Panchabheda

By:  Shri Prasanna Tadipatri 

Painting by Smt.Vani Rao, Baton Rouge,LA

Sri Madhvacharya's doctrine of Panchabheda.
I will try and utilize as much of what I learned as possible, but the ideas are not taken from any particular book/text (though I'll quote wherever I can).
   
    In this world, there are many types of views. On one extreme we see the materialist view, which denies the existence of anything beyond what we perceive, jIvas (souls), Narayana (God), these are thought of as being merely beliefs, though they are illusory, people still believe in them, such is their view.  On the other extreme, we see the monist view that accepts the existence of Atman --equating it both with the embodied jIva (soul) as well as Brahman. According to them, the world around us is illusory, but because of our ignorance, we don't realize this, until moksha.

Of course, no atheist would ever agree to such a blunt statement of the materialist view, nor would any Advaitin say that I'm doing justice in giving such a pUrvapaksha, but Sri Madhvacharya's view stands in stark contrast to both of these views.

    Sri Madhvacharya's philosophy of Tattvavada affirms the existence of

1)the physical world (there are illusions around us of course, but we recognize the distinction between the appearance of water on a hot road, and actual water--the fact that we can distinguish the two itself shows that the latter is real)

2) the class of embodied souls (as DesCartes, another dualist, put it--"I think therefore I am"--we can doubt the existence of anything we want, but that thinking self, that is real)

3)Narayana, sarvaguNa sampUrNa, sarva doSha vivarjita, creator, sustainer & destroyer of all this, as stated clearly in the Gita.

At first glance it seems strange that one would ever state identity between these, or negate the existence of any of this. Newton's argument for the existence of God was very simple--"in the absence of any other proof, the thumb alone would convince me of God's existence." For such a great scientist like Newton (the founder of calculus), science was not at odds with religion; rather, his study of science reaffirmed his faith in God.

    Moving into the realm of shAstra, there are beautiful verses in the Gita that not only affirm the existence of all 3, but the distinction between them as well:

  "UttamaH puruShastvanyaH paramAtmetyudAhrtaH |
  Yo loka trayam aaviShya bibhartyavya IshvaraH || " (Chapter 15--verse17)

The supreme being (Purusha) is known as ParamAtma, he who enters the 3 worlds and supports them. How can any commentary of this verse get around the existence of multiple entities--would Narayana support an illusory world?

A topic like the doctrine of Panchabheda, presenting various pUrvapaksha-s, is a very very deep topic. I'll try and bring up as many points as I can on it. Please forgive any errors on my part.

The distinctions which I hope to cover in future postings are:
1) jada-jada bheda (distinction between one physical object & another)
2) jiva -jiva bheda  (distinction between one individual or soul & another)
3) jada-jiva bheda (distinction between body & soul, physical world & non-physical souls)
4) jada-paramatma bheda (distinction between the unintelligent matter, and omniscient Narayana)
5) jiva-paramatma bheda (distinction between the embodied soul/self, and supreme soul/self)

Of course explaining these distinctions rests on the existence of all 3 --jiva, jada, and paramatma. So I'll try and present the best arguments I can for the existence of each, relying on pratyaksha (perception), anumana (logic), and agama (scripture) as evidence.

According to Dvaita philosophy as expounded by Sri Madhvacharya, what exists can be divided into 2 categories--svatantra (independent, it doesn't exist/function because of something else) and asvatantra (dependent: deriving its existence, functioning from something else). In the first category(svatantra) is Narayana alone. As the Vedas state "tena vina trnamapi na chalati"--without him (Vishnu), not even a blade of grass can move. The second category, those things that depend on Narayana, include everything else. Of course, this can be divided again--cetana (sentient) and acetana (insentient). Sentient beings include you and me (difference between body & soul will be in part 4)--those things which are capable of "knowing". The physical world around us is insentient. So we see in this "tattvavada", Sri Madhvacharya has neatly divided the whole sum of existence into these distinct categories. Another name for a-cetana is jada. In this posting,

I'll focus on this category: Jada. 
 So as mentioned above, the 2 important traits of "jada" are 

1)it is not svatantra, or independent. That is, even though we see the world around us apparently functioning on its own, we should realize that there is a hidden cause behind the functioning of all this. Perhaps when we were little and we hear about Krishna being unarmed in the Mahabharata War, we may wonder--how did Krishna defend himself? However with the understanding that this entire physical world, this is all dependent on Krishna, then it makes sense--weapons, etc, can do nothing to Krishna, it is actually the other way around--it is actually His will that makes those weapons exist & function. So this is one characteristic of the physical world. 

2)the second characteristic is that anything in this category of jada is insentient--it isn't conscious, it doesn't have the ability to "know". It may seem obvious to point out that things which are made of matter are not conscious, but you'd be surprised, many people, though they understand that things like rocks and stones, or even the flesh that makes up our bodies is not sentient, they often attribute the brain, just a collection of molecules, with the ability to "know" or "be aware". The distinction between the physical body and the soul, again, I'll cover in a future posting. 

    Well if you notice me having a bit of difficulty quantifying what is Jada, the reason should be obvious, not only does it include all the physical things around us--any substance composed of those elements in the Table of Elements, but also, those beyond the grasp of the senses--Prakriti (the "stuff" that is used to create this world), avyakrta Akasha (space), kAla (time), Mahattattva, Ahankara tattva. Some of these, like space & time, we have a grasp of, even though they're not perceived through our regular senses. Others, like Prakriti, Mahattatva, we know through Shastra--we don't directly perceive them through our senses, but they too are part of this category of acetana. It is interesting to note the parallels between Indian philosophy and Western science. While doing sandhyAvandana, we are all familiar with the expression 

"pR^thivyApastejovAyurAkasha"--pr^thvi (earth), aapas (water), tejo (fire), vAyu (wind), AkAsha (air). 

