by Dr. Robert J. Zydenbos published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (1991):
By: Shri Kesava Rao Tadipatri
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| Rangoli by Smt.Padmini Rao, Coimbatore |
Jaina Background of Dvaitavedanta ??
Dr. Robert J. Zydenbos had published an article in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (1991) and that has drawn a conclusion that Acharya Madhva borrowed his concepts from Jaina and Christian schools.
The following article was written by Kesava Rao Tadipatri to completely reject that notion in clear and logical terms.
Some of the readers may be aware that, there was some discussion about an article in which there were claims that Sri Madhva drew some ideas from Jainism and that Sri Jayatiirtha made some logical errors and similar objectionable items which can easily be disproved. I will make a humble attempt to point out the flaws in those arguments. The original author or any of the readers are very welcome to argue in support of the article by opposing the views that I present here. In the same tone, any comments or questions are very welcome too.
Rebuttal of the article named "On The Jaina Background of Dvaitavedanta" by Dr. Robert J. Zydenbos published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (1991):
Always in any scholarly articles, the conclusions are drawn based on a set of sources and the arguments of the author. These conclusions can go wrong based on the incomplete and incorrect understanding of the author or use of inaccurate sources which have some inherent defects as such. Further the incorrectness of those conclusions can be established in either or both of the following two methods -
1. Point out the inconsistencies of the logic without even using any of the sources mentioned.
2. Point out the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the sources by the author by analyzing the sources used.
I shall attempt to use both the methods in my own way.
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Pūrvapakṣa-1:
Dr. Zydenbos in 1.1 (Pages. 250) of the article: Dvaita vedānta begins with Madhva in the thirteenth century; there is no Dvaitin teacher before him, and the only authoritative texts of the school earlier than the writings of Madhva are those which Madhva has classified as sadāgama, viz. the Vedas, the Mahābhārata, the entire corpus…. To these are also added the brahmasūtras of bādarāyaṇa, who is vyāsa, the author of the Vedas, etc., who is an incarnation of the Lord.
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Siddhānta-1:
Dvaita vedānta does not begin with Sri Madhvacharya. It was there before his incarnation. He only revived it. The very fact that he used the sadāgamas indicates that the philosophy existed before. Even though the same sadāgamas were used by advaitins and dvaitins to interpret them in accordance with their own schools, it does not mean that Dvaita concepts were not there before. This is an openly erroneous assumption. Secondly, vyāsa is not the author of Vedas. He only classified them. They existed before He classified them.
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Pūrvapakṣa-2:
Dr. Zydenbos in 1.1 (Page. 250) of the article: Though this identification of Madhva with Vayu and the earlier incarnations merits further investigation on account of its symbolic meaning, it seems not unlikely that in ascribing a divine nature to Madhva the early dvaitins evinced an uneasy awareness that their creation of a new Vedantic tradition could be frowned upon within the Brahminical community, and the claim of divinity of the founder could be seen as a sign of how serious they were in pursuing their ideas. Also the author says in the "Notes" - "Siauve mentions that Madhva declared himself an avatara, but she gives no reference."
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Siddhānta-2:
Does this mean that her claim may presumably be ignored? The author is saying clearly that it is very likely that in ascribing a divine nature to Sri Madhvacharya, the earlier Dvaitins evinced an uneasy awareness. This is a straight assumption with neither proof nor any other kind of substantiation. It is a question of faith and they would never mind if such a claim could be seen as a sign of serious pursuit of their ideas as they were serious. At least, one cannot say that they were not serious. Early dvaitins as well as present dvaitins (at all times) were easy and comfortable (in addition to being quite convinced) in ascribing a divine nature to Sri Madhvacharya.
Sri Madhvacharya gave a clear endorsement and declared himself as an avatara of Vayu in several instances. One such can be found at the end of śrī viṣṇutattvavinirṇayaḥ
yasya trīṇyuditāni veda-vacane rūpāṇi divyānyalam |
baṭtaddarśatamitthamevanihitaṁ devasya bhargo mahat |
vāyo rāmavaconayaṁ prathamakaṁ pṛkśo dvitīyaṁ vapuḥ |
madhvo yattu tṛtīyametadamunā granthaḥ kṛtaḥ keśave ||
Whose three divine forms have been described by Vedic statements (such as the BaLitthā Sūkta of the Rg Veda); whose nature is that of great wisdom and ability, is the support of the activity of the worlds, is very worshipful (of Vishnu), and who incarnates with his full potency (with no diminution); that Vāyu, in his first avatāra, carried the message of Rāma, destroyed a fearsome army in his second, and in the third, as Sri Madhvacharya, composed this work (the VTVN) as a service to Lord Keshava".
One can be found at the end of śrī brahmasūtrabhāṣyam.
yasya trīṇyuditāni vedavacane rūpāṇi divyānyalam |
baṭ taddarśanamitthameva nihitaṁ devasya bhargo mahat |
vāyo rāmavaconayaṁ prathamakaṁ pṛkṣo dvitīyaṁ vapuḥ |
madhvo yattu tṛtīyakaṁ kṛtamidaṁ bhāṣyaṁ harau tena hi ||
Whose three divine forms have been described by Vedic statements (such as the BaLitthā Sūkta of the Rg Veda); whose nature is that of great wisdom and ability, is the support of the activity of the worlds, is very worshipful (of Vishnu), and who incarnates with his full potency (with no diminution); that Vāyu, in his first avatāra, carried the message of Rāma, destroyed a fearsome army in his second, and in the third, as Sri Madhvacharya, composed this bhāṣya (for Brahmasutras) as a service to Lord Hari".
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Pūrvapakṣa-3:
Dr. Zydenbos in 1.1 (Pages. 250-251) of the article: Certain peculiar teachings of the MAdhvas (the followers of Dvaita, i.e. of the teachings of Madhva), more particularly certain aspects of the mythological account of Madhva's life such as we find it in works like Narayana's "Madhvavijaya", have in the past led some researchers to assume that there was a Christian influence in the formation of the doctrine, S.N. Dasgupta opposes this in his "History of Indian Philosophy", stating that bhakti can be traced to certain Vedic and Upanishadic verses, that there is no trace of a trinity doctrine in Madhva's thought, and that Madhva urges repeatedly that his doctrines are based on the Vedas, Gita and other scriptures. Though from a philosophical point of view Christian influence in Dvaita seems not likely, Dasgupta's argumentation against it is hardly convincing. Of course a thinker who wants to be accepted as a Vedāntin will claim that his ideas are drawn from the Brahminical tradition, or that they represent the "essence of Vedic thought". Long before Madhva, Shankara did the same, and it has been established that Shankara's Advaita to a large extent is a Brahminical adaptation of ideas drawn from Madhyamika Buddhism. Madhva too has noticed this, especially in his "Tattvoddyota", which is the first work in which Advaitin-Buddhist similarity is pointed out supported by arguments. Thus the claim of a philosophical doctrine to "Vaidikatva" or "Astikatva" is hardly a guarantee against the incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin.
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Siddhānta-3:
The author is trying to prove with a twist of thought that it is likely that there is a Christian influence on Dvaita philosophy. This is done in a subtle way. If one reads Narayana Panditacharya's Sumadhvavijaya with a critical mind, such person will not make a wrong assumption or make a wrong statement that the tattvavada school was influenced by Christianity. If one analyzes such wrong argument and the subsequent
conclusions, the baseless nature of it comes to surface easily. Dasgupta's argumentation against it might have been hardly convincing to Dr. Zydenbos; but the arguments for it are even less convincing, if anything.
This is the sequence of arguments of Dr. Zydenbos in brief:
1. A thinker that wants to be a Vedantin claim that his ideas are drawn from Brahminical tradition.
2. Shankara did the same (made such a claim). But his Advaita is Brahminical adaptation of ideas drawn from Madhyamika Buddhism.
3. The claim of Vaidikatva is hardly a guarantee against the incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin.
Is this an implication or conclusion? - Just as Advaita who claimed Vaidikatva has incorporated Buddhism (a non-Hindu origin), Madhva who claimed Vaidikatva has incorporated Christianity (a non-Hindu origin).
If such conclusions are drawn, the unending erroneous ripple effect will overturn the ship of arguments and the whole realm of logic sees no light of any proper sense. If one sect of Christianity in one area of U.S. involves in some unacceptable acts in the name of the religion, that cannot be extended as a sine qua non for the Christianity itself. In the same way, even if it is true that Shankara (Advaita), who claimed Vaidikatva, has incorporated Buddhism (a non-Hindu origin), it does not entail that Madhva (Dvaita), who claimed Vaidikatva, has incorporated Christianity (a non-Hindu origin).
Many supernatural deeds were performed by Sri Madhvacharya. The similarity with what is written in old testament or new testament is not even worth considering because even in those instances, the similarity does not extend to circumstances as well. When many miracles were performed, one or two being similar can very well be mere coincidence. So the Christianity influence argument on the basis of similarity is hardly convincing and in fact meaningless too. The more one studies tattvavāda, built from original and purely vedic thoughts, the more one gets convinced of non-influence of non-Hindu origin. Just to put in a nutshell, when the philosophical potency in the rest of the world was in a stage of infancy with incompletely opened eyes, the spiritual thinking and philosophical phenomenon in India in Vedic schools had phenomenal hegemony with Himalayan heights. Sri Madhvacharya had no need to turn to either Christianity or Jainism.
In this regard, I would like to quote a few passages from Appendix X (Pages 609-611) of History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature, Third Revised Edition: Delhi 2000.
"One cannot build castles in the air on the basis of similarities of legends and miracles alone as has been attempted to be done as between Christianity and Mādhva Philosophy - by unscrupulous Western scholars under the influence of fearly missionaries on the west coast, in the wake of establishment of British rule and the conversion of the members of the lower rungs of Hindu society by way of proselytization on a large scale.
These missionaries and Western scholars like Burneli, Grieson and A. L. Basham had an axe to grind in giving publicity to these assumptions - resting mostly on legends and miracles...- had not taken into account that Madhva's religio philosophical system is a Vedanta system rooted entirely in the heritage of the Vedas, Upanishads, Aranyakas, Epics and Purāṇas and Brahmasutras and Giita which, even according to Western Orientalists, are centuries earlier than the rise of Christianity or Islam.".
"Neither the position of Mukhya prāṇa nor of Andham Tamas for tamoyogyas in Madhva's philosophy is therefore derived from or influenced by Christianity - in view of the internal evidence of the Hindu scriptures themselves in point, which are centuries older than the birth of Christianity."
"One wonders whoever told the missionaries...that Madhva was born in Kalyanpur. The contemporary biography mentions Madhva's birth place as pāje (Pājakakṣetra) which lies some 10 kms. South East of Udupi, while Kalyanpur is situated some miles South West of Udupi... So much for Kalyanpur. It is also very doubtful, if there were any Christian settlements in Madhva's days in Kalyanpur. Even supposing there was one, it is incredible that there was any exchange of thought between Christians and Madhva's biographer regarding the miracles of Christ or his doctrines. Even today the social barriers between the orthodox Brahmins and the Christian priests are rigid. Imagine the state of affairs in the 13th century!"
"It is time then that the canard of Christian influence on Madhva or his doctrines is buried fathoms deep, not only as shallow but as highly mischievous, tendentious and motivated fictions given currency to under missionary partisanship. A substantial amount of authentic literature in English is now available on Madhva's thought, its origin and development from the Vedic heritage down to the present times and they should put an end once for all to such irresponsible propaganda of erroneous views rearing their heads now and then."
Some clarification before proceeding further:
While the main subject/object of the article itself is to assess whether Dvaita was influenced by Jainism and whether Sri madhvacharya borrowed anything from it, Dr. Zydenbos, the author of the article, made an attempt to indicate that Dvaita has infact incorporated Christianity as well. This accusation is slipped into the article in a subtle way.
If you read the extract from his article, the following is the sequence of arguments, he had put forth:
It is a five step approach.
1. Shankara claimed Vaidikatva
2. He incorporated Buddhism (based on the context, the author claims Buddhism as being of non-Hindu origin.) into Advaita.
3. Claiming Vaidikatva is no guarantee against incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin (In other words, though one claims Vaidikatva, he can incorporate thoughts of non-Hindu origin into it.)
4. Madhva claimed Vaidikatva.
5. From step 3 above, there is no guarantee that Madhva would not have incorporated thoughts of non-Hindu origin (current context is Christianity).
The strange part is that such a claim for Christian influence is derived from two things namely
I. Similarity in the performance of miracles
II. Absence of guarantee for a claimer of Vaidikatva to abstain from
incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin.
This is similar to Murphy's law (or sometimes referred to as Finagle's Law) viz. "If one can go wrong, he will". Here the crafty implication is "If Madhva could incorporate thoughts of non-Hindu origin, he did".
But, needless to say that there is no place for such conclusions in the realm of logic.
The author is making grounds for his argument that if Madhva can incorporate thoughts of one non-Hindu origin (Christianity), he might as well have incorporated thoughts of second non-Hindu origin (Jainism) into Dvaita.
In other words, if Advaita (who claimed Vaidikatva) is guilty of incorporating thoughts from one non-Hindu origin (Buddhism), on similar lines, Dvaita (who claimed Vaidikatva) is guilty of incorporating thoughts from two philosophies of non-Hindu origin (Christianity and Jainism) into Dvaita.
If one intends to make a claim that a school of philosophy say "A" has borrowed some thing from another school of philosophy say "B" and that "A" has not acknowledged this, that person must do all the three following tasks :
1. Make a thorough study of the points or topics from both the schools.
2. Establish that both the schools have exactly same approach (not merely same number of divisions with some similarity like upper kind, middle kind and lower kind etc.)
3. If the school "A" has listed its sources, prove that none of the listed sources contain those topics.
In many cases, people miss out on atleast one of the above things. But surprisingly, in the following instance, the author of the article has failed so miserably in all the three cases. An attempt will be made to prove this. For ease of understanding and to differentiate the text from the article and the rest of the text, an offset of two will be used for the text in the article and also will be enclosed by "===============".
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Pūrvapakṣa-4:
Dr. Zydenbos in section 1.2 (Pages. 252) of the article: In the tatvaviveka, ...there are two nityamuktas ...in the universe : the Lord Vishnu and his consort , Sri or Lakṣmi, and all other souls are sṛṣṭiyuj or associated with Vishnu's creation. These ...are again either muktāḥ or amuktāḥ, ...and the not -liberated souls are again of three kinds: ... muktiyogyāḥ, nityavartāḥ and tamoyogyāḥ. In the Tattvasamkhyana, ... the muktāḥ and amuktāḥ are called vimuktāḥ and duḥkhasamsthāḥ and the latter are muktiyogyāḥ and ayogyāḥ, or returning to threefold division...vimuktiyogyah, sṛṣṭisamsthitāḥ and tamogāḥ.
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Siddhānta-4:
1. The terms "sṛṣṭiyuj" and "sṛṣṭisamsthitāḥ" have to be replaced with "sṛtiyuj" and "sṛtisamsthitāḥ". This error cannot be ignored as mere typographical error as the author makes further note saying "associated with Vishnu's creation". This creates many problems. Does this mean that other categories are not "associated with Vishnu's creation". If they are "associated with Vishnu's creation", then the division is flawed as what purpose does it serve to give such a definition. If they are not "associated with Vishnu's creation", then the all supremacy of Viṣṇu is questioned, which is a flaw to the original thought itself (namely everything is under Viṣṇu's control and thus must be associated with Vishnu'screation). Also, what is the meaning of this expression "associated with Vishnu's creation". Is not Goddess Lakṣmi associated with Vishnu's creation? On the other hand, "sṛtiyuj" and "sṛtisamsthitāḥ" mean those associated with samsāra and touched by sorrow at some point of time. Even the liberated souls were touched by sorrow before their liberation. In other words, they are "duḥkhasamspṛṣṭāḥ".
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Pūrvapakṣa-5:
Dr. Zydenbos continues (Pages. 252) : Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the final state is not the same for all souls. Jainism expressed such a doctrine from its very beginning, in its own ternminology. Here the Tattvarthasutra, the foremost jaina doctrinal text , mentions three characteristics of the soul in II .7: jivabhavyābhavyatvāni ca. According to ...Bhaskaranandi, jivatva is consciousness, which in Jainism has always been considered an essential characteristics of the soul. ...He (Bhaskaranandi) was either as elder contemporary of Madhva or already was no more by the time of Madhva's birth, and that he lived and worked not far away from the main area of Madhva's activity. "He [i.e., the soul] who possesses the ability to manifest characteristics of Samyagdarsana, etc., is a bhavya," Bhaskaranandi says as an explanation of bhavyatva and a soul that does not show that ability is an abhavya. Samyagdarshana has commonly been translated as 'right faith' which later leads on to samyagjnana or 'right knowledge ' and samyakcarita or 'right conduct' the three together forming the prerequisities or path towards mokṣa.
