanuja terms as ‘Vaidika’, as followed by Tanka, Dramida, Bodhayana, etc. All objects perceived are real.
KT: Of course, the shell is real. That is why I warned, giving partial statements will only lead to confusion.
 
 One can use either AkhyAti or AkhyAti Samvalita YathArtha KhyAti and there is no need for anyathA KhyAti or its variants.

KT: That is exactly what one must avoid.
 
A person, who is aware of yellowness caused by jaundice, knows about the absence of yellowness. The causes for mistakenness can be many, but it is mistakenness nevertheless.
 Is the yellow color unreal or absent? It is present, but it does not belong to the object.
KT: That is exactly where VA is failing. Just because the silver in the shop is real, it does not mean that the silverness in the shell is real. Just because
the yellow color elsewhere is real, it does not mean the yellow color in the object (which is not yellow) is real. While VA says "it does not belong to the
object", it fails to understand that properly.
 
 The error here is the non-apprehension of the difference between yellowness and the object. Just like when a white object is covered with pink cloth, one says ‘I see a pink object’. Thus, even here, the object of perception is real in so much that one sees an object whose color is masked by yellow bile, and error is due to non-apprehension of the difference between yellow bile and object (akhyAti).

KT: See the amount of confusion you are creating to yourself. Of course, all the objects are real. The pink cloth is real, and it is pink. The white object is
real and is white. You are confused that the white object is pink. Thus the pinkness in the white object is not real. No matter how you look at, your
confusion is your confusion, and the real object is real object.
 
 The presence of ‘yellow object’ is denied as real but the reality of yellow and object is not denied. The error, thus, is not apprehension of
something unreal, but an incapability to differentiate two distinct reals.
KT: That is precisely what is anyathAkhyAti - mistaking one real for another real.
 
I'd just like you to understand that we do not use pancha bhuta karana for all examples.
KT: If silver and shell are not part of panchabhutas what are they? If panchbhutas are not used, then you will be deprived of the panchatanmatra-s as well, which are shabda, sparsha, rasa, rUpa and gandha. Remember you are using rUpa in shell/silver.
 
 Only YathArtha and AkhyAti is used for some, whereas pancha bhuta karana can be used to explain YathArtha in others.
KT: That is complete self-contradiction. How can you have yathArtha and AkhyAti, without using panchabhutas and panchtanmatra-s?
 
 In one of my posts, I accidentally wrote 'Sri Ramanuja does not use yathArtha for all'. This is a genuine mistake and I apologise. I meant to say 'Sri Ramanuja does not use pancha bhuta karana for all examples'.
KT: That is fine. Ordinary mortals do make mistakes. Your move for correction is like going from frying pan to fire. Here he is using panchbhUtakAraNa-s only.

Pancha Bhuta Karana is seeing aspect of one element in another. It is confined to a few examples like shell/silver, mirage, etc.
KT: Isn't the main discussion about shell/silver?
 
 In other cases like double moon vision or rotating firebrand, Sri Ramanuja justifies YathArtha using other means.
KT: Even here, the moon is panchbhUtAtmaka only and the vision is tanmAtra only.
 
AkhyAti explains the cause of error, whereas YathArtha explains that the object perceived, and cognition is real.
KT: You are not listening. The shell is real, but not the cognition of silver in there. Until you listen, it won't be clear to you.
 
which is "Swami Ramanuja's theory of illusion is defined as akhyAti samvalita yathArtha khyAti". We cannot have a falsehood covered truth or truth covered falsehood. That statement was meant for all examples.
KT: And that cannot go for any example.
 
 Please read the Sri Bhashya.
KT: Please read Nyayasudha and you have answers for Sri Bhashya.
 
 There are varying explanations for different examples and all use YathArtha and AkhyAti.
KT: All do not use the same approach. Sri Ramanuja did not agree with Sri Sankara.
 
 In some examples like shell/silver and mirage, pancha bhuta karana is used. It is not used in others.
KT: As long as you are confined in samsAra, you have no choice, but to use panchabhUta karaNa and panchatanmAtra for any pratyakSha based items. Hope you understand that.
 
 No ‘falsehoods’ here.
KT: The presence of silver in the shell is false only.
 
 You did not comprehend my earlier statement.
KT: Quite well and that is why I am showing the flaws in there.
 