The 3 states of matter that we divide matter into are solid (corresponding to pr^thvi), liquid (corresponding to Apas), and gas (corresponding to AkAsha). There is a verse in the Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata (I don't remember which)that, uses "cheShTa" or activity as a synonym for "Vayu".These states of matter are in motion--there are various physical forces acting on them & that they exert on each other, and this "cheShTa" is what is referred to as "Vayu". In addition to matter, there is energy( tejas ). So the 3 states of matter, their motion, plus energy (correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe this is what is referred to as the panchabhUtas--5 elements), to many materialists, this is the whole sum of existence, but in Indian philosophy, this is just a very small part of what exists.  The only major difficulty encountered I think is that whereas we know that matter can change from one state to another, and that energy & matter are equivalent,  in this concept of panchabhutas--each element, "pR^thivyApastejovAyurAkasha", is thought of as being distinct. How do we reconcile this concept of bheda with what we know in science?

    Now I can move on to the distinction between jaDa-jaDa. This is actually more complicated to explain that it may first appear. The biggest obstacle that we face is defining what an object is. A mango for example, is composed of the skin of the fruit, the seed, and the fleshy part. From chemistry, each of those is a collection of molecules, which are composed of atoms. Even those atoms are not single objects, they're composed of several objects, like protons, etc. Ok, we'll stop there, but when we hear of "jada-jada bheda"--there is a difference between one object and another, can you see the difficulty that can arise?

1)Do we define the whole mango as a single object? Do we not consider the seed & the skin objects? Then what happens when we take the mango apart, have we suddenly created new "objects"?

2)Or, do we consider each and every single atom (actually each part of an atom) to be a separate object? Then in that case, there is no single "mango" object--just a collection of several objects (atoms).

    So, obviously without precisely defining what we mean by one object and another it's hard to explain what "jada-jada bheda" exactly means. Philosophers delight in this kind of nitpicky logic. As one example in my philosophy class, consider 3 balls. How many objects are there? One philosopher responded 7. Why? Well, you have 3 balls, then you have each pair of balls, that's 3 more objects (why not? We consider a collection of atoms to be a single object), finally you have all 3 balls together forming another object--3+3+1 for a total of 7 objects. Weird as it sounds, it brings across the difficulty of saying what exactly we mean by an "object."

    I think by this point I've thoroughly confused myself and others in trying to explain "jada-jada bheda", but this difficulty won't be there for the other 4 "bhedas". Why? Because jIva and paramAtma cannot be subdivided any further. They are a complete whole. Remember the difficulty we had with the example above? We don't know whether to think of the whole mango as being 1 single object, or whether each part of the mango is a separate object--this needs to be clarified before we can talk about the distinction between one object and another!

    Though I haven't studied many different views in Indian philosophy, I know there have been lengthy discussions on "amsa" and "amsin", part & whole. I request the learned members of the forum to explain "jada-jada bheda" better than I can, by first explaining what precisely is meant by a single "jada".

First of all, if you haven't already, I would urge everyone to read K. Krishna's reply to Jada-jada bheda. It gives an *excellent* answer to some of the questions I raised about how exactly you define jada-jada bheda by splitting bheda into svajAtiya, vijAtiya and svagata bheda. So if I understand correctly, these types of "differences" depend on how we define the world--we can define the objects as fine as we want (even to the atomic level), and then categorize the difference as belonging to one of those 3 categories.
    Now, moving on to jIva, Madhvacharya defines it very simply as "ahamiti yo vedyaH sa eva jIvaH"  (correct me if the quote isn't exact). That which is known as I, that is what is called jIva. In the West, DesCartes has come up with an interesting reason that regardless of what we doubt the existence of, we cannot doubt our own existence--perhaps you've all heard the famous "I think, therefore I am".

    Why can't we doubt the existence of that "self"? Say, for argument's sake, this desk or this table is illusory (such would be the position of Advaita, Buddhism, but I won't delve into it here)--there is something affected by that illusion, correct? There's something that *thinks* the table is there, correct (when, for the sake of argument, that table is not there)? Now, we run into a problem if this thinking self doubts its own existence--if, for argument's sake, I *think* I exist, but in reality I don't, we have a paradox--because then, what is doing the thinking. It's a bit strange to grasp this logic--but in essence, that's the meaning of DesCarte's "I think therefore I am"--we must absolutely accept the existence of some thinking self, at the bare minimum. Some would take that as common sense--"oh, of course I know I exist"--but there are schools of thought "nairAtmya"-that deny the existence of the self. The argument above can be offered in response.

    In any case, having established the reality of the self (it's this that's referred to as jIva), next comes the question of whether there are many selfs, or if we're all a part of one self. That is, is there a distinction among us, or not? Of course, **any** school of thought, Advaita included, will say that yes, on the surface, it **seems** as though we are all distinct from one another, but then they'd say that in reality we are not. If the Advaita position is true, then it raises some very difficult questions about karma. Karma, simply put is just the past actions done by an individual (from the root kr=to do), be they in this lifetime, or previous lifetimes. If we accept a distinction among souls, then each individual soul can be held  responsible for its own actions. If however on the other hand, there is no distinction, then how are we able to answer the question of karma? One person does a good deed, another does a bad deed, with a distinction between the two, one can be rewarded, the other punished. If they are one and the same soul? In a school that only accepts the existence of one entity--Atman =the Self, there is no scope for such a distinction. 