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Siddhānta-5:
The sentence "Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the final state is not the same for all souls." is a very serious logical flaw in several ways. First of all, Dvaita never claimed that it is a brand new school of thought. It claimed that all the sadagamas hold the Dvaita views and supplied enough quotes and explanations. Further, in the prior paragraph the three-fold classification of non-liberated souls (amukta jivās) as per Dvaita school is described. In the subsequent sentences, three-fold classification of non-liberated souls (amukta jivās) as per Jaina school is described. In the logical paradigm in question, the above sentence not only stands as irrelevant, but also creates confusion in the mind of the reader. Perhaps, the author of the article was confused as well since "the final state is not the same for all souls" means "Ananda tāratamya" or "gradation among liberated souls or mukta jīvās". This is not the point discussed either in the Dvaita context or in the Jaina context. Not only one should note the difference between mukta jīvas (liberated souls) and amukta jīvās (non-liberated souls), but one should also be aware of the difference between "gradation" and "classification". Gradation or "tāratamya" is an assertion that there is difference in the level of two entities that are compared. On the other hand, classification is division of ceratin group of entities into some sub-groups based on certain criteria. Perhaps the author meant to say "Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the amukta jīvās or non-liberated souls (which is prior to final state or mokṣa) can be classified into three categories.", in which case there is some logical connection between the sentences that lie prior to that sentence and the sentences that follow it. Otherwise that sentence will be hanging in the limbo only.
2. Though both (Jaina theory and tattvavāda) have 3 fold divisions, they do not bear much similarity.
In Jainism, the categories are
i. jīvās - those who have jīvatva or consciousness,
ii. bhavyās - who possess the ability to manifest characteristics of Samyagdarsana, etc.,
iii. abhavyās - those who do not have such ability.
They do not seem to be mutually exclusive. For ex. Can a jīva be bhavya and not have jīvatva. Just because abhavyās do not have Samyagdarsana, etc., can we say that they are not jīvās ? It seems as if (ii.) and (iii.) are subdivisions of (i). The division seems to be flawed. Also there is no "one to one correspondence" between Jainism and tattvavāda. There is no similarity of description.
More over the concept of mokṣa itself is very different between the two schools as Jainism is basically "nirīṣvara" (or one that propounds the absence of Supreme God), where as Dvaita clearly says "Vishnu" is supreme. According to Dvaita, mokṣa is not only the liberation from the cycles of birth and death, but also a state of eternal bliss to the fullest capacity of each individual soul in the company of God, which can be attained only by the grace of God and only after completion of destined "sādhana".
3. Now comes the most crucial point which blows away all these theories, which are based on superficial similarity, chronological precedence and geographical proximity.
As the author of the article has noted, Sri Madhvacharya has stated that "sadagamas" form a source for Dvaita philosophy. Even if the author, Dr. Zydenbos did not make a thorough search of all the sadagamas to see if such division exists anywhere else in the sadāgamās, atleast a look into the well-known Bhagavadgīta, which forms an accepatable text to all the vedantic schools, could have revealed that such a division indeed existed prior to the birth of Jainism.
Irrespective of the interpretation of other schools or acceptance by other schools, there are several verses in Bhagavadgīta that describe at length the three-fold classification of jīvas. For the fear of bulk or hugeness of this posting, I shall give a small sample but mention some of the other verses that speak of such division.
trividhā bhavati śraddhā dehināṁ sā svabhāvajā |
sāttvikī rājasī caiva tāmasī ceti tāṁ śṛṇu || 17.2
sattvānurūpā sarvasya śraddhā bhavati bhārata |
śraddhāmayo'yaṁ puruṣo yo yacchraddhaḥ sa eva saḥ || 17.3
The "shraddhā"(Astikya buddhi) of the jīvās are of three kinds and they are born out of the inherent nature of the jīvās. This manifests in three kinds viz. "sātvika", "rājasa" and "tāmasa". The "shraddhā" of all the jīvās are in accordance with their "sattva" or "jīvasvarūpa" only. This jīva is "shraddhātmaka" or "shraddhāsvarūpa" only.
The verses 1-20 of 16th chapter describe at length the characteristics of muktiyogya and tamoyogya jīvas.
The verses 20-21 of chapter 9, verses 42-44 of 2nd chapter, verses 20-24 of chapter 7 describe the pattern of nityasamsārins.
yajante sāttvikā devānyakṣarakṣāṁsi rājasāḥ |
pretānbhūtagaṇāṁścānye yajante tāmasā janāḥ || 17.4
sātivikās (muktiyogyās) worship gods (with Vishṇu as the ultimate receiver), rājasās (nityasamsārins) worship yakṣās and rākṣasās and tāmasās (tamoyogyās) worship piśāchās and bhūtagaṇās (evil spirits) in the sacrificial offerings.
Similarly verses 5-28 of chapter 17, verses 4-9, 20-22 and 40 of chapter 18 describe the three categories.
Also
niyataṁ saṅgarahitamarāgadveṣataḥ kṛtam |
aphalaprepsunā karma yattatsāttvikamucyate || 18.23
yattu kāmepsunā karma sāhaṁkāreṇa vā punaḥ |
kriyate bahulāyāsaṁ tadrājasamudāhṛtam || 18.24
anubandhaṁ kṣayaṁ hiṁsāmanavekṣya ca pauruṣam |
mohādārabhyate karma yattattāmasamucyate || 18.25
The prescribed action done without desire, hatred, attachment, feelings of independence, and desire for the fruits of action is known as "sātvik" (the inherent nature of muktiyogya). The action done with desire for heaven etc. and with feelings of independent doership and resulting in smaller fruits and a lot more exertion is called "rājasa" (the inherent nature of nityasamsārin). The action done with disregard that one action can lead to another unavoidable binding by another action and also disregard to the harm and agony that it does to others with an illusory knowledge that the jīva is the independent doer is "tāmasa" (the inherent nature of tamoyogya).
Further the verses 26-39 of chapter 18 also describe the three categories.
Verses 11-12 describe tamoyogyas and verses 13-14 describe muktiyogyas.
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Pūrvapakṣa-6:
Ref : Page 253 2nd para (section 1.3)
This parrallelism of views in Dvaita and Jainism acquires still greater significance when we consider the historical circumstances in which Dvaita originated . Madhva was born in a village very near the modern Udupi in the southwestern Karnataka state, and at that time that region was ruled by a staunch Jaina dynasty which had its capital at Barkur, only a few miles away from Madhva's birthplace. One modern biographer of Madhva states that at the time of Madhva's birth Jainism was very strong in that region, and he adds that the
Ananteśvara and Candreśvara temples in Udupi, which today are major shrines of Vaishnava sect which Madhva founded, once were Jaina temples dedicated to Tirthankaras and Anantanātha and Candranātha.
Also, in the later history of Madhva Vaishnavism we see examples of Madhva - Jaina confrontation: thus the town Subrahmanya, also in South Kanara district, was once a Jaina kṣetra, but is now dominated by Madhvas; the multi - religious place of pilgrimage Dharmasthala, in the very same region, is still primarily a Jaina kṣetra, but employs Madhva priests.
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Siddhānta-6:
The author's statement can be summarized into the following steps.
1. Madhva's birthplace is in close proximity to Jaina dynasty.
2. Jainism was strong at the time of Madhva's birth.
3. Some of today's major shrines of Vaishnava were once Jaina temples.
4. There were examples of Madhva - Jaina confrontation
5. Dharmasthala, a primary Jaina kṣetra, employs Madhva priests.
Granting all these, what does the author try to assert ?
A. Madhva borrowed his philosopihical tenets from Jainism ?
Certainly, not. None of the above points can substantiate that.
B. The views are parallel because of the above stated reasons ?
They may appear to be parallel to some. But, the differences are lot more than the similarities. Even if there is some common terminology, the interpretations vary very much. Even the chronological precedence does not grant much benefit to Jainism.Time and again, Madhvacharya quoted that the source for tattvavāda
is sadāgamās. Jainism itself was not considered "sadāgama", thoughJainism may have used sadāgamās in postulating some of its principles. When one can find the original source itself, there is no need to use the secondary source.
The points listed above only show that, a lot of Jains must have embraced Madhva philosophy much to the dislike of other Jains. Dharmasthala was influenced by Shri vādirājā's teachings. The coexistence of the two cultures is hardly a proof for Jaina influence on madhva philosophy.
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Pūrvapakṣa-7:
Ref : Page 254 2nd para
More importantly, objection is made against the Jaina syādvāda, the doctrine which says that because each real object combines within it a huge variety of aspects and characteristics, conflicting predications can be made about that object. This has been summarized in the famous saptabhaṅgīnyāya or 'seven-fold predication' , which says that in a certain sense, a thing is , and is not, and also both, and neither, etc., Sankara conveniently overlooked that the syādvāda does not say that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame temporal and spatial circumstances, and so his criticism on this point does not reach far beyond a mere sarcastic stating that tertium non datur. This model refutation has been followed by all other Vedantins ever since.
Madhva does the same in his Anuvyakhyāna, his fouth commentary on the Brahmasutras, and hence in his famous sub-commentary, the Nyāyasudha, Jayatirtha, the most important commentator on Madhva's works, deals with this matter also. What is very striking, however, is the amount of space that Jayatirtha devotes to his discussion of Jainism: in the most recent edition of the text, this passage is approximately 12 pages long. Also, we must notice that in his description of Jaina teachings, he reveals a genuine familiarity with them and presents a more detailed and truthful picture of Jainism than most Vedanta authors do.
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Siddhānta-7:
This is full of self-contradictions. On one side, the author says that Hindu philosophical thoughts "have comparatively neglected Jainism". On the other side, it says that several pages were written about Jainism. It is like a double-edged weapon. Let us see what a critic will say in the following two instances.
1. If for the sake of refuting some theory, a thorough treatise is given about the theory, it is labelled as influence.
2. If on the other hand a short sketch of the theory is given, it is called "neglecting", where in a thorough understanding of the refuted theory is lacking.
Here I will be forced to bring two things to the notice of the author.
1. kṣapaṇaka is a common word used for Jaina and Buddha. There are lot of similarities between Jainism and Buddhism. When there are lot of arguments to refute Buddhism, it is to be realized that for all the common points, the refutation of Jainism is also accomplished.
2. It is the greatness of tattvavāda that before it refutes any theory, a correct and complete explanation of "pūrvapakṣa" is given, so that there will be no accusation that the refuted theory is incorrectly comprehended. So I do not see anything wrong in Jayatiirtha giving full explanation of particular set of points of Jainism being discussed, so that a proper refutation can be done.
I do not know what the author is trying to say regarding "Jayatirtha's genuine familiarity with Jainism". It is very clear that the purpose of that chapter is to refute Jainism. It is to be commended that pūrvapakṣa is given full explanation before it is refuted. If one does not have a full understanding of what is being refuted, it does not make sense. As regards saptabhaṅgīnyāya, the explanation etc. are very clear. The accusation of model refutation of overlooking that "the syādvāda does not say opposing predications can be made…" is totally baseless for the following reasons.
In fact in page 254 of the article the author says "seven-fold predication which says that in a certain sense, a thing is, and is not, and also both, and neither etc.". It is interesting that the seven were not listed. In fact, the "neither" is called avaktavya and three more categories are created by combining avaktavya with "is", "is not" and "both".
It does not make sense to use "etc." when that list of seven-fold predication is important and relevant. In fact it would have been worthwhile for the author even to give a brief explanation for each so that he can substantiate his argument which has following three step logic.
1. Shankara conveniently overlooked that the syādvāda does not say that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame temporal and spatial circumstances, and so his criticism on this point does not reach far beyond a mere sarcastic stating that tertium non datur.
(# The fact that syādvāda does speak of opposing predication at the same time is shown below).
2. This model refutation has been followed by all other Vedantins ever since.
3. Madhva does the same in his anuvyākhyāna.
If one had basic understanding of "tattva viveka" and "tattva sankhyāna", he would not say that Madhva has done such a serious mistake. There are usage of terms like "pūrvābhāva" "aparābhāva" and "sadābhāva" in these works which take into account all such circumstances. This only indicates that the author's criticism has no basis.
In page 3996 of nyāyasudha (Imprint Bengalura : Srimanmadhva siddhantābhivrddhi-karini sabha, 1982)
"etatsaptaprakāram kutaḥ asmbhavāt so'pi katham dṛṣti virodhataḥ | sarvam hi svopādhau sat paropādhau asat | svarūpeṇa bhāvo'nyātmatvādinā'bhāvaḥ | dravyarūpeṇa nityamavasthābhedena anityam | svarūpādinā'bhinnaṁ svagunādinā bhinnābhinnamityeva pratīyate | nāto'nyena prakāreṇa'to vyavasthayā niyama grāhaka pratyakṣādivirodhenāsambhavādayuktaṁ evānekāntamatamiti |"
which means
'It is impossible for these seven kinds to happen. Why impossible? - because it is against the experience of direct perception.
How ? -
everything is "existing in its own paramaters and non-existing outside its own parameters, expressible or manifesting by its own inherent nature and inexpressible or non-manifesting by the inherent nature of others, eternal in terms of matter, non-eternal in terms of change of status, non-different from inherent nature, etc.,
bhinnābhinna (some ways different and someways not) from its qualities, etc.". Everything is seen thus only and no other way. Thus "anekānta theory" is improper because it is against the direct perception, etc., which are acceptable forms of arrangement.'
# (See above for the accusation that all vedantins made wrong assumption)
That the syādvāda says that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame tempora and spatial circumstances is endorsed by Jaina works.
I will be referring to the two sources mentioned by Dr. Zydenbos.
Dr. S. Mookerjee's "The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism":
The Saptabhanginyāya is described as (ref. p 118)
1. Existence (in a specific context)
2. Non-existence (in another context)
3. Successive occurrence of both
4. Inexpressibility
5. Inexpressibility as qualified by first predicate
6. Inexpressibility as qualified by second predicate
7. Inexpressibility as qualified by third predicate
The substance (dravya), attribute (bhāva), time (kāla) and space (kṣetra) form the context. The context of space cannot be applied to space itself or the universe. Similarly, the context of time cannot be applied to time itself or the eternity. Even this context- based division is talked of at the same time only. For e.g.,
B.K.Matilal writes (Pages. 52,53):
'Samantabhadra has commented upon the meaning of "syāt" as follows "When the particle 'syāt' is used by you (Mahavīra) as well as by a shruta kevalin (e.g., a saint) in a sentence, it indicates in connection with other meanings, non-one sidedness; it qualifies (since it is a particle=nipāta) the meaning (of the sentence
concerned)".'
Further Matilal says, "Thus the particle 'syāt' in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the sentence." Again on p 61, he says, "Thus a philosophy does not really understand the point that is being made by the opposite side. Rival schools only encourage dogmatism and intoleration in philosophy. This according to the Jainas, is the evil of ekānta 'one sided' philosophies. Even the conflicting propositions of rival schools may be in order, provided they are asserted with proper qualification or conditionalization. This is what exactly Anekanta doctrine teaches. Add a syāt particle to your philosophic proposition and you have captured the truth."
Living with a philosophy with such kind of flexibility is like living in a building whose foundation can move at the touch of a button.
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Pūrvapakṣa-8:
Ref : PAGES.255-256 (section 1.4).
In his discussion of the position of memory in Indian theories of pramāṇa, B. K. Matilal remarks that memory-experience was never regarded by any non-Jaina philosopher (a Naiyayika or a Buddhist) to constitute a piece of knowledge, a prama, a cognitive awareness which amounts truth." The qualification "a Naiyayika or a Buddhist" is necessary here, for we see that Madhva and his followers very explicitly do so...Though these ideas are already found in the Tattvarthasutra, Bhavasena's work proves that they were known in southwestern Karnataka in Madhva's time.
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Siddhānta-8:
Here the question is whether the author is saying that prior to Jaina theory, there was no usage of the term "memory" itself or whether there is no instance or explanation where the memory is treated
as Pramana. Both can be easily refuted as there are many references to memory in many places.
The following verses from Bhagavadgita :
dhyāyato viṣayānpuṁsaḥ saṅgasteṣūpajāyate |
saṅgātsañjāyate kāmaḥ kāmātkrodho'bhijāyate || II.62||
krodhādbhavati saṁmohaḥ saṁmohātsmṛtivibhramaḥ |
smṛtibhraṁśād buddhināśo buddhināśātpraṇaśyati || II.63||
"Whoever muses on the objects of senses, develops attachment to them; from attachment springs up desire; and from desire arises anger; from anger ensues delusion or error of judgement; from delusion results loss of memory such as scriptural commandments and injunctions; from shattered memory eventuates loss of good sense and understanding and he perishes from the loss of good sense and understanding."
mṛtyuḥ sarvaharaścāhamudbhavaśca bhaviṣyatām |
kīrtiḥ śrīrvākca nārīṇāṁ smṛtirmedhā dhṛtiḥ kṣamā || X.34||
"I (Lord Krishna) am death, the devourer of all. I am the origin of all to come, among women, I am fame, prosperity, speech, memory, intelligence, firmness and forgiveness."
sarvasya cāhaṁ hṛdi sanniviṣṭo mattaḥ smṛtirjñānamapohanaṁ ca |
vedaiśca sarvairahameva vedyo vedāntakṛdvedavideva cāham || XV.15||
"I am lodged in the hearts of all; from Me originate memory, knowledge and misapprehension. I am indeed He who is to be known by all the vedas; I am the author of vedanta and I alone possess the knowledge of what the vedas proclaim."
naṣṭo mohaḥ smṛtirlabdhā tvatprasādānmayā'cyuta |
sthito'smi gatasandehaḥ kariṣye vacanaṁ tava || XVIII.73||
"O Achyuta, my delusion is gone. I have gained knowledge through Your grace (my memory is brought back). I stand firm with my doubts dispelled. I shall act according to your word of command."
rājansaṁsmṛtya saṁsmṛtya saṁvādamimamadbhutam |
keśavārjunayoḥ puṇyaṁ hṛṣyāmi ca muhurmuhuḥ || XVIII.76||
tacca saṁsmṛtya saṁsmṛtya rūpamatyadbhutaṁ hareḥ |
vismayo me mahānrājanhṛṣyāmi ca punaḥ punaḥ || XVIII.77||
"O king(Dhṛtarāṣṭra), remembering and recalling to memory this marvellous and sacred dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna, I (Sanjaya) rejoice again and again. O king, remembering and remembering that most marvellous form of Hari, great is my wonder and I rejoice over and over again".