 I mentioned that Sri Ramanuja does use YathArtha for every example.
KT: No one questions using yathArtha. The question is which is yathartha and which is not.
 
 In the case of dreams, yathArtha is involved.
KT: Again same thing. The question is not whether yathArtha is involved. The question is which is yathArtha.
 
 What I said was that Sri Ramanuja uses pancha bhuta karana for some examples, and not for others.
KT: As long as in samsAra, for every pratyaksha example, you got to use panchabhUta. No way out.
 
 Jaya Tirtha argues solely against YathArtha,
KT: You are thoroughly mistaken. yathartha j~nAna is utmost important. When ayathArthaj~nAna is there, that has to be pointed out, no matter who says that.
 
 and even assumes that Swami Ramanuja uses only YathArtha and Pancha Bhuta Karana for every example. Not so.
KT: Then you are going from frying pan to fire. It is not a question of assuming. How can any VA speak of pratyaksha, without using panchabhUta karaNa?
 
 Examples like Yellow Vision, Dreams etc. are AkhyAti and YathArtha as well.
KT: AkhyAti and YathArtha can be spoken of only with the help of panchbhUta. Remember even mind is jaDa.
 
 Vishishtadvaita is perfectly clear and honest about this.
KT: There is no question of honesty or dishonesty here. Deficiency of thinking is not dishonesty, but not accepting the deficiency is dishonesty. VA has serious drawback here.
 
 1. YathArtha KhyAti cannot account for any kind of error. Only akhyati or anythAkhyAti can account for errors. Anyatha is redundant.
KT: It is unavoidable.
 
 As you yourself admitted, error involves cognition of a property.
KT: I strongly advised against partial statements. Error involves cognition of a property that is not there. In other words, if a vyApti is made erroneously either as avyApti or ativyApti, that is in error. I strongly recommend you to study prAmANa LakShana of Sri Madhva and PramAnapaddhati of Sri Jayatirtha.
 
 The entire substrate need not be cognized.
KT: You are missing the point again. The critical, conclusive and unambiguous aspects need to be cognized. Need not be entire.
 
 Hence, cognition of a property means cognition of a real thing, and there is no need to perceive the whole substrate or object, as anyathA assumes.
KT: The shell is of course real. No one is saying entire. If critical, conclusive and unambiguous aspects are not cognized, you end up with "anyathA" only. No assumption is involved here.
 
 Neither is the cognition unreal.
KT: Whatever is your cognition, the silverness in the shell is unreal.
You are going into a loop and repeating the same faulty statements again and again.
 
 Sri Ramanuja is very systematic in his approach.
KT: Every school is systematic only. Things can also be systematically wrong.
 
 This is a misunderstanding of yours.
KT: No, that is misunderstanding of VA. The very inability to understand the unavoidability of panchabhUta karaNa in pratyAkSha is a serious handicap.
 
 You have assumed that we use the panchabhuta karana for every example.
KT: You wish you use that. If not it is like jumping from frying pan to fire.
 
No, yathArtha does not explain the cognition. The person who cognizes it either corectly or wrongly explains his own cognition. The explanation does not change yathArtha.
 Again, this is a total misunderstanding. The person cognizes the color correctly, does he not? He sees the color and goes, ‘its white/bright, like
silver’.
KT: Gottcha! Now it is clear which is the misunderstanding. There is nothing wrong in saying "its white/bright, like silver". What is wrong is in saying "It is silver because its white/bright".
 
 Hence, the cognition of white (which is an aspect of silver) is clearly correct. What is wrong is that, based on prior memory of silver, he assumes that the object is really silver.

KT: Now you must be very sure as to how you are confusing yourself. Because of this you are going into infinite loop and repeating the same.
To perceive self-contradictions in your statements -
Quote -
"...one can say that my neighbor and I possess a similar gene makeup due to pancha bhutakarana. However, this similarity is not big enough to cause error.
In silver/shell case, it is. Similarly, we say an infinitesimal portion of some elements that make up the basic substance of silver is present in shell."
Unquote.
Though you and your neighbor either for a genetic similarity or what ever, possess head, hands, chest, legs, etc. but that is not big enough? Otoh, 'the
infinitesimal portion of silver present in shell' is big enough?
If it is infinitesimal, then how can it be big enough?
 

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