    To get around this problem, one explanation offered is that yes on a practical (vyAvahArika) level, such a distinction has to be made, but in reality (pAramArthika) no such distinction exists. So perhaps the rewards and punishments themselves are not real--this could be one possible pUrvapaksha argument.Then it that case, we end up with an even more difficult situation--all the rewards and punishments meted out to individuals become illusory!
    Another argument I've heard involves a play on the word difference (and its Sanskrit counterpart--bheda). One meaning is just a simple distinction--this object is not that object. Another meaning is rivalry or discord. So, one might argue, if we advocate difference among each other then that may lead to fighting/discord. If there's unity (unity in the sense that I am you--you are me--there are no distinctions), then whatever happens to you affects me as well. So with this kind of an "aikya" attitude--I wouldn't do any harm to others, because they ARE me--there is identity between this person and that person. Again, if you haven't heard this kind of reasoning, it may be a little hard to grasp, but in essence, yes if someone has an attitude that there is just one self and we are all a part of that Self, then yes they would treat others **literally** just the way they treat themselves.

    However, let's see how a dualist would approach this problem. Yes, there are distinct jIva-s. But simply because you are a different individual from me doesn't mean that it would lead to some kind of rivalry (so, make sure we distinguish between the 2 meanings of "bheda"--a distinction among souls is accepted, but not the other meaning of difference--rivalry). Then what feeling of "unity" is there for the dualist? There is unity in the sense that we are all God's children--there is a Bhagavad Gita verse where Krishna says that that person is jnani (enlightened) who sees Krishna *IN* everything--

    vidya-vinaya-sampanne
    brahmane gavi hastini
    suni caiva sva-pake ca
    panditah sama-darsinah

Having acquired knowledge, scholars see Brahman equally in a cow, elephant, chandaala, dog, etc. This isn't speaking of identity--note the use of the locative case! Rather, you see each of those animals, people, as functioning/existing because of Narayana. This is the kind of unity that a dualist would speak of. Because of devotion to Narayana, you respect those things existing because of him. So we see that with such an attitude, clearly accepting a difference (distinction) between me and others won't lead to differences (rivalry). I'm sorry--I'm not able to phrase this argument well--perhaps someone can do a better job?

    It seems simplest to accept a distinction among jIva-s, not just a "seeming" distinction but an actual distinction, otherwise problems arise as to who reaps the fruits of whose actions. And as we saw, accepting a distinction among souls has no bearing on how we treat one another, as long as we understand the usage of the term "bheda". As a final note, I didn't emphasize this in the previous posting--the pancabheda-s are eternal, in both directions. So the distinction between jaDa-jaDa mentioned in the previous posting and jIva-jIva bheda, didn't just start at some point in the past or will end at some point in the future--but have always and will always exist. Of course, this goes without saying that the jIva is enternal:   "na tvevAham jAtu nAsam"--Krishna tells Arjuna in the Gita that there never was a time when you or I didn't exist nor when we will cease to be.
  "anAdi mAyayA supto yadA jiva prabudhyate.."--In the Upanishad, the jIva is described as being affected by (ajnAna or mAyA) ignorance from time immemorial. So once again, it's beginningless. If we understand this, a problem that arises in the Judeo-Christian faiths is solved. In their view, we are not beginningless, though we exist forever (eternity in heaven/hell). Whereas for Hindus, we can resort to Karma to account for the distinction among people--why is one person born under horrible circumstances, but not another. Our response is that each person is responsible for his own actions, so past actions are the cause for this (but, hang on, *we* must not play God and treat others badly--even though someone may be suffering because of their past actions, we must help them out, that is our duty, if we fail to do that, we get pApa karma!). In the Judeo-Christian faith, the cause for suffering is given as Original Sin. According to them, we all suffer because of Adam & Eve's sin.This doesn't explain the *distinction* among people--why, if there's a just God, one person suffers, whereas another doesn't, nor does it explain why we are held responsible for someone else's actions.
    
In the Hindu view of "anAdi jIvAH"-- beginningless souls, the suffering & joy of an individual can be traced back to that individual's own past actions. Only if there is jIva-jIva bheda can each individual be held for his own past deeds. This is part of the Dvaita Siddhanta. Please forgive any logical flaws on my part--I've tried to explain jIva-jIva bheda as best I could, while at the same time providing a fair though brief account of the opposing "purvapaksha".

So in the previous 2 posts we have covered the category of jaDa (insentient--matter, the physical world), and jIva (the sentient thinking self). This posting will explain the distinction between the two. The immediate distinction is that jaDa is insentient, meaning it is incapable of "feeling", experiencing, whereas the jIva is capable of experiencing. Whereas a jIva (such as you or I) has the capability to make choices, that is we have a will, we can choose (however not independently of Narayana, the distinction between svatantra Narayana and asvatantra jIva-s), something that is jaDa is determinate--mud, or stone or even the various organs in our body have no icchA--will.

So, with such a glaring distinction, what would a pUrvapaksha be? Let us consider the materialist position. For him, there is no soul distinct from the body--we are identical with our body, or we are the functioning of the body. If for argument's sake there is no such thing as a jIva, well, the same problem covered in the previous posting arises--we can't say that it is due to ignorance that people believe in things such as a soul, because something needs to be **affected** by ignorance. In other words, for the materialist, since there is nothing other than the physical world, he will have to either leave the question unanswered or say that matter, insentient matter, is affected by ignorance. Such a position is laughable! So, if a nAstika (atheist) were to argue that there is no jIvatman--I am my body, it is only those who are ignorant who believe that they are something separate from the body (I have heard such arguments believe it or not--"people believe in a soul/spirit because they want to live forever), you can counter with the same question that was posed to Sri Shankaracharya --"kasya avidyA"? In Advaita, what exactly is affected by ajnAna is a difficult question to answer because all that exists is Brahman!  Likewise for the nAstika, to define what is affected by ajnAna is difficult because all that exists is the insentient physical world!