The following is from Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
"atha ha mana ūcustvaṁ na udgayeti tatheti tebhyo mana udagāyadyo manasi bhogastaṁ devebhya āgāyadyatkalyāṇaṁ saṅkalpayati tadātmane te viduranena vaina udgātrā'tyeṣyantīti tamabhidrutya pāpmanā avidhyan sa yaḥ sa pāpmā"
Also in other places in this and other upanishads, the mind is treated as sixth sense organ and one kind of knowledge that is obtained through mind is memory and so that is a valid form of knowledge.
The following which is courtesy of Sri Shrisha Rao :
Begin-quote ========================================
I. In the pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa our Acharya quotes a verse saying:
smṛtiḥ pratyakṣamaitihyamanumānacatuṣṭayam |
pramāṇamiti vijñeyaṁ dharmādyarthe bubhūṣubhiḥ || iti śruteśca |
(p. 233 of the ABMM edition, 1969)
It has been discovered that the first hemistich is to be found in the Black
Yajur Veda:
smṛtiḥ pratyakṣamaitihyam | anumānacatuṣṭayam | etairādityamaṇḍalam| sarvaireva vidhāsyate sūryo marīcimādatte | sarvasmādbhuvanādadhi | tasyāḥ pākaviśeṣeṇa | smṛtaṁ kālaviśeṣaṇam | nadīva prabhavākācit | akṣayyā tsyandate tathā | tāṁ nadyo'bhisamāyanti | soruḥ satī na nivartate | evaṁ nānāsamutthānāḥ | kālāḥ saṁvatsaraṁ śritāḥ | aṇuśaśca mahaśaśca | sarve samavayantri tam | sa taiḥ sarvaiḥ samāviṣṭaḥ | ūraḥ sanna nivartate | adhisaṁvatsaraṁ vidyāt | tadeva lakṣaṇe aṇubhiśca mahadbhiś- ca | samārūḍhaḥ pradṛśyate | saṁvatsaraḥ pratyakṣeṇa | nādhisatvaṁ pradṛśyate | paṭaro viklidhaḥ piṅgaḥ |etadvaruṇalakṣaṇam |
yatraitadupadṛśyate | sahasraṁ tatra nīyate | ekaṁ hi śiro nānā mukhe | kṛtsnaṁ tadṛtulakṣaṇam | ubhayataḥ saptendriyāṇi | jalpitaṁ tveva dihyate śukraṁ te anyadyajataṁ te anyat | viṣurūpo ahanī dyaurivāsi | viśvā hi māyā avasi svadhāvaḥ | bhadrā te pūṣaṇiha rātirastu |
(kṛ. ya. ve. III.1-2)
The passage seems to make reference to `saptendriyāṇi', etc., so later parts may also be of relevance.
A reference for the previous is: `Mula Yajurveda-Samhita', Vol. VIII, The Banaras Hindu University Sanskrit Series, June 1973, PK 3201 1973, page 182. Vedic accents, etc., have not been shown.
II. The doctrine that smṛti is valid knowledge may also be inferred from the fact that a vast literature called smṛti exists in Vedanta, which is supposed to be written remembrances of sages; if their memories had no validity, then how could these texts?
III. In the Bhagavad Gita, Sri Krishna also says (verse XV-15) that He is the cause of memory and of forgetfulness, which is read even by Shankara to mean that He causes the exact knowledge of memory in the pious and lapses of memory in the sinful:
ataḥ mattaḥ ātmanaḥ sarvaprāṇināṁ smṛtiḥ jñānaṁ tadapohanaṁ apagamanaṁ ca yeṣāṁ yathā puṇyakarmiṇāṁ puṇyakarmānurodhena jñānasmṛtī bhavataḥ tathā pāpakarmiṇāṁ pāpakarmānurūpeṇa smṛtijñānayoḥ apohanaṁ ca apāyanaṁ apagamanaṁ ca | ... etc.
(śaṅkara-bhāṣya on BG XV-15)
Later in the 'Gita, Arjuna reports that his delusion has been destroyed and his memory restored (verse XVIII-73), under which also Shankara gives indication that he considers Arjuna's memory to be valid and obtained by grace of Krishna:
smṛtiḥ ca ātmatattvaviṣayā labdhā yasyāḥ lābhāt sarvahṛdayagranthīnāṁ vipramokṣaḥ | tvatprasādāt tava prasādāt mayā tvatprasādaṁ āśritena acyuta | anena mohanāśapraśnaprativacanena sarvaśāstrārthajñānaphalaṁ etāvat eva iti niścitaṁ darśitaṁ bhavati yataḥ jñānāt mohanāśaḥ ātmasmṛtilābhaḥ ca iti |
Shankara may have contradicted himself elsewhere, but it cannot be denied that at least in these instances, under the clear impelling of the 'Gita, he was obliged to honor memory as a valid source of knowledge. Indication that the 'Gita considers memory to be valid is also to be found in Sanjaya's statement
'rājan samsmṛtya samsmṛtya', etc. (XVIII-76/77).
Therefore, it is correct to say that our Acharya's doctrine of validity is derived from the Yajur Veda and from the Bhagavad Gita and not from Jainism, and even that said doctrine was known to and accepted by Shankara also.
End-quote ============================================
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Pūrvapakṣa-9:
Ref : PAGES.256 (section 1.4).
In his Pramāṇalakṣaṇa, Madhva briefly states yathārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ, i.e., "pramāṇa [is] true to the object," and Jayatirtha elaborates that a pramāṇa "makes" a thing as it is its object". Where Jayatirtha uses
the term yāthārthya , "the quality of being true to the object" as a characterization of pramāṇa, Bhavasena uses yāthātmya, "the quality of being true to the nature [of the object]" Madhva then continues by saying that pramāṇa is twofold, kevala and anupramāṇa. Kevala is further defined as yathārthajñāna, and anupramāṇa is the means by which it is attained. In this latter context, Jayatirtha adds that yathārthajñāna i.e., kevala, is prama. In other words, here kevala, which was first
defined as one of the two basic kinds of pramāṇa, finally is considered pramā as well, as has traditionally been the case in Jainism. Dvaitin authors, whether classical or modern, have never noticed or acknowledged this obvious similarity between the two systems.
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Siddhānta-9:
It is strange how the similarity is drawn between "yāthārthya" and "yāthātmya" by taking their translation into English. "yathārtham" is split as "yathā" (which is Indicative of "anatikrama" meaning not crossing the bounds which in turn means exact) and "artha" (which comes from "aryata" = jñeyam = to be known). So "yathārthaṁ" is exact knowledge. Now "yatha" and "Atma" will mean exact nature of the object. Here the subject matter is knowledge about the object and not nature of the object. Now let us delve deep into these definitions which superficially seem similar. When one talks about "the knowledge about an object/subject", the things that automatically follow are -
"one who attempts to know" (pramātṛ),
"thing or object to be known" (prameya), etc.
When one talks about "the nature of the object", "pramātṛ" and "prameya" fail to convey anything meaningful. One cannot wriggle out saying "pramātṛ is the one who attempts to know the nature of the object as this leads to "ativyāpti" (the flaw of unwarranted extension of the definition) which, in essence, is crossing its boundary (which is merely the nature and not the knowledge). Similarly, one cannot say that prameya is "thing or object which is to be known" which also has the flaw of "ativyāpti". This shows the invalidity of the definition "yāthātmya" (the quality of being true to the nature [of the object]) to describe "pramāṇa". It is surprising that the author has tried to prove the influence of Jainism on Dvaita based on this superficial similarity, while the definition given by Jainism itself is invalid. This phonetic similarity is no similarity at all. This statement "Dvaitin authors, whether classical or modern, have never noticed or acknowledged this obvious similarity between the two systems" is meaningless in case of the definition of pramāṇa.
Now comes the second point "...here kevala, which was first defined as one of the two basic kinds of pramāṇa, finally is considered pramā as well, as has traditionally been the case in Jainism". First some clarification about pramā. Pramā means the same thing as kevala-pramāṇa, except that it is used in a singular sense, to denote one piece of correct knowledge, etc.; the latter is more often used to indicate a body of correct knowledge. Even granting that "Jainism has given the same definition to pramā", it is totally futile effort on the part of the author to search for the similarities between "tattvavāda" and "Jainism" and it is equally ridiculous to conclude that, on account of the similarity and later chronological existence, "tattvavāda" has derived its theory from "Jainism". For drawing such a conclusion, the author has to prove that prior to Jainism, these concepts never existed. When no such attempt is made by the author how can he claim or expect that "Dvaitin authors, whether classical or modern, should notice or acknowledge this obvious similarity between the two systems." Such similarities are either mere coincidence or on account of the fact that Jainism also must have used "sadāgamās" for drawing some of its theories. The latter case seems more probable as they had access to those sadāgamās like anyone else.
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Pūrvapakṣa-10:
Ref : PAGES.256-257 (section 1.5).
Earlier, Jaina thinkers ... made a basic twofold distinction of pramanas... Knowledge is of five kinds, viz. mati, sruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala: the first two, viz. sensory[including memory] and the scriptural [or reported] were termed parokṣa, and the remaining three were termed pratyakṣa. With Bhavasena we find a change from the older division in the Tattvarthasutra: another, fourfold division of pratyakṣa, viz. indriya-, manas-, yogi-, and svasamvedanapratyakṣa, has taken its place. Thus sensory knowledge has become pratyakṣa, more in agreement with the terminology of other schools of thought, and parokṣa has been redefined as knowledge which is caused by "the application of the self [atmāvadhānena]; "pratyakṣa, etc"., including memory, recollection, ūha, apoha, tarka, and Agama.
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Siddhānta-10:
Let us first summarize what the author is trying to say about the classification in Jainism.
Earlier Jaina thinkers approach: Knowledge five kinds -
1. mati - sensory[including memory]
2. sruta - scriptual [or reported]
3. avadhi
4. manaḥparyāya
5. kevala
1. and 2. are parokṣa. 3., 4. and 5. are pratyakṣa.
Bhavasena did another fourfold division of pratyakṣa.
1.indriya- 2. manas- 3. yogi- 4. svasamvedanapratyakṣa
Thus sensory knowledge became pratyakṣa (thereby Bhavasena contradicted earlier Jaina thinkers, according to the author).
parokṣa has been redefined as knowledge which is caused by "the application of the self [atmāvadhānena]; "pratyakṣa, etc", including memory, recollection, ūha, apoha, tarka, and Agama.
The author continues:
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Pūrvapakṣa-11:
In Madhva's Pramanalakṣana, we find that kevala has a similar fourfold division as the Jaina pratyakṣa has, though here it is divided into īsa-, lakṣmi-, yogi-, and ayogijñāna. These four may all be called jñāna, since it has already been stated that kevala is yathārthajñāna. These four kinds of kevala are distinguished from each other by a qualitative gradation in clarity, which we also find among the varieties of pratyakṣa of the Tattvarthasutra.
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Siddhānta-11:
It is shocking that a similarity of division is assumed based on such superficial factors like "four-fold division" and a common term "yogi", with total disregard to what was classified, what was the guideline for the classification and what was the definition for "yogi" or "yoga".
In Dvaita:
1. What was classified - the kevala jñāna
2. The guideline for classification -pramātṛ
3. yoga - "bhagavaddharmānuṣṭānādirūpajñānopāyaḥ" (the skill or expertise in knowing the duties, actions etc. that are to be performed towards God)
In Jainism:
1. What was classified - the pratyakṣa jñāna
2. The guideline for classification - not pramātṛ (Much worse is the case here than what it could have been. This is an imperfect classification as it lacks exact guide line. One cannot say pramātṛ is the guide line as it has "indriya", "manas", etc. One cannot say "the organ used" is the guide line, as "yogi" and
"svasamvedana" categories fall out of such guide line. Thus this pathetic classification crumbles down in its embryo stage itself).
3. yoga - no matter what Jaina definition is, it has no place for God and thus bears no similarity to the definition given in dvaita.
Thus, the similarity in four-fold classification is mere shadow chasing.
The author continues:
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Pūrvapakṣa-12:
Of course Jainism, being ultimately an atheistic system, cannot offer any place of special epistemological significance to the supposed knowledge of the two main Vaisnava deities; but apart from the similar
occurance of a fourfold division, we notice that both the Jaina and the Dvaitin classification include a variety of knowledge which they term yogi-[pratyakṣa or jñāna]. Yogipratyakṣa is the term which Bhavasena uses to cover the two varieties of knowledge known by the older terms avadhi- and manaḥparyāyajñāna. Through special dhyana or meditative practices [dhyānaviśeṣād] one acquires yogipratyakṣa, which is a clear apprehension of all things [sakalapadārthaspaṣṭāvabhāsaḥ]. avadhijñāna apprehends all material objects and souls in samasāra, and again exists in further gradations. Through manaḥparyāyajñāna one also apprehends still more subtle phenomena, such as the thoughts of others. Kevala finally is omniscience, which is obtained when a soul sheds all its karma and thereby realizes its true nataure. Similarly in the Dvaitin view, yogijñāna is an excellence acquired through the influence of the yoga which increases gradually until liberation is attained.
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Siddhānta-12:
There are some statements, which are either erroneous or make unwarranted assumption that usage of same term includes same definition as well.
> 1. ...both the Jaina and the Dvaitin classification include a variety > of knowledge which they term yogi-[pratyakṣa or jñāna].
Mere use of the same term does not mean any thing unless both the systems give same definition. For e.g., in dvaita school the term yoga is defined as "bhagavaddharmānuṣṭānādirūpajñānopāyaḥ" (the skill or expertise in knowing the duties, actions etc. that are to be performed towards God), which is taken from the commentary of Sri Raghavendra tiirtha. How can Jainism even use such a definition when it is ultimately an atheistic system?
> 2. Kevala finally is omniscience, which is obtained when a soul sheds > all its karma and thereby realizes its true nature.
Kevala is not omniscience and no jiva obtains this omniscience in dvaita. Only īsha or the Lord is omniscient.
> 3. ...in the Dvaitin view, yogijñāna is an excellence acquired through > the influence of the yoga which increases gradually until liberation is attained.
In dvaita, yogijñāna is further classified into
I. ṛju II. tāttvika III. atāttvika
Only ṛjuyogijñāna increases gradually until liberation is attained.
So, now the question arises whether Jaina version of "yogipratyakṣa" corresponds with "ṛjuyogijñāna" of dvaita. Whether the answer is "yes" or "no", the similarity does not exist by virtue of the fact that the definition of yoga itself is very different.
The author continues:
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Pūrvapakṣa-13:
The use of the word kevala to denote a variety of knowledge both in Jainism and in Dvaita deserves closer attention. Though the term occurs in different places within the classification of pramana-s in the two systems, they share a common feature. The first two kinds of jñāna in the Jaina classification,
viz. mati and sruta, correspond to the Dvaitin anupramana-s [ which are pratyakṣa, anumāna and Agama] since in the older Jaina classification anumana is included in matijñāna. What distinguishes kevala from
anupramana in Dvaita is that kevala is knowledge, a manifestation of the soul, which is independent of any further sadhana or instrument. The definition of anupramana is tatsadhanam anupramanam, where tat stands
for kevala. The three kinds of knowledge called pratyakṣa in Jainism, of which kevala is one, are characterized by exactly that same independence. Thus we see that what is called kevala in Dvaita corresponds to what is called pratyakṣa in Jaina texts, while the use of the term pratyakṣa by Madhva shows a closer similarity to its use in the other schools of Indian philosophy.
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Siddhānta-13:
1. Here comes the complete self-contradiction from the author. Earlier in the article, the author mentioned that mati and sruta were termed parokṣa. Now he is saying that they "correspond to the Dvaitin anupramana-s [which are pratyakṣa, anumāna and Agama]. How can parokṣa correspond to pratyakṣa?
2. Where did this definition of "knowledge" as "a manifestation of the soul" come from? Kevala is knowledge and anupramāṇa is means/instrument of knowledge. Where is this question of "independent of any further
sādhana" ? Not only the number of divisions between the two systems are different, but even the basis of division and the definition of the terms are so very different.
3. The author claims that the two systems use different terms to mean same thing - like kevala in Dvaita corresponds to pratyakṣa in Jaina. Does this also mean that pratyakṣa in Dvaita different from Pratyakṣa in Jainism? If it is, then it means that the two systems do not speak same language even - use the same term to mean different things. If not different, then pratyakṣa in dvaita is same as pratyakṣa in Jainism, which is same as kevala in Dvaita. This poses two problems. I. The author has taken extra effort to show similarity between kevala of Dvaita and pratyakṣa of jainism while both have common pratyakṣa.
II. The kevala in Dvaita ends up same as pratyakṣa in dvaita - which is very wrong as one is knowledge and the other a tool.