    Some people think that they are the physical brain. That I can't be the brain is obvious because after death, the brain remains there whereas the person does not. If one were to then argue, no, no, I'm not the brain but the functioning of the brain, this too can be disproven, because, everything in the physical world is deterministic, whereas human beings have the capability to make choice. To explain this further, take any physical object, even something like a computer--it has no ability to "choose" what it does--it just functions mechanically. Whereas you & I, we have the capability to make choices (side note: in computer science we learned how patterns of electricity can be used to "process information". After you take classes like that, you realize that the intelligence lies in the designer, not the parts themselves! If the computer-brain model holds, then for the atheist, he would have to credit the designer of the brain with intelligence, not the brain itself!!). What if there is no thing as "free will"--if everything is deterministic?  If man is nothing more than a mechanical bunch of parts, how can he be held responsible for his actions? Only something such as a jIva can be bound by karma--it makes choices and reaps the fruits of them. By clearly understanding the existence and the difference (bheda) between jIva and jaDa, you can attribute the jIva with icchA, jnAna, etc. and the jaDa as being insentient and deterministic.

    Notice that this reperesents a very stark contrast with modern science. According to science, the brain is considered the place where knowledge is stored, but according to Indian thought, only objects capable of knowing, both jIva & paramAtma, can possess knowledge. The brain is just an organ, made of flesh and blood like anything else in the body--why should it possess the ability to store knowledge? The reason why people say that is because they don't understand the distinction between the jIva and the brain. If we accept punarjanma--reincarnation, then how people recollect their past lives can be explained if the jIva passing from one body to another stores knowledge, not the brain. Another riddle posed is if knowledge is stored in the brain, when the jIva & the body separate, would one expect to find knowledge in the brain left behind (part of the corpse)? Certainly not!

    The brain is sometimes compared to an information processor, like a computer.  To show the flaw in the computer analogy: In a computer, the various components in it are simply obeying the laws of electricity, there is nothing in that computer that "knows"--it's the computer designer who's put them together who knows how those parts function, it's the computer designer that **interprets** the pattern of electricity as information, and knows what the various patterns of off & on wires stand for--now here's the problem: If we want to compare the brain to a computer, then the atheist will be forced to concede that it's not the brain processing information, but rather whoever designed the brain **interpreting** the patterns of electricity in the brain as information--such a position would hardly be acceptable for him! I'm not sure if I explained the argument clearly, but in essence what I'm trying to point out is the problem with thinking of the brain as though it's "intelligent" or having some kind of ability to initiate its own actions. The brain is jaDa, it is not intelligent. The soul, or jIva, that is what we are, that is what is intelligent. Again, we mustn't fall into that mindset where we think that mere electricity in the brain is information--in the case of a computer, the electricity is *interpreted* as information by its designer, whereas the analogy obviously doesn't hold in the case of the brain.
   
 In my opinion, this is just my personal view, I think of the brain as just sending electric signals to various parts of the body--an energy supply, that is it, nothing more. All the thinking, feeling, decision making, etc. are done by me, the jIva. So it's not the brain, something that is distinct from me that stores information, but rather I do. Of course there are various chemical changes in the brain that match up to processes like thinking, etc, but we shouldn't think of chemical processes as "thoughts" or "feelings" or knowledge/ information". If all my thoughts can be reduced to just chemical reactions, then if those exact reactions were done in a laboratory, would they be considered "thoughts"? No, of course not, thinking requires a thinker. That is why the materialist position seems problematic to me, and the dualist view of mind/brain makes more sense, at least to me.
    I have started to digress a bit, but getting back to the difference between body and self, this is expressed clearly within the gIta--

dehinAm yathA dehe kaumAram yAuvanam jaraa |
tathA dehAntarah prAptirdhIrastatra na muhyate ||

Just the way the indweller in the body passes through youth and old age, likewise, after discarding one body, he acquires a new one. The wise are not confused by this.

    Here a very simple explanation for the existence of a self different from the body is given. The body I am in now is not the same as the body that I was in several years ago. I think that this hand, this is me, but it is not, because the cells in my body are continuously being replaced. I was there 7-8 years ago, but the cells that made up my hand then are not the cells that make up my body now. It is because of my association (abhimAna) with this body that I think it's me, even though it is not. Also, if something pricks my hand, it's not the molecules in my hand, or even those in my brain that feel pain, but rather I do...yet again, there is a distinction between the experiencer and the physical body. As a final note, returning back to shAstra, there are many passages which seem to state an identity between the world that is jaDa, and Atman, or the self, but I'll cover this in the paramAtma-jaDa bheda section.

I'll try to explain what I said about jada-jiva bheda a little better. A word synonymous with 'jada' is acetana. Both jiva & Paramatma are called cetana. The word cetana comes from the Sanskrit root cit meaning to think.  In the olden days, the distinction between acetana and cetana was fairly easy to see--anything made of matter is insentient, incapable of "thought", whereas the human mind was capable of thought (nowadays people often fail to distinguish between the body & self). However, with the advent of computers and such, we can now think of electricity and wires as "storing/processing information". Using the analogy of a computer, people have started to think of the brain as just such an information processor. So according to some materialists, the view that there is a separate thinking self(jiva) from the body is just a "myth"--in reality there is nothing more than the brain.

    The view that the brain stores information directly contradicts Indian thought--we hear of people remembering past lives. Certainly such knowledge & memories cannot reside in the brain, because after death, the brain is a part of the corpse left behind--this knowledge must reside *elsewhere*. And if we understand the distinction between the cetana jivAtman (thinking self) and acetana sharIra (body), I am not this body, I am not the brain, why should knowledge/information be stored in the brain--no, it is stored in me, the jIva. And if you think about the kinds of things we know, how to perform daily tasks, memories of childhood events--how can such things be reduced to atoms & molecules? Often this question is just brushed aside--oh, the brain *knows* how to represent such information. The brain is just an organ, like anything else in my body. In Madhva siddhanta, only sentient beings--jIva & paramAtma have the ability to "know" & "experience".