4. To show identity of terms, the author is not using the definition of terms in the two systems, but using vague expressions like "being independent, etc.". In Dvaita pratyakṣa (direct perception) is defined as "nirdoṣārthendriyasannikarṣaḥ" (flawless contact between the sense organ and its object). There are two questions that come in.
I. Did Jainism give same definition to pratyakṣa (or to kevala)?
II. If so, is there any evidence to show that such a view was not present before Jainism?
The author must prove both I and II to make his point.
Or alternately,
5. In Dvaita "kevala" is defined as "yathārthajñānaṁ".
The two questions that come in are
I. Did Jainism give same definition to pratyakṣa ?
II. If so, is there any evidence to show that such a view was not present before Jainism?
Again, the author must prove both I and II to make his point.
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Pūrvapakṣa-14:
Ref : PAGES.258-259 (section 1.5).
Pratyakṣa is perception and is conceived of as being of seven kinds, viz. perception through the sakṣin ( the svarūpendriya, a function of the soul, to which we must return later), the manas and the five senses. The passage in the Pramanalakṣana where this is mentioned is briefly commented upon by Jayatiirtha. But then comes the surprise. After first supporting Madhva's statement that pratyakṣa is of seven kinds, he continues: "And this is said not to be universal. For pratyakṣa is of four kinds. It is known under the divisions. It is known under the divisions īsha-, Lakṣmi-, yogi- and ayogi-pratyakṣa. This is of course exactly the same kind of fourfold division which we have already come across in our discussion of kevala; and in a few lines Jayatiirtha gives what looks like a summary of what he has already said earlier in connection with kevala. His statement that pratyakṣa is of four kinds has no foundation in Madhva's text; worse still, it is a flat contradiction. Also, it seems that he has made a logical error. From what Jayatiirtha tells us about the four kinds of kevala and the four kinds of pratyakṣa, it appears that there is no distinction whatsoever between kevala and pratyakṣa. But if Madhva and therefore also Jayatiirtha, makes a fundamental distinction between kevala and anupramāṇa as two basically different types of pramāṇa and the very same foursome which has previously been given as kevala returns later as a subcategory of anupramāṇa, then this amounts to self-contradiction. Yet Jayatiirtha was very firm in this, for we see exactly the same thing happen in his pramāṇapaddhati, which must be a later work.
Commenting on Jayatiirtha, Raghavendratiirtha states that "The sevenfoldness is not connected with all souls". and Srinivasatiirtha further elaborates that this is not the case with īsha and Lakṣmi, since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through svarūpendriya. But Srinivasatiirtha's contention does not hold good for all the remaining souls, yogin, as well as ayogin, since they do possess a manas and all the five senses, and so their pratyakṣa is ubhayavidhendriyasannikarṣaṇātmaka "of the nature of contact with the two kinds of sense organs", as Jayatiirtha himself states. Thus the problem of the seven kinds of pratyakṣa which are four kinds remain unsolved.
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Siddhānta-14:
This infact is the biggest surprise from Dr. Zydenbos. The author is all confused about kevala and pratyakṣa and mixed them up thoroughly and passed on the confusion to the Dvaita Acharyas. Let me explain this division for the benefit of Dr. Zydenbos and other readers as well.
Pramana (yathārthaṁ) is divided into two.
1. Kevala (yathārtha jñānaṁ) - the exact or precise knowledge
2. anupramāna (tatsādhanaṁ) - the means of obtaining such knowledge
Kevala is divided into 4 parts based on the "pramātṛ" (the knower)
1a. īsha (the Supreme God)
1b. Lakṣmi (the Goddess who is His consort)
1c. yogi
1d ayogi
anupramāṇa is divided into 3 parts
2a. pratyakṣa (flawless direct perception through the sense organs)
(nirdoṣārthendriyasannikarṣaḥ)
2b. anumāna (flawless logical inferencing/deductions) (nirdoṣopapattiḥ)
2c. Agama (nirdoṣa shabda)
Pratyakṣa is further divided into seven kinds.
2a-1. sākṣi (also called svarūpendriya)
2a-2. shrotra (hearing through the ears)
2a-3. tvak (touch through the skin)
2a-4. chakṣu (seeing through the eyes)
2a-5. jihva (tasting through the tongue)
2a-6. ghrāṇa (smelling through the nose)
2a-7. manas (thinking/remembering through the mind)
Sometimes 2a-1 is also called aprākṛtendriya and 2a-2 to 2a-7 (which are shaḍindriyās or six senses) are called prākṛtendriyas or asvarūpendriyās.
It can be seen that pratyakṣa is different from kevala. Kevala does not return as a subcategory of anupramana. There is no self-contradiction. Only a confusion of mind can perceive self-contradiction here. It is crystal-clear and why should any one make an effort to equate "one kind of knowledge" with "one kind of means of knowledge". It is fine to see logical connections.
When a term like yogipratyakṣa is used, it means that the knowledge yogi gets through pratyakṣa.
Sri Jayatiirtha has never contradicted Sri Madhvacharya. Even in cases, where some thing is mentioned which is not in mūla, he is elaborating the matter for the sake of others and consists of one of the following three cases :
1. A detailed explanation of what Sri Madhvacharya has said in the mūla that is being commented upon currently.
2. A detailed explanation of the pūrvapakṣa for the benefit of the reader.
3. A cross-referencing of what is said by Sri Madhvacharya elsewhere or use the thoughts expressed in other texts of the mūla by Sri Madhvacharya.
The third case applies to the following accusation.
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Pūrvapakṣa-15:
Dr. Z: >> "His statement that pratyakṣa is of four kinds has no foundation in Madhva's text; worse still, it is a flat contradiction"
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Siddhānta-15:
Sri Madhvacharya clearly mentioned in anuvyākhyāna-
prakṛtam śuddhacaitanyamakśaṁ tu dvividhaṁ matam |
śuddhamīśaramāmukteśvanyatra praktairyutam | 2-1-29
nirdośameva caitanyamanyatrobhayamiṣyate |
sukhaduḥkhādiviśayaṁ śuddhaṁ samsārageṣvapi || 2-1-30
nirdoṣatvātiniyamāttadbaliṣṭatamaṁ matam |
pañcendriyamanobhedātprākṛtaṁ ṣadvidhaṁ smṛtam || 2-1-31
Pratyakṣa is of two kinds - prākṛta (materialistic) and shuddha chaitanya (pure sentient which is also called aprākṛta). This "pure sentient means" (aprākṛta indriya) is for the Lord, Lakṣmi and liberated. In all other cases, it is along with materialistic senses. The svarūpendriya is of pure or flawless form. In other instance, it is mixed with joys and sorrows. Even the samsārins have both these kinds. Because of its flawless nature, the pure one (svarūpendriya) is the strongest one. The prākṛta senses are of six kinds viz., the five sense organs and the mind.
And in VTVN, he says
pratyakśaṁ trividhaṁ jñeyaṁ aiśvaraṁ yaugikaṁ tathā |
ayaugikaṁ ceti tathā sarvamakśātmakaṁ matam ||
akśāṇi ca svarūpāṇi nityajñānātmakāni ca |
viṣnoḥ śriyaḥ tathaivoktānyanyeṣāṁ dvividhāni tu ||
svarūpāṇi ca bhinnāni bhinnāni trividhāni ca |
devāsurāṇi madhyānītyetat pratyakśamīritam ||
quoted from brahmatarka.
Pratyakṣa is of three kinds 1. aiśvara. 2. yaugika 3. ayaugika
Note: Though different number of divisions appear, they lead to same end because of subdivisions or sub-grouping. Here aiśvara refers to
1a. Vishnu and
1b. Lakṣmi.
This four part division is what Sri Jayatiirtha refers to in order to explain that "seven kinds of pratyakṣa" cannot be universally applied.
(Here Pratyakṣa refers to the knowledge obtained through the pratyakṣa which is the means of direct perception. The confusion will be out of the mind if the correlation is understood, which will be explained a little later.).
In case of Vishnu and Lakṣmi, the direct perception is through nitya-jñānātmaka svarūpendriyas (the svarūpendriya which has eternal inherent knowledge).
In case of others, the sense organs of direct perception are two kinds svarūpa and asvarūpa. This asvarūpa senses are again three kinds
1. Deva pratyakṣa (divine), 2. Asura pratyakṣa (demonic) and 3. Madhya pratyakṣa (middle kind).
(This is just another kind of division which gives a different perspective and
does not lead to contradiction with any thing).
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Pūrvapakṣa-16:
Dr. Z >> Also it seems that he has made a logical error. From what Jayatiirtha tells us about the four kinds of kevala and the four kinds of pratyakṣa, it appears that there is no distinction whatsoever between kevala and pratyakṣa. But if Madhva and therefore also Jayatiirtha, makes a fundamental distinction between kevala and anupramāṇa as two basically different types of pramāṇa and the very same foursome which has previously been given as kevala returns later as a subcategory of anupramāṇa, then this amounts to self-contradiction. Yet Jayatiirtha was very firm in this, for we see exactly the same thing happen in his pramāṇapaddhati, which must be a later work.
Commenting on Jayatiirtha, Raghavendratiirtha states that "The sevenfoldness is not connected with all souls". and Srinivasatiirtha further elaborates that this is not the case with īsha and Lakṣmi, since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through svarūpendriya. But Srinivasatiirtha's contention does not hold good for all the remaining souls, yogin, as well as ayogin, since they do possess a manas and all the five senses, and so their pratyakṣa is ubhayavidhendriyasannikarṣaṇātmaka "of the nature of contact with the two kinds of sense organs", as Jayatiirtha himself states. Thus the problem of the seven kinds of pratyakṣa which are four kinds remains unsolved.
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Siddhānta-16:
There is absolutely no problem.
I will try to use a mathematical notation just to indicate how clear the concepts are.
Kevala is of four kinds.
1. Let us denote K(G) as the set to indicate God's knowledge. It is immeasurable and universal indicating omniscience. Everything else is a subset of K(G). As God has "aprākṛta'(non-materialistic and all-blissful) body, His pratyakṣa is through svarūpendriya only and also, He does not need "anumāna" or "Agama" as He is pratyakṣa sākṣi for everything.
2. Let us denote the knowledge(Kevala) of Lakṣmi as K(L). It is more than every one else, but subset of K(G). God knows completely about Himself, but Lakṣmi does not know completely about God. But her knowledge about God is more than all others.
3. Let us denote the knowledge(Kevala) of Yogi as K(Y) and
4. that of ayogi as K(A).
In both cases of K(Y) and K(A), it consists of the knowledge which is acquired through seven kinds of pratyakṣa and in addition the knowledge acquired through anumāna and Agama.
In case of ayogi, he can see what is happening in front of his eyes at present. In case of yogi, this goes beyond the limitations of time and space. The extent of this 'super ability' depends on the individual capacity of yogi. Again, yogis are three kinds (ṛju, tāttvika and atāttvika). Any K(Y) or K(A) is significantly and enormously small compared to K(L).
If we denote the knowledge obtained through pratyakṣa as P, then this P is of seven kinds (based on svarūpendriya, shrotra(ears or hearing), tvak(skin or touch), chakṣu (eyes or seeing), jihva (tongue or tasting), ghrāṇa (nose or smelling) and manas (mind or thinking or memory). Let us denote them as PP, PS, PT, PC, PJ, PG and PM.
Also let us denote the knowledge obtained through anumāna as AN and that through Agama as AG.
Thus
K(G) = P(G) (Where P(G) is Pratyakṣa of God and as can be seen it is a universal set and no sub-divisions in this case)
K(L) = P(L) (where P(L) is Pratyakṣa of Lakṣmi which also does not have any subdivisions)
K(Y) = PP(Y) + PS(Y) + PT(Y) + PC(Y) + PJ(Y) + PG(Y) + PM(Y) + AN(Y) + AG(Y)
and
K(A) = PP(A) + PS(A) + PT(A) + PC(A) + PJ(A) + PG(A) + PM(A) + AN(A) + AG(A)
The above notation shows seven kinds of Pratyakṣa appearing in last two cases only and so Sri Jayatiirtha said "na sArvatrikaṁ" (not universal) for the seven-fold division. That is what Sri Raghavendratiirtha means in stating that "The seven-foldness is not connected with all souls".
Of course some of these can be null or zero, like for a totally blind, PC(A) is null and for one not exposed to AgamAs or not able to read them properly, AG(A) is null.
The four kinds of Pratyakṣa can be seen on the right hand side based on the left
hand side of the notation above.
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Pūrvapakṣa-17:
Dr. Z >> Commenting on Jayatiirtha, Raghavendratiirtha states that "The sevenfoldness is not connected with all souls". and Srinivasatiirtha further elaborates that this is not the case with īsha and Lakṣmi, since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through svarūpendriya. But Srinivasatiirtha's contention does not hold good for all the remaining souls, yogin, as well as ayogin, since they do possess a manas and all the five senses, and so their pratyakṣa is ubhayavidhendriyasannikarṣaṇātmaka "of the nature of contact with the two kinds of sense organs", as Jayatiirtha himself states.
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Siddhānta-17:
Sri Srinivasatiirtha said exactly what Sri Jayatiirtha and Sri Raghavendratiirtha said namely īsha and Lakṣmi do not have sevenfold division and others do have. Thus his contention does hold good.
Equating Kevala with Pratyakṣa and then seeing a contradiction is like equating an apple with orange and then expecting them to have the same juice.
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Pūrvapakṣa-18:
Ref: Page. 260 (article 1.5):
Jayatirtha is aware of the Jaina categorization of souls, but he does not use the Jaina terms. According to him, "Souls are three kinds. [They are] bound, have achieved yoga and are liberated"...To my knowledge, this threefold classification does not occur in Jaina texts; the tattvarthasutra (II, 10) distinguishes only samsarino muktās ca,"[souls] in samsāra and liberated [souls]"...we have already seen that the Dvaitins themselves have formulated a tripartite classification of souls as tamoyogya, nityāvarta and muktiyogya, which, although different, shows a similarity in gradation in view of the ultimate spiritual goal. Whereas the Dvaitin threesome assumes three different degrees of potentiality with regard to attaining mukti, the supposed Jaina threesome, in the form in which Jayatirtha gives it, assumes three different degrees of actuality in the souls' progression towards mukti. In any case, what Jayatirth tells us about the Jaina view is incorrect, and it seems that a contamination has taken place, in which a Dvaitin tendency to see three categories has also been ascribed to the Jainas.
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Siddhānta-18:
Let us first summarize what the author is saying.
============
Dr.Z >> 1. Jainas categorize souls as souls in samsara and liberated souls.
>> 2. Dvaitins have tendency to see three categories.
>> 3. Jayatirtha contaminated Jaina view by ascribing three categories to the Jainas.
>> 4. What Jayatirtha tells about the Jaina view is incorrect.
>> 5. Dvaitin threesome assumes three different degrees of potentiality wrt attaining mukti. The alleged jaina threesome assumes three different degrees of actuality in the souls' progression towards mukti.
===========
1. If there is no further classification of samsārins in Jainism, then it bears no resemblance to dvaita.
2. In dvaita, the souls are classified into muktas and amuktas and then amuktas are further classified into muktiyogyās (who are ucchās), nityāvartās (madhyās) and tamoyogyās (nīcās). The three categories exist among amukta (non-liberated) souls.
3. What is the need for Jayatirtha to contaminate the Jaina view? Is it to give an opportunity to those who want to accuse that something is borrowed from Jainism? In fact even this alleged ascribing makes only two categories out of samsarins (baddha and yogasiddha) and not three.
4. The author has committed a great blunder by not seeing the very next sutra in Jaina texts; the tattvarthasutra (II, 11) which classifies samsarins further "samanaskā'manaskāḥ", which means "[souls] with mind and [souls] without mind". This makes it threesome classification. If it is a contamination, then it existed in original Jaina texts itself. The terminology that Jayatirtha has used may have been used by the Jaina adversaries of his day. But that is not even relevant. It is beyond any dispute that the threesome classification existed in original Jaina texts. The "so called Dvaitin tendency" does not even come into picture.
What is worse is that the author has made a big time counting error.
In Dvaita system, the souls are classified into four categories
1. Muktās, 2. tamoyogyās, 3. nityāvartās, 4. muktiyogyās
In Jaina system (even with the alleged contamination), the souls are classified into three categories
1. Muktas, 2. baddha, 3. yogasiddha
(Or by original texts)
1. Muktas, 2. amanaskās, 3. samanaskās
5. Dvaitin Mukta and amukta classification is based on actuality. Further amukta classification into three is based on potentiality. Thus, both actuality and potentiality are taken into consideration in classification in dvaita.
Thus, the final conclusion is:
A. There is no Jaina influence or borrowing from Jainism as far as dvaita is concerned. There is no borrowing from Christianity either.
B. Jayatirtha has not contaminated by assigning threesome division to Jaina view.
C. The threesome classification existed in the original texts.
D. Even with or without the alleged accusations of contamination, there is no similarity either in number of divisions or type of divisions between the two systems.
śrī Kṛṣṇārpaṇamastu.
Dr. Robert J. Zydenbos had published an article in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (1991) and that has drawn a conclusion that Acharya Madhva borrowed his concepts from Jaina and Christian schools.
The following article was written by Kesava Rao Tadipatri to completely reject that notion in clear and logical terms.