    But then, getting back to computers--we can speak of artificial intelligence can't we? A computer is no more than a bundle of wires, transistors, etc, and it can simulate thought (in fact, a computer was built that was actually "smarter" than the world's top chess champion!). Couldn't the human brain be something similar to that? In other words the electrical processing inside a computer is compared to that in the brain. No, there are several crucial distinctions--in the case of a computer, there is nothing that is 1)aware, conscious of what it's doing and 2)there is nothing that has free will. Will(IcchA) and Knowledge (jnAna) are properties of the jiva, and cannot be reduced to physical matter--**nothing** that is made of matter has these properties (this seems like more of an assertion on my part--how do you prove that matter is not sentient?). Also, we mustn't forget that such computers were *designed*. That is, whoever designed those computers had a particular *representation* in mind--so the number 4 would correspond to 100--a wire that's on, a wire that's off, & another wire that's off. There's no "knowledge" or "information" inside a computer, the designed chose that representation! So, here's the critical problem for the atheist--would he say "Just the way the designer of the computer had a particular representation in mind, likewise the designer for the brain chose to represent information that way". No, of course not!! Such an option is available for anyone else, but not a nAstika!

Again, to drive the point across, if someone were to argue that all the electricity in the brain, that's information, the question "who chose to represent information that way?", remains unanswered!!
    To avoid such a mess, we can simply say that jnAna, knowledge, information, resides in the jIva, not the jada sharIra. So, if I am interpreting Madhva siddhanta correctly, everything I know, that resides in the jIva. Knowledge about how to move the various parts of my body, that resides in whoever designed this body, whoever designed this brain--paramAtman, not this jaDa brain itself. So, all the electricity that's in the brain, it's not "information", it's just a flow of electrons, nothing more. To move the various parts of my body requires electricity, and the brain serves as a supply of electricity, nothing more (but this is my personal view, correct me if I'm wrong).

    I'm sorry if this seems somewhat digressed off-topic on this forum, but in this series on panchabheda, I really wanted to bring out this jaDa-jIva bheda as best as I could. Often times, people just say "there is a distinction between jada & jiva" without really going into it in any sort of depth.

Now, we come to one of the most debated among the panchabheda--the difference between the jIva, the embodied soul, and paramAtma, the supreme soul. At first glance, it seems difficult to see how there could be any identity between the two. You and me, jIva-s, are affected by ignorance, bound in samsAra experiencing not just the joys, but also sorrows of life), whereas Atman, as described in the veda-s, upanishads, gitA, etc. is sarvajna (omniscient), and dukhAsprShta (untouched by sorrow). Still, one of the central tenets of Advaita is that the 2 are identical, but because of ajnAna, ignorance, we are unaware of this identity. Realization of this is the ultimate knowledge.

    There is the famous question asked to Shankaracharya, the propounder of Advaita, "kasya avidya?" Whose ignorance? According to records, Shankaracharya smiled and said "tava"--yours. Though a response like this may sound clever, let us analyze the position of Advaita in greater depth. In non-dualism, there is only 1 thing that exists in the universe--Atman. Scriptural quotes such as "neha nAnAsti kincana" are used to show that there is NO difference here. If I'm affected by ignorance, and all that exists is Atman/Brahman, then the Advaitin's nirguNa, nirAkara Brahman is affected by ignorance! To avoid this conclusion, they could either say that the jIva itself is illusory, but as we all know, any illusion requires someone to be affected by that illusion. What else besides Atman is there for the Advaitin? If as an alternative, we say that ajnAna itself is illusory, then there needs to be another ajnAna that's the cause for that, and so on, and so forth--we get an infinite regression. If Ajnana is real, then we have multiple real entities, not just Brahman. To get around this, one approach that they take is the concept of vyAvahArika satya, something that is neither real, nor unreal--anirvachaniya. There have been many lengthy discussions on these topics, I'm just grazing the surface of it.

    It's fair to say that the question of ignorance remains unanswered on the part of the Advaitin, because ultimately there can be nothing other than Brahman that can be affected by ignorance. For the Dvaitin however, who accepts that both paramAtman and jIvAtman are real, we can say that ignorance affects only the jIva, not paramAtma. Also, because of the distinction between the two, the jIva is touched by sorrow (though we may doubt many things, our experiences of sorrow/happiness are real--they are never open to doubt, and can't be dismissed as mere illusions--if I am experiencing sorrow, can I even think for an instant that such experiences are mere illusions? Like the illusion of water on the road, do we ever find out that any of our experiences were not real?). ParamAtman is untouched by sorrow, never experiences duhkha. With this fundamental distinction in mind, there is no scope, in my mind, to accept identity between the two, at *any* time.
 But what about texts? We see texts such as Purusha Sukta:

"puruSha evedam sarvam yadbhUtam yaccha bhavyam..."
Literally, Purusha (Brahman) is all this, whatever existed & whatever will be.

These have to be interpreted contextually. For example, in the case of the verse above, if you look in the previous verse, it clearly states "atyatiShtaddashAngulam"--he stands infinitely *beyond* the world (dasha can be interpreted to mean infinite--see my postings on the Purusha Sukta). So carrying over this from the previous verse, it makes sense--brahman *surpasses* all this, whatever existed & what will be.

Perhaps this is just my own interpretation? No, continuing the verse above "utAmrtatvasyeshaano yadannenAtirohati"--he is described as the "IshAnaH"--lord of AmR^ta. If Purusha is all that exists, why would he be described as the lord of this "amrta". As I pointed out in a previous posting, the meanings of "amRta"(immortal) and "anna"(destructible) very closely parallel the meanings of "akshara" & "kshara" mentioned in the Gita verse:

"dvAvimau puruShau loke ksharaschAkshara eva ca..."

Where all living beings (jIvas) are categorized as kshara (destructible) because their bodies are destroyed. Akshara is interpreted to mean Lakshmi, since she never undergoes samsAra like other souls. Finally, most importantly the distinction between ParamAtman(Uttama Purusha) and "akshara", as well as between ParamAtman and "kshara". Though Shankaracharya has written a commentary on the Gita, I believe it is absolutely impossible to interpret the ending section of the Gita Chapter 15 as pointing to identity between jIva & paramAtma.