Some of the readers may be aware that, there was some discussion about an article in which there were claims that Sri Madhva drew some ideas from Jainism and that Sri Jayatiirtha made some logical errors and similar objectionable items which can easily be disproved. I will make a humble attempt to point out the flaws in those arguments. The original author or any of the readers are very welcome to argue in support of the article by opposing the views that I present here. In the same tone, any comments or questions are very welcome too.
Rebuttal of the article named "On The Jaina Background of Dvaitavedanta" by Dr. Robert J. Zydenbos published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (1991):
Always in any scholarly articles, the conclusions are drawn based on a set of sources and the arguments of the author. These conclusions can go wrong based on the incomplete and incorrect understanding of the author or use of inaccurate sources which have some inherent defects as such. Further the incorrectness of those conclusions can be established in either or both of the following two methods -
1. Point out the inconsistencies of the logic without even using any of the sources mentioned.
2. Point out the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the sources by the author by analyzing the sources used.
I shall attempt to use both the methods in my own way.
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Pūrvapakṣa-1:
Dr. Zydenbos in 1.1 (Pages. 250) of the article: Dvaita vedānta begins with Madhva in the thirteenth century; there is no Dvaitin teacher before him, and the only authoritative texts of the school earlier than the writings of Madhva are those which Madhva has classified as sadāgama, viz. the Vedas, the Mahābhārata, the entire corpus…. To these are also added the brahmasūtras of bādarāyaṇa, who is vyāsa, the author of the Vedas, etc., who is an incarnation of the Lord.
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Siddhānta-1:
Dvaita vedānta does not begin with Sri Madhvacharya. It was there before his incarnation. He only revived it. The very fact that he used the sadāgamas indicates that the philosophy existed before. Even though the same sadāgamas were used by advaitins and dvaitins to interpret them in accordance with their own schools, it does not mean that Dvaita concepts were not there before. This is an openly erroneous assumption. Secondly, vyāsa is not the author of Vedas. He only classified them. They existed before He classified them.
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Pūrvapakṣa-2:
Dr. Zydenbos in 1.1 (Page. 250) of the article: Though this identification of Madhva with Vayu and the earlier incarnations merits further investigation on account of its symbolic meaning, it seems not unlikely that in ascribing a divine nature to Madhva the early dvaitins evinced an uneasy awareness that their creation of a new Vedantic tradition could be frowned upon within the Brahminical community, and the claim of divinity of the founder could be seen as a sign of how serious they were in pursuing their ideas. Also the author says in the "Notes" - "Siauve mentions that Madhva declared himself an avatara, but she gives no reference."
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Siddhānta-2:
Does this mean that her claim may presumably be ignored? The author is saying clearly that it is very likely that in ascribing a divine nature to Sri Madhvacharya, the earlier Dvaitins evinced an uneasy awareness. This is a straight assumption with neither proof nor any other kind of substantiation. It is a question of faith and they would never mind if such a claim could be seen as a sign of serious pursuit of their ideas as they were serious. At least, one cannot say that they were not serious. Early dvaitins as well as present dvaitins (at all times) were easy and comfortable (in addition to being quite convinced) in ascribing a divine nature to Sri Madhvacharya.
Sri Madhvacharya gave a clear endorsement and declared himself as an avatara of Vayu in several instances. One such can be found at the end of śrī viṣṇutattvavinirṇayaḥ
yasya trīṇyuditāni veda-vacane rūpāṇi divyānyalam |
baṭtaddarśatamitthamevanihitaṁ devasya bhargo mahat |
vāyo rāmavaconayaṁ prathamakaṁ pṛkśo dvitīyaṁ vapuḥ |
madhvo yattu tṛtīyametadamunā granthaḥ kṛtaḥ keśave ||
Whose three divine forms have been described by Vedic statements (such as the BaLitthā Sūkta of the Rg Veda); whose nature is that of great wisdom and ability, is the support of the activity of the worlds, is very worshipful (of Vishnu), and who incarnates with his full potency (with no diminution); that Vāyu, in his first avatāra, carried the message of Rāma, destroyed a fearsome army in his second, and in the third, as Sri Madhvacharya, composed this work (the VTVN) as a service to Lord Keshava".
One can be found at the end of śrī brahmasūtrabhāṣyam.
yasya trīṇyuditāni vedavacane rūpāṇi divyānyalam |
baṭ taddarśanamitthameva nihitaṁ devasya bhargo mahat |
vāyo rāmavaconayaṁ prathamakaṁ pṛkṣo dvitīyaṁ vapuḥ |
madhvo yattu tṛtīyakaṁ kṛtamidaṁ bhāṣyaṁ harau tena hi ||
Whose three divine forms have been described by Vedic statements (such as the BaLitthā Sūkta of the Rg Veda); whose nature is that of great wisdom and ability, is the support of the activity of the worlds, is very worshipful (of Vishnu), and who incarnates with his full potency (with no diminution); that Vāyu, in his first avatāra, carried the message of Rāma, destroyed a fearsome army in his second, and in the third, as Sri Madhvacharya, composed this bhāṣya (for Brahmasutras) as a service to Lord Hari".
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Pūrvapakṣa-3:
Dr. Zydenbos in 1.1 (Pages. 250-251) of the article: Certain peculiar teachings of the MAdhvas (the followers of Dvaita, i.e. of the teachings of Madhva), more particularly certain aspects of the mythological account of Madhva's life such as we find it in works like Narayana's "Madhvavijaya", have in the past led some researchers to assume that there was a Christian influence in the formation of the doctrine, S.N. Dasgupta opposes this in his "History of Indian Philosophy", stating that bhakti can be traced to certain Vedic and Upanishadic verses, that there is no trace of a trinity doctrine in Madhva's thought, and that Madhva urges repeatedly that his doctrines are based on the Vedas, Gita and other scriptures. Though from a philosophical point of view Christian influence in Dvaita seems not likely, Dasgupta's argumentation against it is hardly convincing. Of course a thinker who wants to be accepted as a Vedāntin will claim that his ideas are drawn from the Brahminical tradition, or that they represent the "essence of Vedic thought". Long before Madhva, Shankara did the same, and it has been established that Shankara's Advaita to a large extent is a Brahminical adaptation of ideas drawn from Madhyamika Buddhism. Madhva too has noticed this, especially in his "Tattvoddyota", which is the first work in which Advaitin-Buddhist similarity is pointed out supported by arguments. Thus the claim of a philosophical doctrine to "Vaidikatva" or "Astikatva" is hardly a guarantee against the incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin.
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Siddhānta-3:
The author is trying to prove with a twist of thought that it is likely that there is a Christian influence on Dvaita philosophy. This is done in a subtle way. If one reads Narayana Panditacharya's Sumadhvavijaya with a critical mind, such person will not make a wrong assumption or make a wrong statement that the tattvavada school was influenced by Christianity. If one analyzes such wrong argument and the subsequent
conclusions, the baseless nature of it comes to surface easily. Dasgupta's argumentation against it might have been hardly convincing to Dr. Zydenbos; but the arguments for it are even less convincing, if anything.
This is the sequence of arguments of Dr. Zydenbos in brief:
1. A thinker that wants to be a Vedantin claim that his ideas are drawn from Brahminical tradition.
2. Shankara did the same (made such a claim). But his Advaita is Brahminical adaptation of ideas drawn from Madhyamika Buddhism.
3. The claim of Vaidikatva is hardly a guarantee against the incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin.
Is this an implication or conclusion? - Just as Advaita who claimed Vaidikatva has incorporated Buddhism (a non-Hindu origin), Madhva who claimed Vaidikatva has incorporated Christianity (a non-Hindu origin).
If such conclusions are drawn, the unending erroneous ripple effect will overturn the ship of arguments and the whole realm of logic sees no light of any proper sense. If one sect of Christianity in one area of U.S. involves in some unacceptable acts in the name of the religion, that cannot be extended as a sine qua non for the Christianity itself. In the same way, even if it is true that Shankara (Advaita), who claimed Vaidikatva, has incorporated Buddhism (a non-Hindu origin), it does not entail that Madhva (Dvaita), who claimed Vaidikatva, has incorporated Christianity (a non-Hindu origin).
Many supernatural deeds were performed by Sri Madhvacharya. The similarity with what is written in old testament or new testament is not even worth considering because even in those instances, the similarity does not extend to circumstances as well. When many miracles were performed, one or two being similar can very well be mere coincidence. So the Christianity influence argument on the basis of similarity is hardly convincing and in fact meaningless too. The more one studies tattvavāda, built from original and purely vedic thoughts, the more one gets convinced of non-influence of non-Hindu origin. Just to put in a nutshell, when the philosophical potency in the rest of the world was in a stage of infancy with incompletely opened eyes, the spiritual thinking and philosophical phenomenon in India in Vedic schools had phenomenal hegemony with Himalayan heights. Sri Madhvacharya had no need to turn to either Christianity or Jainism.
In this regard, I would like to quote a few passages from Appendix X (Pages 609-611) of History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature, Third Revised Edition: Delhi 2000.
"One cannot build castles in the air on the basis of similarities of legends and miracles alone as has been attempted to be done as between Christianity and Mādhva Philosophy - by unscrupulous Western scholars under the influence of fearly missionaries on the west coast, in the wake of establishment of British rule and the conversion of the members of the lower rungs of Hindu society by way of proselytization on a large scale.
These missionaries and Western scholars like Burneli, Grieson and A. L. Basham had an axe to grind in giving publicity to these assumptions - resting mostly on legends and miracles...- had not taken into account that Madhva's religio philosophical system is a Vedanta system rooted entirely in the heritage of the Vedas, Upanishads, Aranyakas, Epics and Purāṇas and Brahmasutras and Giita which, even according to Western Orientalists, are centuries earlier than the rise of Christianity or Islam.".
"Neither the position of Mukhya prāṇa nor of Andham Tamas for tamoyogyas in Madhva's philosophy is therefore derived from or influenced by Christianity - in view of the internal evidence of the Hindu scriptures themselves in point, which are centuries older than the birth of Christianity."
"One wonders whoever told the missionaries...that Madhva was born in Kalyanpur. The contemporary biography mentions Madhva's birth place as pāje (Pājakakṣetra) which lies some 10 kms. South East of Udupi, while Kalyanpur is situated some miles South West of Udupi... So much for Kalyanpur. It is also very doubtful, if there were any Christian settlements in Madhva's days in Kalyanpur. Even supposing there was one, it is incredible that there was any exchange of thought between Christians and Madhva's biographer regarding the miracles of Christ or his doctrines. Even today the social barriers between the orthodox Brahmins and the Christian priests are rigid. Imagine the state of affairs in the 13th century!"
"It is time then that the canard of Christian influence on Madhva or his doctrines is buried fathoms deep, not only as shallow but as highly mischievous, tendentious and motivated fictions given currency to under missionary partisanship. A substantial amount of authentic literature in English is now available on Madhva's thought, its origin and development from the Vedic heritage down to the present times and they should put an end once for all to such irresponsible propaganda of erroneous views rearing their heads now and then."
Some clarification before proceeding further:
While the main subject/object of the article itself is to assess whether Dvaita was influenced by Jainism and whether Sri madhvacharya borrowed anything from it, Dr. Zydenbos, the author of the article, made an attempt to indicate that Dvaita has infact incorporated Christianity as well. This accusation is slipped into the article in a subtle way.
If you read the extract from his article, the following is the sequence of arguments, he had put forth:
It is a five step approach.
1. Shankara claimed Vaidikatva
2. He incorporated Buddhism (based on the context, the author claims Buddhism as being of non-Hindu origin.) into Advaita.
3. Claiming Vaidikatva is no guarantee against incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin (In other words, though one claims Vaidikatva, he can incorporate thoughts of non-Hindu origin into it.)
4. Madhva claimed Vaidikatva.
5. From step 3 above, there is no guarantee that Madhva would not have incorporated thoughts of non-Hindu origin (current context is Christianity).
The strange part is that such a claim for Christian influence is derived from two things namely
I. Similarity in the performance of miracles
II. Absence of guarantee for a claimer of Vaidikatva to abstain from
incorporation of thoughts of non-Hindu origin.
This is similar to Murphy's law (or sometimes referred to as Finagle's Law) viz. "If one can go wrong, he will". Here the crafty implication is "If Madhva could incorporate thoughts of non-Hindu origin, he did".
But, needless to say that there is no place for such conclusions in the realm of logic.
The author is making grounds for his argument that if Madhva can incorporate thoughts of one non-Hindu origin (Christianity), he might as well have incorporated thoughts of second non-Hindu origin (Jainism) into Dvaita.
In other words, if Advaita (who claimed Vaidikatva) is guilty of incorporating thoughts from one non-Hindu origin (Buddhism), on similar lines, Dvaita (who claimed Vaidikatva) is guilty of incorporating thoughts from two philosophies of non-Hindu origin (Christianity and Jainism) into Dvaita.
If one intends to make a claim that a school of philosophy say "A" has borrowed some thing from another school of philosophy say "B" and that "A" has not acknowledged this, that person must do all the three following tasks :
1. Make a thorough study of the points or topics from both the schools.
2. Establish that both the schools have exactly same approach (not merely same number of divisions with some similarity like upper kind, middle kind and lower kind etc.)
3. If the school "A" has listed its sources, prove that none of the listed sources contain those topics.
In many cases, people miss out on atleast one of the above things. But surprisingly, in the following instance, the author of the article has failed so miserably in all the three cases. An attempt will be made to prove this. For ease of understanding and to differentiate the text from the article and the rest of the text, an offset of two will be used for the text in the article and also will be enclosed by "===============".
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Pūrvapakṣa-4:
Dr. Zydenbos in section 1.2 (Pages. 252) of the article: In the tatvaviveka, ...there are two nityamuktas ...in the universe : the Lord Vishnu and his consort , Sri or Lakṣmi, and all other souls are sṛṣṭiyuj or associated with Vishnu's creation. These ...are again either muktāḥ or amuktāḥ, ...and the not -liberated souls are again of three kinds: ... muktiyogyāḥ, nityavartāḥ and tamoyogyāḥ. In the Tattvasamkhyana, ... the muktāḥ and amuktāḥ are called vimuktāḥ and duḥkhasamsthāḥ and the latter are muktiyogyāḥ and ayogyāḥ, or returning to threefold division...vimuktiyogyah, sṛṣṭisamsthitāḥ and tamogāḥ.
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Siddhānta-4:
1. The terms "sṛṣṭiyuj" and "sṛṣṭisamsthitāḥ" have to be replaced with "sṛtiyuj" and "sṛtisamsthitāḥ". This error cannot be ignored as mere typographical error as the author makes further note saying "associated with Vishnu's creation". This creates many problems. Does this mean that other categories are not "associated with Vishnu's creation". If they are "associated with Vishnu's creation", then the division is flawed as what purpose does it serve to give such a definition. If they are not "associated with Vishnu's creation", then the all supremacy of Viṣṇu is questioned, which is a flaw to the original thought itself (namely everything is under Viṣṇu's control and thus must be associated with Vishnu'screation). Also, what is the meaning of this expression "associated with Vishnu's creation". Is not Goddess Lakṣmi associated with Vishnu's creation? On the other hand, "sṛtiyuj" and "sṛtisamsthitāḥ" mean those associated with samsāra and touched by sorrow at some point of time. Even the liberated souls were touched by sorrow before their liberation. In other words, they are "duḥkhasamspṛṣṭāḥ".
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Pūrvapakṣa-5:
Dr. Zydenbos continues (Pages. 252) : Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the final state is not the same for all souls. Jainism expressed such a doctrine from its very beginning, in its own ternminology. Here the Tattvarthasutra, the foremost jaina doctrinal text , mentions three characteristics of the soul in II .7: jivabhavyābhavyatvāni ca. According to ...Bhaskaranandi, jivatva is consciousness, which in Jainism has always been considered an essential characteristics of the soul. ...He (Bhaskaranandi) was either as elder contemporary of Madhva or already was no more by the time of Madhva's birth, and that he lived and worked not far away from the main area of Madhva's activity. "He [i.e., the soul] who possesses the ability to manifest characteristics of Samyagdarsana, etc., is a bhavya," Bhaskaranandi says as an explanation of bhavyatva and a soul that does not show that ability is an abhavya. Samyagdarshana has commonly been translated as 'right faith' which later leads on to samyagjnana or 'right knowledge ' and samyakcarita or 'right conduct' the three together forming the prerequisities or path towards mokṣa.
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Siddhānta-5:
The sentence "Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the final state is not the same for all souls." is a very serious logical flaw in several ways. First of all, Dvaita never claimed that it is a brand new school of thought. It claimed that all the sadagamas hold the Dvaita views and supplied enough quotes and explanations. Further, in the prior paragraph the three-fold classification of non-liberated souls (amukta jivās) as per Dvaita school is described. In the subsequent sentences, three-fold classification of non-liberated souls (amukta jivās) as per Jaina school is described. In the logical paradigm in question, the above sentence not only stands as irrelevant, but also creates confusion in the mind of the reader. Perhaps, the author of the article was confused as well since "the final state is not the same for all souls" means "Ananda tāratamya" or "gradation among liberated souls or mukta jīvās". This is not the point discussed either in the Dvaita context or in the Jaina context. Not only one should note the difference between mukta jīvas (liberated souls) and amukta jīvās (non-liberated souls), but one should also be aware of the difference between "gradation" and "classification". Gradation or "tāratamya" is an assertion that there is difference in the level of two entities that are compared. On the other hand, classification is division of ceratin group of entities into some sub-groups based on certain criteria. Perhaps the author meant to say "Dvaita was not the first school of thought in India to hold that the amukta jīvās or non-liberated souls (which is prior to final state or mokṣa) can be classified into three categories.", in which case there is some logical connection between the sentences that lie prior to that sentence and the sentences that follow it. Otherwise that sentence will be hanging in the limbo only.
2. Though both (Jaina theory and tattvavāda) have 3 fold divisions, they do not bear much similarity.
In Jainism, the categories are
i. jīvās - those who have jīvatva or consciousness,
ii. bhavyās - who possess the ability to manifest characteristics of Samyagdarsana, etc.,
iii. abhavyās - those who do not have such ability.
They do not seem to be mutually exclusive. For ex. Can a jīva be bhavya and not have jīvatva. Just because abhavyās do not have Samyagdarsana, etc., can we say that they are not jīvās ? It seems as if (ii.) and (iii.) are subdivisions of (i). The division seems to be flawed. Also there is no "one to one correspondence" between Jainism and tattvavāda. There is no similarity of description.
More over the concept of mokṣa itself is very different between the two schools as Jainism is basically "nirīṣvara" (or one that propounds the absence of Supreme God), where as Dvaita clearly says "Vishnu" is supreme. According to Dvaita, mokṣa is not only the liberation from the cycles of birth and death, but also a state of eternal bliss to the fullest capacity of each individual soul in the company of God, which can be attained only by the grace of God and only after completion of destined "sādhana".
3. Now comes the most crucial point which blows away all these theories, which are based on superficial similarity, chronological precedence and geographical proximity.
As the author of the article has noted, Sri Madhvacharya has stated that "sadagamas" form a source for Dvaita philosophy. Even if the author, Dr. Zydenbos did not make a thorough search of all the sadagamas to see if such division exists anywhere else in the sadāgamās, atleast a look into the well-known Bhagavadgīta, which forms an accepatable text to all the vedantic schools, could have revealed that such a division indeed existed prior to the birth of Jainism.
Irrespective of the interpretation of other schools or acceptance by other schools, there are several verses in Bhagavadgīta that describe at length the three-fold classification of jīvas. For the fear of bulk or hugeness of this posting, I shall give a small sample but mention some of the other verses that speak of such division.
trividhā bhavati śraddhā dehināṁ sā svabhāvajā |
sāttvikī rājasī caiva tāmasī ceti tāṁ śṛṇu || 17.2
sattvānurūpā sarvasya śraddhā bhavati bhārata |
śraddhāmayo'yaṁ puruṣo yo yacchraddhaḥ sa eva saḥ || 17.3
The "shraddhā"(Astikya buddhi) of the jīvās are of three kinds and they are born out of the inherent nature of the jīvās. This manifests in three kinds viz. "sātvika", "rājasa" and "tāmasa". The "shraddhā" of all the jīvās are in accordance with their "sattva" or "jīvasvarūpa" only. This jīva is "shraddhātmaka" or "shraddhāsvarūpa" only.
The verses 1-20 of 16th chapter describe at length the characteristics of muktiyogya and tamoyogya jīvas.
The verses 20-21 of chapter 9, verses 42-44 of 2nd chapter, verses 20-24 of chapter 7 describe the pattern of nityasamsārins.
yajante sāttvikā devānyakṣarakṣāṁsi rājasāḥ |
pretānbhūtagaṇāṁścānye yajante tāmasā janāḥ || 17.4
sātivikās (muktiyogyās) worship gods (with Vishṇu as the ultimate receiver), rājasās (nityasamsārins) worship yakṣās and rākṣasās and tāmasās (tamoyogyās) worship piśāchās and bhūtagaṇās (evil spirits) in the sacrificial offerings.
Similarly verses 5-28 of chapter 17, verses 4-9, 20-22 and 40 of chapter 18 describe the three categories.
Also
niyataṁ saṅgarahitamarāgadveṣataḥ kṛtam |
aphalaprepsunā karma yattatsāttvikamucyate || 18.23
yattu kāmepsunā karma sāhaṁkāreṇa vā punaḥ |
kriyate bahulāyāsaṁ tadrājasamudāhṛtam || 18.24
anubandhaṁ kṣayaṁ hiṁsāmanavekṣya ca pauruṣam |
mohādārabhyate karma yattattāmasamucyate || 18.25
The prescribed action done without desire, hatred, attachment, feelings of independence, and desire for the fruits of action is known as "sātvik" (the inherent nature of muktiyogya). The action done with desire for heaven etc. and with feelings of independent doership and resulting in smaller fruits and a lot more exertion is called "rājasa" (the inherent nature of nityasamsārin). The action done with disregard that one action can lead to another unavoidable binding by another action and also disregard to the harm and agony that it does to others with an illusory knowledge that the jīva is the independent doer is "tāmasa" (the inherent nature of tamoyogya).
Further the verses 26-39 of chapter 18 also describe the three categories.
Verses 11-12 describe tamoyogyas and verses 13-14 describe muktiyogyas.
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Pūrvapakṣa-6:
Ref : Page 253 2nd para (section 1.3)
This parrallelism of views in Dvaita and Jainism acquires still greater significance when we consider the historical circumstances in which Dvaita originated . Madhva was born in a village very near the modern Udupi in the southwestern Karnataka state, and at that time that region was ruled by a staunch Jaina dynasty which had its capital at Barkur, only a few miles away from Madhva's birthplace. One modern biographer of Madhva states that at the time of Madhva's birth Jainism was very strong in that region, and he adds that the
Ananteśvara and Candreśvara temples in Udupi, which today are major shrines of Vaishnava sect which Madhva founded, once were Jaina temples dedicated to Tirthankaras and Anantanātha and Candranātha.
Also, in the later history of Madhva Vaishnavism we see examples of Madhva - Jaina confrontation: thus the town Subrahmanya, also in South Kanara district, was once a Jaina kṣetra, but is now dominated by Madhvas; the multi - religious place of pilgrimage Dharmasthala, in the very same region, is still primarily a Jaina kṣetra, but employs Madhva priests.
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Siddhānta-6:
The author's statement can be summarized into the following steps.
1. Madhva's birthplace is in close proximity to Jaina dynasty.
2. Jainism was strong at the time of Madhva's birth.
3. Some of today's major shrines of Vaishnava were once Jaina temples.
4. There were examples of Madhva - Jaina confrontation
5. Dharmasthala, a primary Jaina kṣetra, employs Madhva priests.
Granting all these, what does the author try to assert ?
A. Madhva borrowed his philosopihical tenets from Jainism ?
Certainly, not. None of the above points can substantiate that.
B. The views are parallel because of the above stated reasons ?
They may appear to be parallel to some. But, the differences are lot more than the similarities. Even if there is some common terminology, the interpretations vary very much. Even the chronological precedence does not grant much benefit to Jainism.Time and again, Madhvacharya quoted that the source for tattvavāda
is sadāgamās. Jainism itself was not considered "sadāgama", thoughJainism may have used sadāgamās in postulating some of its principles. When one can find the original source itself, there is no need to use the secondary source.
The points listed above only show that, a lot of Jains must have embraced Madhva philosophy much to the dislike of other Jains. Dharmasthala was influenced by Shri vādirājā's teachings. The coexistence of the two cultures is hardly a proof for Jaina influence on madhva philosophy.
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Pūrvapakṣa-7:
Ref : Page 254 2nd para
More importantly, objection is made against the Jaina syādvāda, the doctrine which says that because each real object combines within it a huge variety of aspects and characteristics, conflicting predications can be made about that object. This has been summarized in the famous saptabhaṅgīnyāya or 'seven-fold predication' , which says that in a certain sense, a thing is , and is not, and also both, and neither, etc., Sankara conveniently overlooked that the syādvāda does not say that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame temporal and spatial circumstances, and so his criticism on this point does not reach far beyond a mere sarcastic stating that tertium non datur. This model refutation has been followed by all other Vedantins ever since.
Madhva does the same in his Anuvyakhyāna, his fouth commentary on the Brahmasutras, and hence in his famous sub-commentary, the Nyāyasudha, Jayatirtha, the most important commentator on Madhva's works, deals with this matter also. What is very striking, however, is the amount of space that Jayatirtha devotes to his discussion of Jainism: in the most recent edition of the text, this passage is approximately 12 pages long. Also, we must notice that in his description of Jaina teachings, he reveals a genuine familiarity with them and presents a more detailed and truthful picture of Jainism than most Vedanta authors do.
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Siddhānta-7:
This is full of self-contradictions. On one side, the author says that Hindu philosophical thoughts "have comparatively neglected Jainism". On the other side, it says that several pages were written about Jainism. It is like a double-edged weapon. Let us see what a critic will say in the following two instances.
1. If for the sake of refuting some theory, a thorough treatise is given about the theory, it is labelled as influence.
2. If on the other hand a short sketch of the theory is given, it is called "neglecting", where in a thorough understanding of the refuted theory is lacking.
Here I will be forced to bring two things to the notice of the author.
1. kṣapaṇaka is a common word used for Jaina and Buddha. There are lot of similarities between Jainism and Buddhism. When there are lot of arguments to refute Buddhism, it is to be realized that for all the common points, the refutation of Jainism is also accomplished.
2. It is the greatness of tattvavāda that before it refutes any theory, a correct and complete explanation of "pūrvapakṣa" is given, so that there will be no accusation that the refuted theory is incorrectly comprehended. So I do not see anything wrong in Jayatiirtha giving full explanation of particular set of points of Jainism being discussed, so that a proper refutation can be done.
I do not know what the author is trying to say regarding "Jayatirtha's genuine familiarity with Jainism". It is very clear that the purpose of that chapter is to refute Jainism. It is to be commended that pūrvapakṣa is given full explanation before it is refuted. If one does not have a full understanding of what is being refuted, it does not make sense. As regards saptabhaṅgīnyāya, the explanation etc. are very clear. The accusation of model refutation of overlooking that "the syādvāda does not say opposing predications can be made…" is totally baseless for the following reasons.
In fact in page 254 of the article the author says "seven-fold predication which says that in a certain sense, a thing is, and is not, and also both, and neither etc.". It is interesting that the seven were not listed. In fact, the "neither" is called avaktavya and three more categories are created by combining avaktavya with "is", "is not" and "both".
It does not make sense to use "etc." when that list of seven-fold predication is important and relevant. In fact it would have been worthwhile for the author even to give a brief explanation for each so that he can substantiate his argument which has following three step logic.
1. Shankara conveniently overlooked that the syādvāda does not say that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame temporal and spatial circumstances, and so his criticism on this point does not reach far beyond a mere sarcastic stating that tertium non datur.
(# The fact that syādvāda does speak of opposing predication at the same time is shown below).
2. This model refutation has been followed by all other Vedantins ever since.
3. Madhva does the same in his anuvyākhyāna.
If one had basic understanding of "tattva viveka" and "tattva sankhyāna", he would not say that Madhva has done such a serious mistake. There are usage of terms like "pūrvābhāva" "aparābhāva" and "sadābhāva" in these works which take into account all such circumstances. This only indicates that the author's criticism has no basis.
In page 3996 of nyāyasudha (Imprint Bengalura : Srimanmadhva siddhantābhivrddhi-karini sabha, 1982)
"etatsaptaprakāram kutaḥ asmbhavāt so'pi katham dṛṣti virodhataḥ | sarvam hi svopādhau sat paropādhau asat | svarūpeṇa bhāvo'nyātmatvādinā'bhāvaḥ | dravyarūpeṇa nityamavasthābhedena anityam | svarūpādinā'bhinnaṁ svagunādinā bhinnābhinnamityeva pratīyate | nāto'nyena prakāreṇa'to vyavasthayā niyama grāhaka pratyakṣādivirodhenāsambhavādayuktaṁ evānekāntamatamiti |"
which means
'It is impossible for these seven kinds to happen. Why impossible? - because it is against the experience of direct perception.
How ? -
everything is "existing in its own paramaters and non-existing outside its own parameters, expressible or manifesting by its own inherent nature and inexpressible or non-manifesting by the inherent nature of others, eternal in terms of matter, non-eternal in terms of change of status, non-different from inherent nature, etc.,
bhinnābhinna (some ways different and someways not) from its qualities, etc.". Everything is seen thus only and no other way. Thus "anekānta theory" is improper because it is against the direct perception, etc., which are acceptable forms of arrangement.'
# (See above for the accusation that all vedantins made wrong assumption)
That the syādvāda says that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame tempora and spatial circumstances is endorsed by Jaina works.
I will be referring to the two sources mentioned by Dr. Zydenbos.
Dr. S. Mookerjee's "The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism":
The Saptabhanginyāya is described as (ref. p 118)
1. Existence (in a specific context)
2. Non-existence (in another context)
3. Successive occurrence of both
4. Inexpressibility
5. Inexpressibility as qualified by first predicate
6. Inexpressibility as qualified by second predicate
7. Inexpressibility as qualified by third predicate
The substance (dravya), attribute (bhāva), time (kāla) and space (kṣetra) form the context. The context of space cannot be applied to space itself or the universe. Similarly, the context of time cannot be applied to time itself or the eternity. Even this context- based division is talked of at the same time only. For e.g.,
B.K.Matilal writes (Pages. 52,53):
'Samantabhadra has commented upon the meaning of "syāt" as follows "When the particle 'syāt' is used by you (Mahavīra) as well as by a shruta kevalin (e.g., a saint) in a sentence, it indicates in connection with other meanings, non-one sidedness; it qualifies (since it is a particle=nipāta) the meaning (of the sentence
concerned)".'
Further Matilal says, "Thus the particle 'syāt' in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the sentence." Again on p 61, he says, "Thus a philosophy does not really understand the point that is being made by the opposite side. Rival schools only encourage dogmatism and intoleration in philosophy. This according to the Jainas, is the evil of ekānta 'one sided' philosophies. Even the conflicting propositions of rival schools may be in order, provided they are asserted with proper qualification or conditionalization. This is what exactly Anekanta doctrine teaches. Add a syāt particle to your philosophic proposition and you have captured the truth."
Living with a philosophy with such kind of flexibility is like living in a building whose foundation can move at the touch of a button.
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Pūrvapakṣa-8:
Ref : PAGES.255-256 (section 1.4).
In his discussion of the position of memory in Indian theories of pramāṇa, B. K. Matilal remarks that memory-experience was never regarded by any non-Jaina philosopher (a Naiyayika or a Buddhist) to constitute a piece of knowledge, a prama, a cognitive awareness which amounts truth." The qualification "a Naiyayika or a Buddhist" is necessary here, for we see that Madhva and his followers very explicitly do so...Though these ideas are already found in the Tattvarthasutra, Bhavasena's work proves that they were known in southwestern Karnataka in Madhva's time.
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Siddhānta-8:
Here the question is whether the author is saying that prior to Jaina theory, there was no usage of the term "memory" itself or whether there is no instance or explanation where the memory is treated
as Pramana. Both can be easily refuted as there are many references to memory in many places.
The following verses from Bhagavadgita :
dhyāyato viṣayānpuṁsaḥ saṅgasteṣūpajāyate |
saṅgātsañjāyate kāmaḥ kāmātkrodho'bhijāyate || II.62||
krodhādbhavati saṁmohaḥ saṁmohātsmṛtivibhramaḥ |
smṛtibhraṁśād buddhināśo buddhināśātpraṇaśyati || II.63||
"Whoever muses on the objects of senses, develops attachment to them; from attachment springs up desire; and from desire arises anger; from anger ensues delusion or error of judgement; from delusion results loss of memory such as scriptural commandments and injunctions; from shattered memory eventuates loss of good sense and understanding and he perishes from the loss of good sense and understanding."
mṛtyuḥ sarvaharaścāhamudbhavaśca bhaviṣyatām |
kīrtiḥ śrīrvākca nārīṇāṁ smṛtirmedhā dhṛtiḥ kṣamā || X.34||
"I (Lord Krishna) am death, the devourer of all. I am the origin of all to come, among women, I am fame, prosperity, speech, memory, intelligence, firmness and forgiveness."
sarvasya cāhaṁ hṛdi sanniviṣṭo mattaḥ smṛtirjñānamapohanaṁ ca |
vedaiśca sarvairahameva vedyo vedāntakṛdvedavideva cāham || XV.15||
"I am lodged in the hearts of all; from Me originate memory, knowledge and misapprehension. I am indeed He who is to be known by all the vedas; I am the author of vedanta and I alone possess the knowledge of what the vedas proclaim."
naṣṭo mohaḥ smṛtirlabdhā tvatprasādānmayā'cyuta |
sthito'smi gatasandehaḥ kariṣye vacanaṁ tava || XVIII.73||
"O Achyuta, my delusion is gone. I have gained knowledge through Your grace (my memory is brought back). I stand firm with my doubts dispelled. I shall act according to your word of command."
rājansaṁsmṛtya saṁsmṛtya saṁvādamimamadbhutam |
keśavārjunayoḥ puṇyaṁ hṛṣyāmi ca muhurmuhuḥ || XVIII.76||
tacca saṁsmṛtya saṁsmṛtya rūpamatyadbhutaṁ hareḥ |
vismayo me mahānrājanhṛṣyāmi ca punaḥ punaḥ || XVIII.77||
"O king(Dhṛtarāṣṭra), remembering and recalling to memory this marvellous and sacred dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna, I (Sanjaya) rejoice again and again. O king, remembering and remembering that most marvellous form of Hari, great is my wonder and I rejoice over and over again".