But what about verses which seem to show identity? One can understand the meaning of these verses from context. For example, the famous "tattvamasi" passage--the whole goal of the passage is to humble Shwetaketu's pride.
Apart from the literal meaning of the text, by showing his identity with omnipresent, omniscient Brahman how does it humble his ego? On the other hand, with reference to Shwetaketu's initial comment (He says to his father "I have learned everything there is to know"), showing that he's NOT omniscient, that there is a Brahman/ParamAtman distinct from him, that would definitely humble his ego! Also, if you look at the analogies, for example, the analogy of salt dissolved in water, or the life force within a tree, they hardly support the concept of identity between jIva & paramAtma.

What about texts that say "sarvam khalvidam Brahma"? When they say that everything is Brahman, how can we say that jIva & paramAtma are 2 distinct entities? Consider the usage of phrases like "there is no one else but you"--it doesn't mean that other people don't exist! To bring out the importance of something we may say it's all that exists. As mentioned earlier, the distinction between jIvAtman & paramAtman is essential since we undergo samsAra, but ParamAtman does not. Two other interpretations of the passage above are that everything is *controlled* by Brahman, and also that the names of everything (sarvashabdavAcyatva) ultimately refer to paramAtman. Such texts cannot be interpreted literally to mean that there is no jIva-paramAtma bheda.

One other final point I want to touch on is the meaning of the word "bheda". It can mean not only distinction, as in this object is a separate, distinct object from another. It can also mean opposition/rivalry. Passages which say that there is no bheda, or is there is aikya between jIva, and paramAtma can be taken in the sense that there is no virodha or opposition--God wants one thing, and the jIva does something else, or there is some kind of rivalry between the two, such is not the case. Saying that God's will is consistent with that of the soul, or a feeling of "togetherness" is entirely a different matter from saying that ParamAtman, sarvajna (omniscient), sarvashakti (omnipotent), sarvada sukhi (always blissful), can be identical with the jIva, alpajna (finite knowledge), alpashakti (there are limitations to what you & I can do), and dukhaspR^Shta (touched by sorrow).

I tried to skim the surface a bit. Obviously this topic of jiva-paramAtma bheda has been dealth with in MUCH more detail than the other ones. That's not to say the other 4 are less important--there's less controversy surrounding them (From the atheist's point of view, jaDa-jiva and jaDa-paramAtma bheda, which I'll cover in the next and final posting, are also hotly debated)

Please pardon any errors in this posting--in quickly running through what I thought of, i may have made several mistakes. Again, jiva-paramAtma bheda is a much more complex topic than the other 5 bheda-s, but I hope I've given people a glimpse of this--why we stress the distinction between jiva & paramAtma.

 This will be the final posting in the series. I'm a bit disappointed that there haven't been more discussions--there are many points that I made that I either wanted people to support or refute, not for idle discussion but to get at the real issue.
    As mentioned in earlier postings, jaDa encompasses the entire material world, not just restricted to what we can see with our eyes, but also the unmanifest--prakrti, time, space, mahattattva, ahankaara tattva, etc.
Paramatma, God, though residing in all of these, is distinct from them. Whereas something that is jaDa is insentient, it has no ability to perceive emotions, cannot be "jnAnin"-the possessor of knowledge, ParamAtma is satchidAnanda--real, sentient, and blissful (sorry for the loose translation). He is sarvajna, there is nothing that is unknown to Him. Though we may speak of inanimate objects like computers and such "storing information"--no material object can "know", so there is a huge difference between jaDa & ParamAtma. Both jaDa & paramAtma are unaffected by sorrow (only jIva-s experience duhkha, at some point in time or other.). But only paramAtma and Lakshmi experience sukha (happiness/bliss) since time immemorial for all eternity (their Ananda is anAdi and ananta). The difference between Lakshmi's Ananda and that of ParamAtma Narayana is that whereas Lakshmi depends on someone else (asvatantra), Narayana does not (svatantra). Phrased differently, without Narayana, Lakshmi would not even be capable of experiencing bliss.

    We know from physics that everything in the physical world is deterministic (okay, some may raise the objection that some things are probabilistic, but this doesn't matter for the discussion on free will).
However, such determinism only applies to what's in the physical world. In the case of non-physical entities, like jIva & paramAtma, they have icchA--the ability to choose. The topic of jIvakartrtva is very complex, but summarized briefly, yes, the jIva does have the ability to choose, hence he can be held responsible for his karma (something that is jaDa cannot), but this jIvakartrva is dependent on Paramatma, that is, without the icchA of Paramatma, you and me, we can't even make choices. So another major distinction between jaDa and jiva or jaDa and paramatma is that something that is jaDa is deterministic, it has no ability to choose, whereas both the jIva and paramAtma are able to do this.

    If some of what is above seems obvious, consider this--many people view the brain as this incredible organ that knows where to send which signals to various parts of the body. What people fail to see is that is not the brain that is amazing--sending precisely the right signals to the right fingers as I type, rather, it is whoever *designed* the brain that is amazing. Like any other part of my body, the liver, the heart, the brain is just an organ, it's not capable of "knowing" how to make various parts of my body function. In the world of machines, the way we consider the designer of those machines to be intelligent, not the parts themselves, so too, when we see the marvelous things the brain can do, we must consider the marvelous Designer behind it.

-- -- -- --
    With reference to creation, we come to 2 major explanations of how this world came about. One is that found in almost all religions in this world-a higher intelligent Being, God designed the various creatures on this planet. The other view is that all the creatures on this planet came about through natural means-instead of being designed, all the life forms we see came about through a more or less random process. According to this evolutionary view, birds were not designed for flight, fish were not designed for an aquatic environment-the traits they possess are a result of random changes to their DNA.  We see so many extraordinary engineering marvels in the world around us - though we haven't seen anyone design them, we know that they could not have come about on their own, someone had to design them. Why can't the same be said of the living creatures on this planet? Yes, there are people who try to combine the two, reconcile the concept of God with the idea that all life evolved from one cell--but this is in clear contradiction with shaastra: Living creatures are divided into the categories aNDaja (born from an egg), piNDaja (live-born), utbija (coming from a seed). A creature in each of these categories comes from its own kind and produces its own kind. If what evolution claims is true, all of these share a common ancestor, which category would that belong in? For a creationist, the answer is simple--animals and plants were separately created. But for an evolutionist? What would the common ancestor between a human and a plant look like, which would be the case if all life comes from 1 single cell? Or for that matter, can they even explain how all the mammals that are out there evolved from a common ancestor? These problems do not arise if God had created various types of creatures.

     If you're wondering how this relates to Paramatma-jaDa bheda, consider the following argument. The various parts of our body each carry out a particular function. The claim made by evolutionists is that starting from 1 simple cell, you can eventually develop human beings with such functional organs, just by *random* changes to the DNA. How can something that is unintelligent, like radiation from the sun, even over extended periods of time, when applied to a single cell, result in the formation of all the various parts of our body? Even with all the technology we have in our hands, we cannot design a functional heart, stomach, brain, etc. It must take someone far more intelligent than a human to design the creatures around us.  To build something like a plane requires an engineer with a grasp of aerodynamics--shouldn't the same apply to the wings of a bird? If we understand the absurdity of saying a plane can form on its own, without any designer, next time you see a flock of birds flying, it's just as absurd to say that those creatures just happened to evolve (what's worse is, evolutionists will say that such graceful birds evolved from creatures that couldn't even fly!). ParamAtma created them, they didn't just come about on their own through evolution. 
    
Finally, one more argument against the view that natural processes (which have no intelligence, they are jaDa) can result in the formation of the life around us.  If we take any vital organ in the body, it needs to be fully functional, otherwise it is completely useless. It's impossible for such structures to gradually develop over time, because a creature with a partially developed heart, partially developed brain, partially developed reproductive organs, etc. cannot function. All these vital organs have to be there *fully* formed, and it requires someone with a purpose in mind to design them.

   Since the origin of life is not open to direct observation, we must turn to Shruti--we find plentiful support for creation of various creatures 

1)Purusha Sukta: " tasmAt yajnAt ...pashUntaamschakre vaayavyaanaaraNyaan graamyaascha ". 

From that yajna, He made creatures that fly, forest-dwelling & tamed creatures. If all creatures had evolved, why is the separate creation of these creatures mentioned?

2)Chandogya Upanishad, "teSham khalveSham bhutAnAm trINyeva bIjAni bhavanti, aNDajam, jIvajam, udbhijjam iti". 

It's emphatically stated that there are only 3 types of creatures, those born from an egg, those that are live born, those born from a seed. Clearly there could not be a common ancestor among them, because as mentioned above, what category would that ancestor fit in? If they were created separately who created them?
Thus it is ParamAtmana sR^iShTi, not jaDa. Why can't matter left to itself, over enough time form into the lifeforms we see?
"na ca karma vimAmala kAla guNaH prabhR^tIShamacittanu taddhiyataH.."

As stated in Dvadasha Stotra by Sri Madhvacharya, know that things like time, etc. are acetana--being jaDa, it has no capacity to think, whereas to design the complex creatures we see around us requires thought far beyond that of humans.

-- -- -- -- --
    From the perspective of Shastra -- there are many quotes which seem to show identity between the material world and Brahman (I'm not entirely sure on how Advaita interprets this--sometimes Brahman is identified with Paramatma, other times, Paramatma is also a product of maaya--just an illusion. In any case, in both the Vishnu Sahasranama & the Gita both ParamAtma and Brahman are identified as Vishnu.)

1)There are many variations on what is claimed by Advaita to mean this entire world is identical with Brahman--"Sarvam khalu idam brahma", "purusha evedam sarvam", etc.  I believe I discussed the quote from Purusha Sukta in a prior posting. As for "sarvam khalu idam Brahma", we can understand this to mean either that all words denote Brahman--whatever words exist describe Vishnu, He is sarvashabdavAcya, as stated in the Vishnu Sahasranama --"yat, tat, padam anuttamam", even words like yat and tat (commonly understood to mean "this" and "that") can be shown to denote Vishnu (see Sri Sri Vidyamanyaru's Kannada commentary on each word of the Vishnu Sahasranama--I have not had a chance to read it, but I would like to go through as much of it as possible, hopefully at some point in my life). Also, instead of pointing out that Brahman is OMNIpresent, OMNIpotent, OMNIscient, omni...etc, it suffices to just say that he is "omni"--everything. Not that he is identical with the physical world--after all, as pointed out above, how can something that is insentient, deterministic, subject to change, be identical with someone who is sarvadA sukhi (always blissful), sarvasamartha (omnipotent, he can do whatever he wishes, and is not bound by the deterministic laws of physics, he has free will), anAdyananta (without beginning and end, in stark contrast with the physical world that was created and will eventually be destroyed).

2)"Neha naanasti kincana". Literally there is no multiplicity(just one--Brahman is all that exists). Some have used this to mean that there is no distinct Paramatma and jaDa. If God and the world were distinct from each other, then how can this be reconciled with the Shruti? We want to take careful note of each word in this quote--notice the "iha". Surely there is no need to specify "iha" (here). Sri Madhvacharya interprets this passage as bringing out the unity of the various forms of the Lord. We must not think of Narayana's various avatars as being distinct from one another (There is a wondeful verse in the Sri Hari Vayu Stuti "gacchan saugandhikaartham.." simultaneously showing the identity between Sri Rama & Sri Parasurama as well as Sri Hanuma & Sri Bhima). The "iha" in "na iha nAnAsti kincana" refers to Brahman. If all that existed were Brahman, there would be no need for this word. Thus, Paramatma-jaDa bheda does not contradict this shruti text.