The following is from Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
"atha ha mana ūcustvaṁ na udgayeti tatheti tebhyo mana udagāyadyo manasi bhogastaṁ devebhya āgāyadyatkalyāṇaṁ saṅkalpayati tadātmane te viduranena vaina udgātrā'tyeṣyantīti tamabhidrutya pāpmanā avidhyan sa yaḥ sa pāpmā"
Also in other places in this and other upanishads, the mind is treated as sixth sense organ and one kind of knowledge that is obtained through mind is memory and so that is a valid form of knowledge.
The following which is courtesy of Sri Shrisha Rao :
Begin-quote ========================================
I. In the pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa our Acharya quotes a verse saying:
smṛtiḥ pratyakṣamaitihyamanumānacatuṣṭayam |
pramāṇamiti vijñeyaṁ dharmādyarthe bubhūṣubhiḥ || iti śruteśca |
(p. 233 of the ABMM edition, 1969)
It has been discovered that the first hemistich is to be found in the Black
Yajur Veda:
smṛtiḥ pratyakṣamaitihyam | anumānacatuṣṭayam | etairādityamaṇḍalam| sarvaireva vidhāsyate sūryo marīcimādatte | sarvasmādbhuvanādadhi | tasyāḥ pākaviśeṣeṇa | smṛtaṁ kālaviśeṣaṇam | nadīva prabhavākācit | akṣayyā tsyandate tathā | tāṁ nadyo'bhisamāyanti | soruḥ satī na nivartate | evaṁ nānāsamutthānāḥ | kālāḥ saṁvatsaraṁ śritāḥ | aṇuśaśca mahaśaśca | sarve samavayantri tam | sa taiḥ sarvaiḥ samāviṣṭaḥ | ūraḥ sanna nivartate | adhisaṁvatsaraṁ vidyāt | tadeva lakṣaṇe aṇubhiśca mahadbhiś- ca | samārūḍhaḥ pradṛśyate | saṁvatsaraḥ pratyakṣeṇa | nādhisatvaṁ pradṛśyate | paṭaro viklidhaḥ piṅgaḥ |etadvaruṇalakṣaṇam |
yatraitadupadṛśyate | sahasraṁ tatra nīyate | ekaṁ hi śiro nānā mukhe | kṛtsnaṁ tadṛtulakṣaṇam | ubhayataḥ saptendriyāṇi | jalpitaṁ tveva dihyate śukraṁ te anyadyajataṁ te anyat | viṣurūpo ahanī dyaurivāsi | viśvā hi māyā avasi svadhāvaḥ | bhadrā te pūṣaṇiha rātirastu |
(kṛ. ya. ve. III.1-2)
The passage seems to make reference to `saptendriyāṇi', etc., so later parts may also be of relevance.
A reference for the previous is: `Mula Yajurveda-Samhita', Vol. VIII, The Banaras Hindu University Sanskrit Series, June 1973, PK 3201 1973, page 182. Vedic accents, etc., have not been shown.
II. The doctrine that smṛti is valid knowledge may also be inferred from the fact that a vast literature called smṛti exists in Vedanta, which is supposed to be written remembrances of sages; if their memories had no validity, then how could these texts?
III. In the Bhagavad Gita, Sri Krishna also says (verse XV-15) that He is the cause of memory and of forgetfulness, which is read even by Shankara to mean that He causes the exact knowledge of memory in the pious and lapses of memory in the sinful:
ataḥ mattaḥ ātmanaḥ sarvaprāṇināṁ smṛtiḥ jñānaṁ tadapohanaṁ apagamanaṁ ca yeṣāṁ yathā puṇyakarmiṇāṁ puṇyakarmānurodhena jñānasmṛtī bhavataḥ tathā pāpakarmiṇāṁ pāpakarmānurūpeṇa smṛtijñānayoḥ apohanaṁ ca apāyanaṁ apagamanaṁ ca | ... etc.
(śaṅkara-bhāṣya on BG XV-15)
Later in the 'Gita, Arjuna reports that his delusion has been destroyed and his memory restored (verse XVIII-73), under which also Shankara gives indication that he considers Arjuna's memory to be valid and obtained by grace of Krishna:
smṛtiḥ ca ātmatattvaviṣayā labdhā yasyāḥ lābhāt sarvahṛdayagranthīnāṁ vipramokṣaḥ | tvatprasādāt tava prasādāt mayā tvatprasādaṁ āśritena acyuta | anena mohanāśapraśnaprativacanena sarvaśāstrārthajñānaphalaṁ etāvat eva iti niścitaṁ darśitaṁ bhavati yataḥ jñānāt mohanāśaḥ ātmasmṛtilābhaḥ ca iti |
Shankara may have contradicted himself elsewhere, but it cannot be denied that at least in these instances, under the clear impelling of the 'Gita, he was obliged to honor memory as a valid source of knowledge. Indication that the 'Gita considers memory to be valid is also to be found in Sanjaya's statement
'rājan samsmṛtya samsmṛtya', etc. (XVIII-76/77).
Therefore, it is correct to say that our Acharya's doctrine of validity is derived from the Yajur Veda and from the Bhagavad Gita and not from Jainism, and even that said doctrine was known to and accepted by Shankara also.
End-quote ============================================
=============================================
Pūrvapakṣa-9:
Ref : PAGES.256 (section 1.4).
In his Pramāṇalakṣaṇa, Madhva briefly states yathārthaṁ pramāṇaṁ, i.e., "pramāṇa [is] true to the object," and Jayatirtha elaborates that a pramāṇa "makes" a thing as it is its object". Where Jayatirtha uses
the term yāthārthya , "the quality of being true to the object" as a characterization of pramāṇa, Bhavasena uses yāthātmya, "the quality of being true to the nature [of the object]" Madhva then continues by saying that pramāṇa is twofold, kevala and anupramāṇa. Kevala is further defined as yathārthajñāna, and anupramāṇa is the means by which it is attained. In this latter context, Jayatirtha adds that yathārthajñāna i.e., kevala, is prama. In other words, here kevala, which was first
defined as one of the two basic kinds of pramāṇa, finally is considered pramā as well, as has traditionally been the case in Jainism. Dvaitin authors, whether classical or modern, have never noticed or acknowledged this obvious similarity between the two systems.
=============================================
Siddhānta-9:
It is strange how the similarity is drawn between "yāthārthya" and "yāthātmya" by taking their translation into English. "yathārtham" is split as "yathā" (which is Indicative of "anatikrama" meaning not crossing the bounds which in turn means exact) and "artha" (which comes from "aryata" = jñeyam = to be known). So "yathārthaṁ" is exact knowledge. Now "yatha" and "Atma" will mean exact nature of the object. Here the subject matter is knowledge about the object and not nature of the object. Now let us delve deep into these definitions which superficially seem similar. When one talks about "the knowledge about an object/subject", the things that automatically follow are -
"one who attempts to know" (pramātṛ),
"thing or object to be known" (prameya), etc.
When one talks about "the nature of the object", "pramātṛ" and "prameya" fail to convey anything meaningful. One cannot wriggle out saying "pramātṛ is the one who attempts to know the nature of the object as this leads to "ativyāpti" (the flaw of unwarranted extension of the definition) which, in essence, is crossing its boundary (which is merely the nature and not the knowledge). Similarly, one cannot say that prameya is "thing or object which is to be known" which also has the flaw of "ativyāpti". This shows the invalidity of the definition "yāthātmya" (the quality of being true to the nature [of the object]) to describe "pramāṇa". It is surprising that the author has tried to prove the influence of Jainism on Dvaita based on this superficial similarity, while the definition given by Jainism itself is invalid. This phonetic similarity is no similarity at all. This statement "Dvaitin authors, whether classical or modern, have never noticed or acknowledged this obvious similarity between the two systems" is meaningless in case of the definition of pramāṇa.
Now comes the second point "...here kevala, which was first defined as one of the two basic kinds of pramāṇa, finally is considered pramā as well, as has traditionally been the case in Jainism". First some clarification about pramā. Pramā means the same thing as kevala-pramāṇa, except that it is used in a singular sense, to denote one piece of correct knowledge, etc.; the latter is more often used to indicate a body of correct knowledge. Even granting that "Jainism has given the same definition to pramā", it is totally futile effort on the part of the author to search for the similarities between "tattvavāda" and "Jainism" and it is equally ridiculous to conclude that, on account of the similarity and later chronological existence, "tattvavāda" has derived its theory from "Jainism". For drawing such a conclusion, the author has to prove that prior to Jainism, these concepts never existed. When no such attempt is made by the author how can he claim or expect that "Dvaitin authors, whether classical or modern, should notice or acknowledge this obvious similarity between the two systems." Such similarities are either mere coincidence or on account of the fact that Jainism also must have used "sadāgamās" for drawing some of its theories. The latter case seems more probable as they had access to those sadāgamās like anyone else.
=============================================
Pūrvapakṣa-10:
Ref : PAGES.256-257 (section 1.5).
Earlier, Jaina thinkers ... made a basic twofold distinction of pramanas... Knowledge is of five kinds, viz. mati, sruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala: the first two, viz. sensory[including memory] and the scriptural [or reported] were termed parokṣa, and the remaining three were termed pratyakṣa. With Bhavasena we find a change from the older division in the Tattvarthasutra: another, fourfold division of pratyakṣa, viz. indriya-, manas-, yogi-, and svasamvedanapratyakṣa, has taken its place. Thus sensory knowledge has become pratyakṣa, more in agreement with the terminology of other schools of thought, and parokṣa has been redefined as knowledge which is caused by "the application of the self [atmāvadhānena]; "pratyakṣa, etc"., including memory, recollection, ūha, apoha, tarka, and Agama.
=============================================
Siddhānta-10:
Let us first summarize what the author is trying to say about the classification in Jainism.
Earlier Jaina thinkers approach: Knowledge five kinds -
1. mati - sensory[including memory]
2. sruta - scriptual [or reported]
3. avadhi
4. manaḥparyāya
5. kevala
1. and 2. are parokṣa. 3., 4. and 5. are pratyakṣa.
Bhavasena did another fourfold division of pratyakṣa.
1.indriya- 2. manas- 3. yogi- 4. svasamvedanapratyakṣa
Thus sensory knowledge became pratyakṣa (thereby Bhavasena contradicted earlier Jaina thinkers, according to the author).
parokṣa has been redefined as knowledge which is caused by "the application of the self [atmāvadhānena]; "pratyakṣa, etc", including memory, recollection, ūha, apoha, tarka, and Agama.
The author continues:
=============================================
Pūrvapakṣa-11:
In Madhva's Pramanalakṣana, we find that kevala has a similar fourfold division as the Jaina pratyakṣa has, though here it is divided into īsa-, lakṣmi-, yogi-, and ayogijñāna. These four may all be called jñāna, since it has already been stated that kevala is yathārthajñāna. These four kinds of kevala are distinguished from each other by a qualitative gradation in clarity, which we also find among the varieties of pratyakṣa of the Tattvarthasutra.
=============================================
Siddhānta-11:
It is shocking that a similarity of division is assumed based on such superficial factors like "four-fold division" and a common term "yogi", with total disregard to what was classified, what was the guideline for the classification and what was the definition for "yogi" or "yoga".
In Dvaita:
1. What was classified - the kevala jñāna
2. The guideline for classification -pramātṛ
3. yoga - "bhagavaddharmānuṣṭānādirūpajñānopāyaḥ" (the skill or expertise in knowing the duties, actions etc. that are to be performed towards God)
In Jainism:
1. What was classified - the pratyakṣa jñāna
2. The guideline for classification - not pramātṛ (Much worse is the case here than what it could have been. This is an imperfect classification as it lacks exact guide line. One cannot say pramātṛ is the guide line as it has "indriya", "manas", etc. One cannot say "the organ used" is the guide line, as "yogi" and
"svasamvedana" categories fall out of such guide line. Thus this pathetic classification crumbles down in its embryo stage itself).
3. yoga - no matter what Jaina definition is, it has no place for God and thus bears no similarity to the definition given in dvaita.
Thus, the similarity in four-fold classification is mere shadow chasing.
The author continues:
=============================================
Pūrvapakṣa-12:
Of course Jainism, being ultimately an atheistic system, cannot offer any place of special epistemological significance to the supposed knowledge of the two main Vaisnava deities; but apart from the similar
occurance of a fourfold division, we notice that both the Jaina and the Dvaitin classification include a variety of knowledge which they term yogi-[pratyakṣa or jñāna]. Yogipratyakṣa is the term which Bhavasena uses to cover the two varieties of knowledge known by the older terms avadhi- and manaḥparyāyajñāna. Through special dhyana or meditative practices [dhyānaviśeṣād] one acquires yogipratyakṣa, which is a clear apprehension of all things [sakalapadārthaspaṣṭāvabhāsaḥ]. avadhijñāna apprehends all material objects and souls in samasāra, and again exists in further gradations. Through manaḥparyāyajñāna one also apprehends still more subtle phenomena, such as the thoughts of others. Kevala finally is omniscience, which is obtained when a soul sheds all its karma and thereby realizes its true nataure. Similarly in the Dvaitin view, yogijñāna is an excellence acquired through the influence of the yoga which increases gradually until liberation is attained.
=============================================
Siddhānta-12:
There are some statements, which are either erroneous or make unwarranted assumption that usage of same term includes same definition as well.
> 1. ...both the Jaina and the Dvaitin classification include a variety > of knowledge which they term yogi-[pratyakṣa or jñāna].
Mere use of the same term does not mean any thing unless both the systems give same definition. For e.g., in dvaita school the term yoga is defined as "bhagavaddharmānuṣṭānādirūpajñānopāyaḥ" (the skill or expertise in knowing the duties, actions etc. that are to be performed towards God), which is taken from the commentary of Sri Raghavendra tiirtha. How can Jainism even use such a definition when it is ultimately an atheistic system?
> 2. Kevala finally is omniscience, which is obtained when a soul sheds > all its karma and thereby realizes its true nature.
Kevala is not omniscience and no jiva obtains this omniscience in dvaita. Only īsha or the Lord is omniscient.
> 3. ...in the Dvaitin view, yogijñāna is an excellence acquired through > the influence of the yoga which increases gradually until liberation is attained.
In dvaita, yogijñāna is further classified into
I. ṛju II. tāttvika III. atāttvika
Only ṛjuyogijñāna increases gradually until liberation is attained.
So, now the question arises whether Jaina version of "yogipratyakṣa" corresponds with "ṛjuyogijñāna" of dvaita. Whether the answer is "yes" or "no", the similarity does not exist by virtue of the fact that the definition of yoga itself is very different.
The author continues:
=============================================
Pūrvapakṣa-13:
The use of the word kevala to denote a variety of knowledge both in Jainism and in Dvaita deserves closer attention. Though the term occurs in different places within the classification of pramana-s in the two systems, they share a common feature. The first two kinds of jñāna in the Jaina classification,
viz. mati and sruta, correspond to the Dvaitin anupramana-s [ which are pratyakṣa, anumāna and Agama] since in the older Jaina classification anumana is included in matijñāna. What distinguishes kevala from
anupramana in Dvaita is that kevala is knowledge, a manifestation of the soul, which is independent of any further sadhana or instrument. The definition of anupramana is tatsadhanam anupramanam, where tat stands
for kevala. The three kinds of knowledge called pratyakṣa in Jainism, of which kevala is one, are characterized by exactly that same independence. Thus we see that what is called kevala in Dvaita corresponds to what is called pratyakṣa in Jaina texts, while the use of the term pratyakṣa by Madhva shows a closer similarity to its use in the other schools of Indian philosophy.
=============================================
Siddhānta-13:
1. Here comes the complete self-contradiction from the author. Earlier in the article, the author mentioned that mati and sruta were termed parokṣa. Now he is saying that they "correspond to the Dvaitin anupramana-s [which are pratyakṣa, anumāna and Agama]. How can parokṣa correspond to pratyakṣa?
2. Where did this definition of "knowledge" as "a manifestation of the soul" come from? Kevala is knowledge and anupramāṇa is means/instrument of knowledge. Where is this question of "independent of any further
sādhana" ? Not only the number of divisions between the two systems are different, but even the basis of division and the definition of the terms are so very different.
3. The author claims that the two systems use different terms to mean same thing - like kevala in Dvaita corresponds to pratyakṣa in Jaina. Does this also mean that pratyakṣa in Dvaita different from Pratyakṣa in Jainism? If it is, then it means that the two systems do not speak same language even - use the same term to mean different things. If not different, then pratyakṣa in dvaita is same as pratyakṣa in Jainism, which is same as kevala in Dvaita. This poses two problems. I. The author has taken extra effort to show similarity between kevala of Dvaita and pratyakṣa of jainism while both have common pratyakṣa.
II. The kevala in Dvaita ends up same as pratyakṣa in dvaita - which is very wrong as one is knowledge and the other a tool.
4. To show identity of terms, the author is not using the definition of terms in the two systems, but using vague expressions like "being independent, etc.". In Dvaita pratyakṣa (direct perception) is defined as "nirdoṣārthendriyasannikarṣaḥ" (flawless contact between the sense organ and its object). There are two questions that come in.