3)One more quote, from the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad: "yatra dvaitamiva bhavati, taditara itaram pasyati...yatra sarvatrAtmaivabhut, tat kena kam pasyet." Literally "Where there is a seeming duality, then one sees another, one tastes another...where there is only Atman, who would see what, who would taste what". Here, as before, though the verse appears to support Advaita's view of Atman alone existing, we must first understand the context. Yajnavalkya is instructing Maitreyi on the means of understanding Brahman. How can the seeker of knowledge be identical to Brahman who is never subject to ignorance? So the view that Brahman/Atman is all that exists, has problems right at the offset. Then we come to the small but important "iva"--seeming. Where there is a *seeming* duality, where there is *no* duality, then one sees another? That doesn't make sense. One could argue that the "iva" carries over to the rest of the sentence, but that is *not* what the quote says--it reads pasyati, not pasyatIva--"where there is a seeming duality, one seems to see another". The way not just Sri Madhvacharya, but also various visiShtadvaita commentators have interpreted this passage is not as denying duality, but saying that there's something more to this duality. 

It's not that Paramatma and jIva or ParamAtma and jaDa are distinct and *unrelated*. Though distinct from each other, in reality both jIvas (like you and me) and jaDa (this world) are *dependent* on Paramatma (Narayana). So in this sense, it's a seeming duality. Also, notice the tense used--pasyati and pasyet. 

The "itara itaram pasyati, itara itaram jighrati" one sees another, one tastes another--is in the present--the way things are. But the *hypothetical* case, where Atman alone exists, "kena kam pasyet? kena kam jighret?"--who would see whom? who would taste whom? It makes more sense to take this passage as a refutation of the idea that Brahman/Atman alone exists, because we run into the problem--if only Atman exists, do any of the texts that prescribe one to meditate, to seek Brahman make sense? No, of course not there has to be something else that seeks Brahman--the jIva.Yes, though this passage is more directly related to jIva-paramAtma bheda, it has been demonstrated that even texts which on the surface appear to show identity between jaDa and paramAtma, when analyzed in more detail, give a completely different meaning.

-- -- -- --

    Of the various topics I touch on in this posting, the final one will be that of idol worship. Some people worship the stone 'vigraha', thinking that the idol itself is the Lord. This has been strongly criticized by Sri  Madhvacharya (I'm not sure of the exact quotations). ParamAtma is sarvavyapta (omnipresent), and is sentient. The idol is most certainly not--how can there be any identity between the two? There is a distinction not only between paramAtma and the idol, but also between paramAtma and the 'vaasana'--the mental impression that we form in our minds. After all, even that impression in our mind is not only finite, but is insentient, in contrast to Narayana who is Anandamaya (made of bliss--this is a difficult concept to fathom, perhaps someone can explain it better).

    But then, why? What is the meaning behind using idols in worship? It is used to help *us*. Our minds wander very easily, it doesn't take much to distract them, the vigraha keeps our attention focused. Instead of thinking about material pleasures, we will be engrossed in thinking about the Lord. Of course, if we ever reach the caliber of Prahlada, Dhruva, etc. there is no need for idols at all, we can just close our minds and think of Narayana.

So the idols, images can be thought of as symbols, like a photograph reminds us of family members--though their is a distinction between the person and image, the image bears special meaning for us.
    There is also another important reason--Though Narayana is omnipresent, certain objects like Saligrama have the 'sannidhana' of Narayana. When we worship Narayana as residing within the Saligrama (correct me if I'm wrong), it bestows greater merit for the worshipper.

    I want to make one more comment on the omnipresence of Narayana. A question may arise, if He is everywhere, even within, for example these idols, then isn't there identity between the two? How can 2 distinct objects be in the same place--shouldn't they be identical? No, it is a property of matter that it occupies space, where one material object is, no other material object can occupy the same space. Since Narayana is not composed of the 5 elements, this rule in physics doesn't apply. As another example, consider our own bodies--every tiny part of our body has a solid, liquid or gas occupying it, yet somewhere in this body, the jIva, me, I reside. If a jIva and jaDa can occupy the same area, yet remain distinct, can't the same be said of Narayana and this material world?

-- --
    As you can see, there is a voluminous discussion that one can get into on paramAtma-jaDa bheda. I've touched on, what I felt are 3 major points. 
1)The first concerns creation, whether the living creatures around us were designed by a Higher Intelligence, or whether random forces in nature, over time, can result in all the lifeforms we see. There is plentiful evidence in Shastra for creation, and when we see organs, etc. carrying out some function, someone must have thought up that function. This cannot be done by something that is jaDa.

2)The second point is the issue of quotes in the Upanishads and other texts. Though there are various quotes that seem to show identity between this world and Brahman, we can see that when analyzed in detail, and interpreted in context they can be shown to support Dvaita, not Advaita. And we must understand the attributes of Brahman (satchidaananda--sentient, blissful) in contrast to that of jaDa (acetana, certainly not capable of experiencing Ananda). How can there be identity between the two? The texts must be interpreted bearing this in mind.

3)Though residing everywhere, Narayana is distinct from the idols, images of Him that we see in temples (and also the mental images formed in our mind). Like a photograph used to remember someone, they are just symbols, and must not be think of the material objects themselves as the Lord.

    With this I conclude. Please forgive any errors in my part. I hope I have not digressed far from the concept of Pancha bheda--I just wanted to show there is more to it, and each of the 5 differences can be explained in greater depth.

Shri KrishNArpaNamastu .

Note: Not proof read yet.

Madhwanavami/ Madhwajayanti links