I. Did Jainism give same definition to pratyakṣa (or to kevala)?
II. If so, is there any evidence to show that such a view was not present before Jainism?
The author must prove both I and II to make his point.
Or alternately,
5. In Dvaita "kevala" is defined as "yathārthajñānaṁ".
The two questions that come in are
I. Did Jainism give same definition to pratyakṣa ?
II. If so, is there any evidence to show that such a view was not present before Jainism?
Again, the author must prove both I and II to make his point.
=============================================
Pūrvapakṣa-14:
Ref : PAGES.258-259 (section 1.5).
Pratyakṣa is perception and is conceived of as being of seven kinds, viz. perception through the sakṣin ( the svarūpendriya, a function of the soul, to which we must return later), the manas and the five senses. The passage in the Pramanalakṣana where this is mentioned is briefly commented upon by Jayatiirtha. But then comes the surprise. After first supporting Madhva's statement that pratyakṣa is of seven kinds, he continues: "And this is said not to be universal. For pratyakṣa is of four kinds. It is known under the divisions. It is known under the divisions īsha-, Lakṣmi-, yogi- and ayogi-pratyakṣa. This is of course exactly the same kind of fourfold division which we have already come across in our discussion of kevala; and in a few lines Jayatiirtha gives what looks like a summary of what he has already said earlier in connection with kevala. His statement that pratyakṣa is of four kinds has no foundation in Madhva's text; worse still, it is a flat contradiction. Also, it seems that he has made a logical error. From what Jayatiirtha tells us about the four kinds of kevala and the four kinds of pratyakṣa, it appears that there is no distinction whatsoever between kevala and pratyakṣa. But if Madhva and therefore also Jayatiirtha, makes a fundamental distinction between kevala and anupramāṇa as two basically different types of pramāṇa and the very same foursome which has previously been given as kevala returns later as a subcategory of anupramāṇa, then this amounts to self-contradiction. Yet Jayatiirtha was very firm in this, for we see exactly the same thing happen in his pramāṇapaddhati, which must be a later work.
Commenting on Jayatiirtha, Raghavendratiirtha states that "The sevenfoldness is not connected with all souls". and Srinivasatiirtha further elaborates that this is not the case with īsha and Lakṣmi, since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through svarūpendriya. But Srinivasatiirtha's contention does not hold good for all the remaining souls, yogin, as well as ayogin, since they do possess a manas and all the five senses, and so their pratyakṣa is ubhayavidhendriyasannikarṣaṇātmaka "of the nature of contact with the two kinds of sense organs", as Jayatiirtha himself states. Thus the problem of the seven kinds of pratyakṣa which are four kinds remain unsolved.
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Siddhānta-14:
This infact is the biggest surprise from Dr. Zydenbos. The author is all confused about kevala and pratyakṣa and mixed them up thoroughly and passed on the confusion to the Dvaita Acharyas. Let me explain this division for the benefit of Dr. Zydenbos and other readers as well.
Pramana (yathārthaṁ) is divided into two.
1. Kevala (yathārtha jñānaṁ) - the exact or precise knowledge
2. anupramāna (tatsādhanaṁ) - the means of obtaining such knowledge
Kevala is divided into 4 parts based on the "pramātṛ" (the knower)
1a. īsha (the Supreme God)
1b. Lakṣmi (the Goddess who is His consort)
1c. yogi
1d ayogi
anupramāṇa is divided into 3 parts
2a. pratyakṣa (flawless direct perception through the sense organs)
(nirdoṣārthendriyasannikarṣaḥ)
2b. anumāna (flawless logical inferencing/deductions) (nirdoṣopapattiḥ)
2c. Agama (nirdoṣa shabda)
Pratyakṣa is further divided into seven kinds.
2a-1. sākṣi (also called svarūpendriya)
2a-2. shrotra (hearing through the ears)
2a-3. tvak (touch through the skin)
2a-4. chakṣu (seeing through the eyes)
2a-5. jihva (tasting through the tongue)
2a-6. ghrāṇa (smelling through the nose)
2a-7. manas (thinking/remembering through the mind)
Sometimes 2a-1 is also called aprākṛtendriya and 2a-2 to 2a-7 (which are shaḍindriyās or six senses) are called prākṛtendriyas or asvarūpendriyās.
It can be seen that pratyakṣa is different from kevala. Kevala does not return as a subcategory of anupramana. There is no self-contradiction. Only a confusion of mind can perceive self-contradiction here. It is crystal-clear and why should any one make an effort to equate "one kind of knowledge" with "one kind of means of knowledge". It is fine to see logical connections.
When a term like yogipratyakṣa is used, it means that the knowledge yogi gets through pratyakṣa.
Sri Jayatiirtha has never contradicted Sri Madhvacharya. Even in cases, where some thing is mentioned which is not in mūla, he is elaborating the matter for the sake of others and consists of one of the following three cases :
1. A detailed explanation of what Sri Madhvacharya has said in the mūla that is being commented upon currently.
2. A detailed explanation of the pūrvapakṣa for the benefit of the reader.
3. A cross-referencing of what is said by Sri Madhvacharya elsewhere or use the thoughts expressed in other texts of the mūla by Sri Madhvacharya.
The third case applies to the following accusation.
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Pūrvapakṣa-15:
Dr. Z: >> "His statement that pratyakṣa is of four kinds has no foundation in Madhva's text; worse still, it is a flat contradiction"
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Siddhānta-15:
Sri Madhvacharya clearly mentioned in anuvyākhyāna-
prakṛtam śuddhacaitanyamakśaṁ tu dvividhaṁ matam |
śuddhamīśaramāmukteśvanyatra praktairyutam | 2-1-29
nirdośameva caitanyamanyatrobhayamiṣyate |
sukhaduḥkhādiviśayaṁ śuddhaṁ samsārageṣvapi || 2-1-30
nirdoṣatvātiniyamāttadbaliṣṭatamaṁ matam |
pañcendriyamanobhedātprākṛtaṁ ṣadvidhaṁ smṛtam || 2-1-31
Pratyakṣa is of two kinds - prākṛta (materialistic) and shuddha chaitanya (pure sentient which is also called aprākṛta). This "pure sentient means" (aprākṛta indriya) is for the Lord, Lakṣmi and liberated. In all other cases, it is along with materialistic senses. The svarūpendriya is of pure or flawless form. In other instance, it is mixed with joys and sorrows. Even the samsārins have both these kinds. Because of its flawless nature, the pure one (svarūpendriya) is the strongest one. The prākṛta senses are of six kinds viz., the five sense organs and the mind.
And in VTVN, he says
pratyakśaṁ trividhaṁ jñeyaṁ aiśvaraṁ yaugikaṁ tathā |
ayaugikaṁ ceti tathā sarvamakśātmakaṁ matam ||
akśāṇi ca svarūpāṇi nityajñānātmakāni ca |
viṣnoḥ śriyaḥ tathaivoktānyanyeṣāṁ dvividhāni tu ||
svarūpāṇi ca bhinnāni bhinnāni trividhāni ca |
devāsurāṇi madhyānītyetat pratyakśamīritam ||
quoted from brahmatarka.
Pratyakṣa is of three kinds 1. aiśvara. 2. yaugika 3. ayaugika
Note: Though different number of divisions appear, they lead to same end because of subdivisions or sub-grouping. Here aiśvara refers to
1a. Vishnu and
1b. Lakṣmi.
This four part division is what Sri Jayatiirtha refers to in order to explain that "seven kinds of pratyakṣa" cannot be universally applied.
(Here Pratyakṣa refers to the knowledge obtained through the pratyakṣa which is the means of direct perception. The confusion will be out of the mind if the correlation is understood, which will be explained a little later.).
In case of Vishnu and Lakṣmi, the direct perception is through nitya-jñānātmaka svarūpendriyas (the svarūpendriya which has eternal inherent knowledge).
In case of others, the sense organs of direct perception are two kinds svarūpa and asvarūpa. This asvarūpa senses are again three kinds
1. Deva pratyakṣa (divine), 2. Asura pratyakṣa (demonic) and 3. Madhya pratyakṣa (middle kind).
(This is just another kind of division which gives a different perspective and
does not lead to contradiction with any thing).
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Pūrvapakṣa-16:
Dr. Z >> Also it seems that he has made a logical error. From what Jayatiirtha tells us about the four kinds of kevala and the four kinds of pratyakṣa, it appears that there is no distinction whatsoever between kevala and pratyakṣa. But if Madhva and therefore also Jayatiirtha, makes a fundamental distinction between kevala and anupramāṇa as two basically different types of pramāṇa and the very same foursome which has previously been given as kevala returns later as a subcategory of anupramāṇa, then this amounts to self-contradiction. Yet Jayatiirtha was very firm in this, for we see exactly the same thing happen in his pramāṇapaddhati, which must be a later work.
Commenting on Jayatiirtha, Raghavendratiirtha states that "The sevenfoldness is not connected with all souls". and Srinivasatiirtha further elaborates that this is not the case with īsha and Lakṣmi, since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through svarūpendriya. But Srinivasatiirtha's contention does not hold good for all the remaining souls, yogin, as well as ayogin, since they do possess a manas and all the five senses, and so their pratyakṣa is ubhayavidhendriyasannikarṣaṇātmaka "of the nature of contact with the two kinds of sense organs", as Jayatiirtha himself states. Thus the problem of the seven kinds of pratyakṣa which are four kinds remains unsolved.
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Siddhānta-16:
There is absolutely no problem.
I will try to use a mathematical notation just to indicate how clear the concepts are.
Kevala is of four kinds.
1. Let us denote K(G) as the set to indicate God's knowledge. It is immeasurable and universal indicating omniscience. Everything else is a subset of K(G). As God has "aprākṛta'(non-materialistic and all-blissful) body, His pratyakṣa is through svarūpendriya only and also, He does not need "anumāna" or "Agama" as He is pratyakṣa sākṣi for everything.
2. Let us denote the knowledge(Kevala) of Lakṣmi as K(L). It is more than every one else, but subset of K(G). God knows completely about Himself, but Lakṣmi does not know completely about God. But her knowledge about God is more than all others.
3. Let us denote the knowledge(Kevala) of Yogi as K(Y) and
4. that of ayogi as K(A).
In both cases of K(Y) and K(A), it consists of the knowledge which is acquired through seven kinds of pratyakṣa and in addition the knowledge acquired through anumāna and Agama.
In case of ayogi, he can see what is happening in front of his eyes at present. In case of yogi, this goes beyond the limitations of time and space. The extent of this 'super ability' depends on the individual capacity of yogi. Again, yogis are three kinds (ṛju, tāttvika and atāttvika). Any K(Y) or K(A) is significantly and enormously small compared to K(L).
If we denote the knowledge obtained through pratyakṣa as P, then this P is of seven kinds (based on svarūpendriya, shrotra(ears or hearing), tvak(skin or touch), chakṣu (eyes or seeing), jihva (tongue or tasting), ghrāṇa (nose or smelling) and manas (mind or thinking or memory). Let us denote them as PP, PS, PT, PC, PJ, PG and PM.
Also let us denote the knowledge obtained through anumāna as AN and that through Agama as AG.
Thus
K(G) = P(G) (Where P(G) is Pratyakṣa of God and as can be seen it is a universal set and no sub-divisions in this case)
K(L) = P(L) (where P(L) is Pratyakṣa of Lakṣmi which also does not have any subdivisions)
K(Y) = PP(Y) + PS(Y) + PT(Y) + PC(Y) + PJ(Y) + PG(Y) + PM(Y) + AN(Y) + AG(Y)
and
K(A) = PP(A) + PS(A) + PT(A) + PC(A) + PJ(A) + PG(A) + PM(A) + AN(A) + AG(A)
The above notation shows seven kinds of Pratyakṣa appearing in last two cases only and so Sri Jayatiirtha said "na sArvatrikaṁ" (not universal) for the seven-fold division. That is what Sri Raghavendratiirtha means in stating that "The seven-foldness is not connected with all souls".
Of course some of these can be null or zero, like for a totally blind, PC(A) is null and for one not exposed to AgamAs or not able to read them properly, AG(A) is null.
The four kinds of Pratyakṣa can be seen on the right hand side based on the left
hand side of the notation above.
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Pūrvapakṣa-17:
Dr. Z >> Commenting on Jayatiirtha, Raghavendratiirtha states that "The sevenfoldness is not connected with all souls". and Srinivasatiirtha further elaborates that this is not the case with īsha and Lakṣmi, since they are spiritual beings who perceive only through svarūpendriya. But Srinivasatiirtha's contention does not hold good for all the remaining souls, yogin, as well as ayogin, since they do possess a manas and all the five senses, and so their pratyakṣa is ubhayavidhendriyasannikarṣaṇātmaka "of the nature of contact with the two kinds of sense organs", as Jayatiirtha himself states.
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Siddhānta-17:
Sri Srinivasatiirtha said exactly what Sri Jayatiirtha and Sri Raghavendratiirtha said namely īsha and Lakṣmi do not have sevenfold division and others do have. Thus his contention does hold good.
Equating Kevala with Pratyakṣa and then seeing a contradiction is like equating an apple with orange and then expecting them to have the same juice.
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Pūrvapakṣa-18:
Ref: Page. 260 (article 1.5):
Jayatirtha is aware of the Jaina categorization of souls, but he does not use the Jaina terms. According to him, "Souls are three kinds. [They are] bound, have achieved yoga and are liberated"...To my knowledge, this threefold classification does not occur in Jaina texts; the tattvarthasutra (II, 10) distinguishes only samsarino muktās ca,"[souls] in samsāra and liberated [souls]"...we have already seen that the Dvaitins themselves have formulated a tripartite classification of souls as tamoyogya, nityāvarta and muktiyogya, which, although different, shows a similarity in gradation in view of the ultimate spiritual goal. Whereas the Dvaitin threesome assumes three different degrees of potentiality with regard to attaining mukti, the supposed Jaina threesome, in the form in which Jayatirtha gives it, assumes three different degrees of actuality in the souls' progression towards mukti. In any case, what Jayatirth tells us about the Jaina view is incorrect, and it seems that a contamination has taken place, in which a Dvaitin tendency to see three categories has also been ascribed to the Jainas.
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Siddhānta-18:
Let us first summarize what the author is saying.
============
Dr.Z >> 1. Jainas categorize souls as souls in samsara and liberated souls.
>> 2. Dvaitins have tendency to see three categories.
>> 3. Jayatirtha contaminated Jaina view by ascribing three categories to the Jainas.
>> 4. What Jayatirtha tells about the Jaina view is incorrect.
>> 5. Dvaitin threesome assumes three different degrees of potentiality wrt attaining mukti. The alleged jaina threesome assumes three different degrees of actuality in the souls' progression towards mukti.
===========
1. If there is no further classification of samsārins in Jainism, then it bears no resemblance to dvaita.
2. In dvaita, the souls are classified into muktas and amuktas and then amuktas are further classified into muktiyogyās (who are ucchās), nityāvartās (madhyās) and tamoyogyās (nīcās). The three categories exist among amukta (non-liberated) souls.
3. What is the need for Jayatirtha to contaminate the Jaina view? Is it to give an opportunity to those who want to accuse that something is borrowed from Jainism? In fact even this alleged ascribing makes only two categories out of samsarins (baddha and yogasiddha) and not three.
4. The author has committed a great blunder by not seeing the very next sutra in Jaina texts; the tattvarthasutra (II, 11) which classifies samsarins further "samanaskā'manaskāḥ", which means "[souls] with mind and [souls] without mind". This makes it threesome classification. If it is a contamination, then it existed in original Jaina texts itself. The terminology that Jayatirtha has used may have been used by the Jaina adversaries of his day. But that is not even relevant. It is beyond any dispute that the threesome classification existed in original Jaina texts. The "so called Dvaitin tendency" does not even come into picture.
What is worse is that the author has made a big time counting error.
In Dvaita system, the souls are classified into four categories
1. Muktās, 2. tamoyogyās, 3. nityāvartās, 4. muktiyogyās
In Jaina system (even with the alleged contamination), the souls are classified into three categories
1. Muktas, 2. baddha, 3. yogasiddha
(Or by original texts)
1. Muktas, 2. amanaskās, 3. samanaskās
5. Dvaitin Mukta and amukta classification is based on actuality. Further amukta classification into three is based on potentiality. Thus, both actuality and potentiality are taken into consideration in classification in dvaita.
Thus, the final conclusion is:
A. There is no Jaina influence or borrowing from Jainism as far as dvaita is concerned. There is no borrowing from Christianity either.
B. Jayatirtha has not contaminated by assigning threesome division to Jaina view.
C. The threesome classification existed in the original texts.
D. Even with or without the alleged accusations of contamination, there is no similarity either in number of divisions or type of divisions between the two systems.
śrī Kṛṣṇārpaṇamastu.
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the book is written in 1991. has the book's author's opinion about the subject changed? i am asking this since i think mr.zydenbos is the person who finds a mention several times in dr. bannanje acharya's pravachanas. i believe zydenbos also spoke during the acharya's 80th birth celebrations.
ReplyDeleteYes he did speak during the Acharya's 80th birth celebration. I also happened to speak there, but did not get a chance to speak to him about this. It is possible that he may have changed his mind. But did he publish officially explaining his new position and agreeing that his earlier position is wrong? This article is nothing personal against him. A neutral person may get confused seeing his article. The purpose of this is to prevent that. Thanks for your comment.
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